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The Evidence of Things Not Seent:
Non-Matches as Evidence of Innocence
James S. Liebman,* Shawn Blackburn," David Mattern **&Jonathan Waisno?'**
ABSTRACT Exonerationsfamously reveal that eyewitness identifications,
confessions, and other "direct" evidence can be false, though police and
jurors greatly value them. Exonerations also reveal that "circumstantial"
non-matches between culprit and defendant can be telling evidence of
innocence (e.g., an aspect of an eyewitness's description of the perpetrator
that does not match the suspect she identifies in a lineup, or a loose button
found at the crime scene that does not match the suspect's clothes). Although
non-matching clues often are easily explained away, making them seem
uninteresting, they frequently turn out to match the real culprit when
exonerations reveal that the wrong person was convicted. This Article uses
"non-exclusionary non-matches" and what would seem to be their polar
opposite, inculpatory DNA, to show that: (i)all evidence of identity derives
its power from the aggregation of individually uninteresting matches or
non-matches, but (2) our minds and criminal procedures conspire to hide
this fact when they contemplate "direct" and some "circumstantial"evidence
(e.g., fingerprints), making those forms of evidence seem stronger than they
are, while, conversely, (3) our minds and procedures magnify the
circumstantial character of non-exclusionary non-matches, making them
seem weaker than they are. We propose ways to use circumstantialmatches
and non-matches more effectively to avoid miscarriagesofjustice.
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INTRODUCTION: THE UNDERUSE OF NON-EXCLUSIONARY NON-MATCHES
To AVOID WRONGFUL CONVICTION

In 1998 in State v. Hayes, a New Orleans jury convicted juveniles Ryan
Matthews and Travis Hayes of the robbery-murder of a New Orleans store
owner., There was considerable evidence against the two. Witnesses
reported that a black male shot the robbery victim, then leapt into a getaway
car through an open passenger-side window and escaped.2 Police stopped
Hayes and Matthews in a vehicle resembling witnesses' description of the
getaway car.s Hayes confessed to the police that he drove the getaway car,
and that Matthews, who was high on marijuana, entered the store and ran
out after several gunshots.4 A witness identified Matthews as the man he saw
running from the store.5
Although strong, the evidence was deficient in some respects. Hayes was
6
borderline mentally retarded and confessed after six hours of interrogation.
His statements were modestly inconsistent with each other and with known
details of the crime.7 The make and model of the car Hayes was driving
when the two were arrested were not the same as witnesses reported, and the
car had a rolled up passenger-side window that had been inoperable for as
long as anyone could remember.8 The eyewitness who identified Matthews
watched the events through a rear-view mirror,9 and other eyewitnesses
could not identify Matthews and described the shooter as 5'6"- six inches
shorter than Matthews.- ° DNA on a ski mask left at the crime scene matched
neither defendant." None of the deficiencies excluded the possibility of
guilt, however, and the jury convicted both men. Hayes was sentenced to life
in prison and Matthews to death. 1
Shortly after the trial, Rondell Love was convicted of an unrelated
manslaughter and sentenced to twenty years in the Louisiana State
Penitentiary, where Matthews was awaiting execution.3 Love told other
i. SeeState v. Hayes, 2001-736, P. 2-3 & n.1 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/26/o); 8o6 So. 2d 816,
818 & n.1; Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., Trapped in the System, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2003), http://www.
nytimes.com/2003/o7/1 4 /opinion/trapped-in-the-system.html; Michael Perlstein, "A Forgotten
Man": Prosecutors Refuse To Reconsider Inmate's Case Despite Evidence SupportingHis Claim, TIMESPICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.) (Oct. 10, 2004), http://www.truthinjustice.org/travis-hayes.htm.
2. Perlstein, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Hayes, 8o6 So. 2d at 82o-21 & nn.9-o.
5. Id. at 820.
6. See Perlstein, supra note 1.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. Hayes, 8o6 SO. 2d at 819.
to. Herbert, supranote t.
1 1. Perlstein, supra note 1.
12. See id.
13. See Herbert, supra note i.
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inmates that he had committed the murder for which Matthews was
condemned.,4 Matthews got wind of Love's claims and reported them to his
lawyers who obtained DNA testing of the ski mask at the scene. The results
implicated Love, who at 5'7" and medium build matched the witnesses'
6
descriptions.'5 Matthews and Hayes were eventually exonerated.'
In 1983 in State v. DeLuna, a jury convicted Carlos DeLuna of stabbing a
young female Hispanic clerk to death at a Diamond-Shamrock gas station in
Corpus Christi, Texas.'7 The main evidence at the trial was a night-time
show-up identification of DeLuna by the sole eyewitness to the singleperpetrator crime, who had seen the assailant escape on foot.'8 Again, there
were discrepancies, including the eyewitness's initial description of the
shabbily dressed, mustachioed, and bewhiskered "derelict" he saw struggling
with the victim;,9 fingerprints found at the scene; and the blood-soaked
scene itself, none of which matched the blood-free white dress shirt, dress
pants, and shoes worn by the clean-shaven DeLuna when he was arrested
shortly after the killing2o The crime was captured on a 911 phone call from
the store clerk.2" Police arrested DeLuna three blocks away, cowering under
a pick-up truck."2 DeLuna testified that he had seen an acquaintance named
Carlos Hernandez wrestling with the clerk inside the store and fled when he
heard sirens coming because he had been drinking in violation of his parole
conditions.'s A police officer testified that he scoured police records for a
"Carlos Hernandez" matching the eyewitness description of the assailant but
found none.'4 The prosecutor dubbed Hernandez a "phantom" and DeLuna

14.
15.
16.

Perlstein, supra note i.
See Herbert, supra note i.
Elisabeth Salemme, Gallery of the Exonerated: Travis Hayes and Ryan Matthews, TIME,

http://wv.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/o,288o4,162 73 68-1627 3 66-1627 3 89,00.ht
ml (last visited Oct. 3, 2012) (noting that Matthews was exonerated in June 2004 and released
in December 2oo06, following eight years in prison).
17.
SeeJames S. Liebman et al., Los Tocayos Carlos, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 711, 724,
1019 (2012); Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, "1 Didn't Do It. But I Know Who Did," CHI. TRIB.
(June 25, 2oo6) [hereinafter Mills & Possley, "IDidn'tDo It"], http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/chi-tx-1-story,o,6 5 39t 5.story; Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, A Phantom, or the Killer?, CHI.
TRIB. (June 26, 20o6) [hereinafter Mills & Possley, A Phantom], http://articles.chicagotribune.
com/2oo6-o6-26/news/o6o626o8gs _jurors-hernandez-home-gas-station; Maurice Possley 9c
Steve Mills, Did One Man Die for Another Man's Crime?, CHI. TRIB. (June 27, 2oo6), http://
articles.chicagotribune.com/2 oo6-o6-2 7/news/o6o6270 137-1 -gas-station-stabbed-killing;
see
also Karen Boudrie Greig, Last Callfrom Death Row: Seeking the Truth During a Final Conversation,
NEW ORLEANS MAG., Aug. 2012, at 94.
18. Mills & Possley, "IDidn'tDo It, " supra note 17.
19. See Liebman et al., supra note 17, at 9o9.
20.
Seeid. at 912.
21.
Mills& Possley, "[Didn't Dolt," supra note 17.
22.
Id.
23. Liebman et al., supra note 17, at 994.
24. Id. at 999.
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a "liar" for fabricating him.25 During DeLuna's appeals, an affirming court
expressed "substantial doubt that Carlos Hernandez even existed."26 DeLuna
was quietly executed in 1989.27
Seventeen years later, the senior author of this Article, and later the
Chicago Tribune, reinvestigated the case and discovered that Carlos
8
Hernandez existed and was well-known to Corpus Christi law enforcement.2
Three years before the convenience store stabbing, the detective and
assistant district attorney handling that case had considered Hernandez a
prime suspect in the beating and knifing death of another young Hispanic
woman.2 9 Although the detective and prosecutor eventually arrested and
tried a different man, he was acquitted after the man's attorney marshaled
evidence that Hernandez was the culprit. Like DeLuna, Hernandez was 5'8"
tall and weighed 16o pounds, as was the man the eyewitness described to
police immediately after the crime. In the subsequent reinvestigation,
relatives of both Carloses mistook one for the other when shown pictures of
the two taken within weeks of the gas station killing.3o
Shortly after the killing, and for years afterwards, Hernandez told
associates that he, not DeLuna, committed the crime.3' Eight months before
DeLuna was executed, Hernandez stabbed another young Hispanic woman
nearly to death with a lock-blade buck knife identical to the one found at the
Diamond-Shamrock crime scene.32 Hernandez had previously confessed the
Diamond-Shamrock stabbing to this woman, and in the midst of attacking
her, told her she was going to suffer the same fate because she insisted on
dating another man.33
Hernandez's characteristic modes of dress and grooming at the time of
the convenience store murder, and many other traits that did not match
DeLuna, did match the eyewitness's initial description of the assailant.34

25.

Id.at

1002.

26. DeLuna v. McCotter, No. C-86-2 34 , slip op. at 8 (S.D. Tex.June 13, 1988), available at
http://www3 .law.columbia.edu/hrlr/Itc/sources/deluna-v-mccotter-s-d-tex-june-l 3-1988.pdf.
27.
Mills & Possley, A Phantom, supra note 17.
28. Liebman et al., supra note 17, passim.
29. Id. at 720-21, 846-48, 853-66.
30. Id. at 898-9oo. The profile view in the photographs is the same one the eyewitness
had as he watched the assailant flee. See infra Figure i.
31. Liebman et al., supra note 17, at 876-82, 889-93.
32.
Id. at 1093-98.
33. Id. at 1092-97.
34. See infra Figure 2 (analyzing matching and non-matching evidence in DeLuna).
Hernandez died in prison in 1999. Liebman et al., supranote 17, at 721, 1098-99.
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FIGURE 1

Carlos DeLuna (left) two weeks before the killing for which he was
executed. Carlos Hernandez (right) two months after that killing, upon his
arrest with a knife behind another convenience store. Hernandez wore a
moustache his entire adult life, except in the weeks after the DiamondShamrock killing.

When considering what went wrong in cases like Matthews/Hayes and
DeLuna, commentators typically focus on the mishandling of what might be
called "big" evidence of identity-evidence that by itself is likely to impress a
jury, such as Hayes's confession and the show-up identification of DeLuna.35
These observers point out that identifications,3 6 confessions,37 and "snitch"
35.
See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) ("A confession is like no
other evidence . . . [and] 'is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be
admitted against [a defendant]."' (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139-40
(1968) (White, J., dissenting))); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 182 (1986) ("[A]
confession makes the other aspects of a trial in court superfluous, and the real trial, for all
practical purposes, occurs when the confession is obtained." (quoting MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE 316 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
36.
See, e.g., BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 13 (1995) (describing studies suggesting that
eyewimess identifications are mistaken approximately 35% of the time); BRANDON L. GARRETT,
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 45-83 (2o11)
(linking eyewitness misidentifications revealed by DNA exonerations to suggestive police
procedures, including stacked lineups and prejudicial remarks by police to witnesses); Kevin
Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of CircumstantialEvidence, 1o 5 MICH. L. REV. 241, 248-49,
252-54 (2oo6) (documenting high error rates in eyewitness identifications); Katherine R.
Kruse, InstitutingInnocence Reform: Wisconsin's New GovernanceExperiment, 2oo6 WIS. L. REV. 645,
652-55 (summarizing mistaken-identity literature); Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a
ReasonableDoubt? Reconsidering UncorroboratedEyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1487 (2oo8); Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, The Other-Race Effect in Eyewitness
Identifications: What Do We Do About It?, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'VY & L. 230 (2001).
37.
See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 36, at 22-33 (describing interrogation procedures
eliciting false confessions); Heller, supra note 36, at 248-49, 254 (summarizing research
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testimonys 8 (another classic example of influential identity evidence) are less
reliable than jurors think. To cut such evidence down to size, these critics
advocate expert testimony about the foibles of eyewitness identifications and
confessions,s9 cautionary instructions about informant testimony,40 or
exclusion of evidence unless it was collected through state-of-the-art
techniques such as double-blind lineups and videotaped confessions.4'
Exoneration cases such as Hayes/Matthews and reinvestigation cases such
as DeLuna reveal a second type of indicative evidence, which commentators
typically ignore. In almost all of these cases, police arrested, prosecutors
tried, andjurors convicted the defendant despite multiple "non-exclusionary
non-matches" between the defendant and potentially evidential traces from
the crime scene that later were matched to the "real killer." "Nonexclusionary non-matches" arise when a suspect or defendant demonstrably
was not the source of bits of potential evidence associated with a crime that
might have been left by the perpetrator but might also have appeared for

indicating that jurors give excessive weight to confessions); Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing
Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2oo6 Wis. L.
REV. 479.
38. See, e.g.,
GARRETT, supra note 36, at 123-39; ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING:
CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2oo9); Stephen S. Trott, Words
of WarningforProsecutorsUsing Criminals as Witnesses, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1394 (1996); Ellen
Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with FederalProsecutors:Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68
FORDHAM L. REV.9 17, 9 5 3 (1999).
39. See, e.g.,
James M. Doyle, Learningfrom Errorin American CriminalJustice, ooJ. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY lo9 (2010) (advocating expert testimony about problems with eyewitness
identifications); Cindy J. O'Hagan, When Seeing Is Not Believing: The Case for Eyewitness Expert
Testimony, 81 GEO. L.J. 741, 744-47 (1993) (advocating use of expert testimony on difficult
memorization process required in making identifications and effect of light, movement,
duration of encounter, and weapons); cf. People v. Santiago, 958 N.E.2d 874, 88o-84 (N.Y.
2011) (overturning conviction because trial court excluded expert testimony on risks
accompanying eyewitness identifications that are cross-ethnic, expressed with confidence, and
based on observations made at gunpoint).
40.
See, e.g., Aaron M. Clemens, Note, Removing the Market for Lying Snitches: Reforms To
Prevent Unjust Convictions, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 151, 235-42 (2004) (proposing polygraph
examinations and other ways to deter false statements byjailhouse informants).
41. See, e.g., Alan M. Gershel, A Review of the Law inJurisdictionsRequiringElectronic Recording
of Custodial Interrogations, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2010) (advocating videotaping of
interrogations); Kruse, supra note 36, at 66o & n.71, 661-62 (discussing videotaping of
interrogations and sequential, double-blind eyewitness lineups); Thomas P. Sullivan, Police
Experiences with Recording Custodial Interrogations, 88 JUDICATURE 132, 132-33 (2004); John
Schwartz, Changes to Police Lineup Procedures Cut Eyewitness Mistakes, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/20l1/og/1g/us/changes-to-police-lineup-procedures-cuteyewitness-mistakes-study-says.html (describing evidence that sequential, double-blind lineups
"catch fewer innocent suspects"); John Schwartz, New OrleansPolice, Mired in Scandal, Accept Plan
for Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2o12/07/25/us/plan-toreform-new-orleans-police-department.html (describing consent decree adopted by the U.S.
Department of Justice and New Orleans Police Department in which the latter agreed to
videotape all sexual assault and homicide interrogations from start to finish and to revise
eyewitness identification procedures to avoid police influence on witnesses).
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reasons having nothing to do with the crime. The police, prosecutors, and
jurors in these cases no doubt acted against the defendant, despite the nonmatches, precisely because the non-matches were "non-exclusionary": they
had explanations consistent with the defendant's guilt, and thus did not
exclude him as the guilty party or prove his innocence.42
Examples include the non-match in the Hayes/Matthews case between
the make and model of the car witnesses linked to the killing and the car
Hayes was driving, between the open passenger-side window of the car
through which the robber was said to have jumped and the fact that the
passenger window on Hayes's car had been stuck in a rolled-up position for
years, and between the 5'6" assailant witnesses described and Matthews 6'1"
frame.4s Examples from the DeLuna case are collected in Figure 2. Of
twenty-nine traces associated with the crime, three match neither DeLuna
(executed for the crime) nor Hernandez (who told associates he committed
the crime). Seven more were never tested as to either man due to police
inaction-for example, large amounts of blood found at the crime scene
and evidence visible in the investigating officers' photographs that they
never noticed, including bloody shoe prints and a wad of chewed gum spat
onto the floor. Only seven of the twenty-nine traces match DeLuna, all seven
of which also match Hernandez: height, weight, ethnicity, sex, hair color,
hair style, and cigarette brand. Of the twelve remaining non-matches as to
DeLuna, two were never tested as to Hernandez (now deceased), and the
remaining ten match Hernandez-including age, clothing, moustache, and
weapon of choice. Although the jury convicted DeLuna based in part on the
seven matches, it never knew that seventeen or more traits matched
Hernandez, including all seven that matched DeLuna.

42.
In contrast, exculsionaty non-matches exonerate the defendant when the culprit must
have left a trace that the defendant could not have left. Examples are non-matching singlesource DNA found in semen in the vagina of a rape victim immediately after the crime or nonmatching fingerprints encased in the victim's blood on the murder weapon. Even these
matches are not absolutely exclusionary given the possibility of a frame-up or laboratory
mistake.
43. See Lisa L. Smith et al., UnderstandingJurorPerceptionsof ForensicEvidence: Investigating the
Impact of Case Context on Perceptionsfor Forensic Evidence Strength, 56 J. FORENSIC Sci. 409, 409
(2011 ) ("Current forensic science techniques are capable of recovering and analyzing a wide
range of materials (e.g., glass, fibers, paint, gun-shot residue) that can be used to establish a
connection between a source and a criminal act or crime scene .... They have decreased the
quantity of trace material required to conduct useful comparative analyses.").
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FIGURE 244

Eyewitness
description of
killer

Traces
found by
police at
crime scene

Traces not
found by
police but
visible in their
photos or seen
by others

Man seen
nearby

Total

Matches only
DeLuna
14. Winston
Cigarettes

1.5'8"
Matches
DeLuna and
Hernandez

2. 16o lbs

3.Hispanic
4. Male
5. Black hair
6. Wavy hair
7. Mid/late

Matches only

Hernandez

7

2os

8. Moustache
9.Unshaven
io. "Derelict"
(shabby,
unkempt
clothes)
1 1.Red plaid

15.Lock-blade
buck knife
16.Maroon
button

29.

Man seen
earlier
lurking
outside gas
station at
McArdle &
Kostoryz

10

flannel shirt or
jacket
12. White or light
grey sweatshirt
13. Blue jeans
Does not
match
DeLuna;
untested as to
Hernandez

Untested as
to both

17. Cash drawer
short $2o-

23.

Clump of hair
on floor

$6o
2

18.Blood pools, 24. Bloody palm
prints
smears,
spatter
25. Bloody shoe
19. Cigarette
prints
fragment
26. Cement chunks
27. Wad of chewed
gum
28. Beer cans
(saliva)

Does not
match either

2o. Fingerprintphone
2a. Fingerprintdoor
22. Fingerprintbeer can

3

44. The information in Figure 2 is taken from Liebman et al., supra note 17, at 731-84,
9o8-27 and figs.3, 8-1o, 23 & 25-29.
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It is not surprising that police, prosecutors, and jurors in the
Hayes/Matthews and DeLuna cases dismissed these "small" non-matches"small" because they were easily explained away on grounds unrelated to the
defendant's guilt or innocence-and focused instead on confessions,
eyewitness identifications, and other "big" evidence of identity. No one
begrudges a prospector for gold who ignores tiny flecks of the stuff in a
stream bed while seeking the mother lode up the canyon side. Compared to
the tedious task of accumulating enough flecks to add up to a real stake, the
prospect of striking it rich with the discovery of a large single vein is hard to
pass up. This Article argues, however, that systematically aggregating more
of the small flecks and putting less faith in the deceptive allure of big lodes
of evidence could generate more evidence of identity and a decrease in
wrongful conviction.
In Part II, we use both hypothetical and actual examples to illustrate
how systematically aggregative analysis of non-matching bits of evidence
might improve the accuracy of answers police, prosecutors, and jurors reach
on the "Whodunit?" question. The English courts' rejection of aggregative
analysis in the actual case discussed in Part II prompts our examination in
Part III of the reasons courts give for resisting efforts to quantify the conjoint
effect of small bits of non-dispositive evidence in resolving the identity
question. The classic case is People v. Collins, which overturned a California
robbery conviction premised in part on a prosecutor's effort to quantify the
overall effect of several individually non-dispositive matches between the two
defendants in the case and what was known about the interracial couple that
committed the robbery.45 Although decided over forty years ago and easily
distinguished based on the prosecutor's flawed methodology and barely
concealed racial ulterior motive, the case continues today to provide part of
the intellectual basis for resisting probabilistic proof generally.
Part IV responds to the Collins critique by showing that the courts
themselves have rejected the critique of probabilistic evidence in actual
practice through their enthusiastic embrace of inculpatory DNA evidence.
With DNA evidence as our prime example, and confession, eyewitness
identification, and fingerprint evidence as supporting cases, we elucidate the
often acknowledged fact that all evidence is probabilistic4 6 with a
demonstration of a less obvious fact: the high probabilities associated with
these and other supposedly "unique" traits matching suspect to culprit are in
fact the aggregate result of multiple matches of non-unique, often very
common traits. Other things being equal, the more non-unique matching
45. People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 41-42 (Cal. 1968).
46. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. RFV.
1477, 1508 (1999) ("It is now generally recognized, even by the judiciary, that since all
evidence is probabilistic-there are no metaphysical certainties-evidence should not be
excluded merely because its accuracy can be expressed in explicitly probabilistic terms .. );
infra note 104 and accompanying text.
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traits subsumed by any given DNA sample, confession, eyewitness
identification, fingerprint, or other piece of "big evidence," the more
probative weight the evidence has. DNA evidence reveals, as well, that there
is no reason in principle to shield even lay jurors from the formal
quantification of the aggregate effect of non-unique bits of evidence into a
stated probability that the defendant was responsible for the existence of
evidence associated with a crime. DNA thus gives the lie to Collins's most farreaching claim-that formal analysis of the aggregate effect of non-unique
matching traits is anathema to accepted modes of judicial fact finding. As
Part IV also develops, the adversary system's swift and dramatic improvement
of forensic DNA analysis, along with the burgeoning capacity of data-mining
techniques to reveal the frequency of millions of traits in relevant
populations and environments, neutralize Collins's lesser, more technical
reasons for rejecting formal aggregative analysis in criminal trials. What is
true for trials is even truer for investigations and prosecutorial decision
making, where our commitments to adversarial judicial proceedings and
jury decision making are not limiting factors.
There are, however, other obstacles to using aggregative analysis of
matches and non-matches in criminal investigations, trials, and appeals. Part
V addresses three categories of barriers: cognitive, structural, and legal.
Focusing mainly on the use of non-exclusionary non-matches to decrease
the likelihood of arresting, charging, and convicting the innocent, Part V
shows how heuristic economization interacts with the structure of trials to
reinforce legal resistance to the aggregative use of "small" evidence and
discourage use of the adversarial system to discipline and improve
aggregative analysis. In Part VI, we chart two intersecting paths around these
obstacles. One is provided by emerging tools designed to make aggregative
analysis more intuitively accessible to investigators and jurors. The other is
the use of management-based regulation, along with the adversarial system,
to discipline systematic steps to pan for small but cumulatively powerful
flecks of evidence of identity in criminal investigations and trials.
II. THE AGGREGATE POWER OF NON-EXCLUSIONARY NON-MATCHES ON THE
QUESTION OF IDENTITY

The Hayes/Matthews and DeLuna cases suggest that fuller attention to
non-exclusionary non-matches might avoid miscarriages ofjustice. This Part
uses two examples--one stylized, the other from an actual case-to show
how systematically aggregating the effect of multiple non-matches, none of
which is very probative by itself, can generate more accurate results.
A. PEOPLE V. ADAMSON REwSED
Although Anglo-American courts resist such analysis, Bayes' Theorem
may be used to demonstrate deductively the power of non-exclusionary non-
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matches to distinguish probably guilty from probably innocent defendants
whom intuitive decision makers would likely treat as equally guilty.47
To show how, we use a hypothetical example based on a familiar case,
People v. Adamson.48 In Adamson, police investigated a murder of an elderly
white woman in Los Angeles. The victim was found in her home without any
stockings on, but police found the bottom half of a pair of women's
stockings nearby. The top halves of the stockings were missing. Suspicion
came to rest on Dewey Adamson, a black middle-aged man. When the police
located him and searched his house, they found one cut-off stocking top on
his dresser and two more in a drawer. Although the stocking tops in
Adamson's possession did not match the bottoms found at the crime scene,
evidence of both was admitted against Adamson at trial. On appeal, the
California and United States Supreme Courts rejected Adamson's
evidentiary and due process claims that the stocking evidence should have
been excluded as more prejudicial than probative.49
The case is a favorite of evidence teachers because it illustrates the
judgment calls and cultural biases that can afflict the assessment of probative
weight and prejudice.5o When the case arose in the 1940s, evidently the only
source of both probative weight and prejudice that the white lawyers and
judges in the case could identify was an inference of sexual perversion-a
man's interest in women's stocking tops. The all-white jury in the cases' also
may have seen only that type of "match" between the culprit and Adamson.
The problem, of course, is that at the time, African-American men
frequently used stocking tops in the process of "conking," or using chemicals
to straighten their hair.52
47. See 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY app. 6A at 398-400 (2010-201 1 ed. 201 o) (describing deductive nature
of Bayesian logic); ATHANASIOS PAPOULIS, PROBABILITY, RANDOM VARIABLES, AND STOCHASTIC
PROCESSES 38-39, 78-8 1, 112-14 (2d ed. 1984) (deriving Bayes' Theorem mathematically).
48. People v. Adamson (Adamson 1), 165 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1946), affd, Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 (1947). The United States Supreme Court's decision in Adamson v. Californiais best
known for the debate it engendered over whether the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause incorporates the Fifth Amendment. Compare Adamson v. California (Adamson II), 332
U.S. 46, 5g-68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (resisting incorporation), with id. at 68-92
(BlackJ, dissenting) (advocating incorporation).
49. See Adamson II, 332 U.S. at 59 (majority opinion) (concluding that the California
court's holding that the stocking "tops were admissible as evidence because this 'interest in
women's stocking tops is a circumstance that tends to identify defendant' as the perpetrator"
did not violate the Constitution (quoting Adamson I, 165 P.2d at 7)).
50.
See, e.g., ERIC D. GREEN ET AL., PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 69 ( 3 d
ed. 2000);JACK B. WEINSTEIN ETAL., CASES AND MATERIALS: EVIDENCE 6 (9th ed. 1997).
5 1. People v. Adamson (Adamson III), 2 10 P.2d 13, 15 (Cal. 1949) (denying Adamson's
claim that the all-white jury that convicted him violated his equal protection and due process
rights).
52.
See AYANA D. BYRD & LORI L. THARPS, HAIR STORY: UNTANGLING THE ROOTS OF BLACK
HAIR IN AMERICA 43-57 (2OO1); MALCOLM X WITH ALEX HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
MALCOLM X 52-56 (1964).
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The case also illustrates the mathematical definitions of relevance,
probative weight, and prejudice that Richard Lempert famously introduced
to legal audiences.5s Under Lempert's definition, evidence is relevant as
long as two probabilities are different-the probability that the evidence
would exist if the defendant is the perpetrator and the probability that the
evidence would exist if the defendant is not the perpetrator.54 Stated
mathematically, evidence is irrelevant if P (E/G)/ P (E/not G) = i. Probative
weight then is the numerator divided by the denominator, except when that
equals i. Additionally, one form of prejudice-"misestimation"-is defined
by the difference between that sum and the sum the jury is likely to arrive at
intuitively.55 For example, the jury may miscalculate the denominator
value-the probability that the evidence would exist though the defendant is
not guilty-because the jurors don't know that African-American men often
use women's stocking tops as a hair-care implement.s6
We modify the Adamson example for another purpose: to illustrate the
use of Bayes' Theorem to calculate the aggregate value of non-exclusionary
non-matches and demonstrate the existence of reasonable doubt that
otherwise might escape the decision maker's attention. We begin with an
insight of Professors Eric D. Green, Charles R. Nesson, and Peter L. Murray.
Although they did not describe it quite this way, they used Adamson to
identify an evidentiary mistake that undermines the accuracy of intuitive
estimates of the numerator probability in the likelihood-ratio calculation of
relevance and probative weight.s7 Building on their insight, we suppose that
the case arose in 2012, not 1946, and that Adamson is white, not black.
Police arrive at the victim's home, where she lived alone, five minutes after a
neighbor reports hearing her scream. The police immediately spot several
attributes of the crime scene that provide clues to the identity of the culprit:

53. Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1977). In the
discussion in text here, we use the conventional definition of probative weight as the likelihood
ratio itself-its numerator divided by its denominator. See, e.g., D.H. Kaye & Jonathan J.
Koehler, The Misquantification of Probative Value, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 645, 649 (2003)
(noting and citing authority for the proposition that "[t]he [likelihood ratio itself] is a common
measure of probative value in law"). Other definitions have been proposed. See, e.g., id. at 649
n.8 (noting statistical reasons for preferring the log-likelihood ratio as a definition of probative
weight). We use a different one below, namely, the absolute value of the likelihood-ratio
numerator minus its denominator divided by its numerator. See infra note 26o and
accompanying text.
54. SeeLempert, supra note 53, at 1026.
55. See id. at 1027.
56. Magnifying the potential for prejudice is the concern that, when the numerator value
is high-when, as here, there is a high probability that if the defendant in a case in which the
perpetrator ran off with the victim's stocking tops is guilty, we would find that he has an interest
in women's stocking tops-jurors may forget to ask the denominator question: how often
innocent defendants may have an interest in women's stocking tops. See infra Part V.A. 4
(discussing the "uniqueness fallacy").
57. GREEN ETAL., supra note 50, at 70-71.
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(i) missing stocking tops;

(2) the victim's wounds, which suggest that the
powerful fatal blows were delivered left-handed; (3) a description-"early
forties, balding, 5'3" tall"-by a male neighbor, who was one of two people
who saw a man standing outside the victim's home as each passed by within
minutes of the time a third neighbor heard a scream; and (4) a shopper's
complaint to a police officer on foot a block away, soon after the scream was
heard, that "this white guy with green eyes just ran hell-bent down the street,
nearly knocking me over as I came out of the supermarket" and sped off in
the same direction, away from the victim's home. Shortly after that, police
get an anonymous tip that Adamson committed the crime and go to his
nearby apartment to talk to him. They bring the two neighbor-witnesses
with them. Adamson steps outside his apartment where he lives alone, giving
the witnesses a good look at him. The male neighbor says he can't say
whether Adamson is the man he briefly saw outside the victim's house. The
female neighbor identifies Adamson as the man she saw there a few minutes
after the male neighbor passed by and two minutes before the scream was
heard.
The police arrest Adamson. They search his home and find several sets
of women's stocking tops in his possession, none matching the stocking
bottoms found near the victim. Adamson is twenty-nine years old, 5'8", righthanded, with a full head of hair and brown eyes.
At trial, the state calls the female neighbor to testify that she saw a man
outside the victim's home, that she accompanied police to Adamson's house
and identified him there, and that she is sure he is the man she saw at the
victim's home. Thereafter, the prosecution introduces evidence of the
missing stocking tops at the crime scene and the sets of women's stocking
tops found in Adamson's home. A detective testifies that, after initially
surmising that the fatal blows to the victim were from the assailant's left
hand, she later backed off of that conclusion because a right-handed
assailant could have struck the fatal blows with his left hand. The defense
then presents evidence establishing Adamson's height, weight, eye color,
and right-handedness and calls both the male neighbor to describe the 5'3",
balding forty-year-old man he saw near the crime scene and the shopper
who was nearly knocked over by a green-eyed sprinter headed away from the
crime scene.
In closing argument, the prosecutor dismisses the men those two
witnesses described as being different from the man the female neighbor
saw at the victim's house just before the crime and identified as Adamson.
Based on that identification and the subsequent discovery that Adamson
shares the culprit's interest in women's stocking tops, the prosecutor urges
the jury to convict him.
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As Professors Green, Nesson, and Murray suggested, the prosecutor's
theory may entice the jury into multiple missteps.5s First, the jury may
underestimate the denominatorprobability that innocent men have a use for
women's stocking tops. Second, the inference of perversion from the
stocking-top evidence may prejudice the jury against the defendant
irrespective of his connection to the crime.
Less obviously, however, the jury also may overestimate the numerator
probability-that a suspect arrested for a crime in which the victim's
stocking tops disappeared would be found to have stocking fragments. The
proper estimation of the numerator in fact is how probable it is that the
suspect would match that stocking-tops clue but not match the other cluesfor example, the left-handed blows the detective initially associated with the
killing; the male neighbor's description of a man at the victim's house as a
short, balding forty-year-old; and the shopper's encounter with a green-eyed
man running hell-bent away from the crime scene. As Professors Green,
Nesson, and Murray pointed out,59 however, once the defendant is arrested
based on evidence that does match him-once the case turns from a
"Whodunit?" to a "Did Adamson do it?"-we can expect participants in the
case to limit the numerator question to the matching stocking-top evidence
and ignore the non-matching handedness, height, hair, age, and eye-color
clues. The same would be true if, for example: (1) police had found a
partially smoked cigarette on the floor just inside the home of the victim,
who was a nonsmoker; (2) the female neighbor had told police that the man
at the victim's house wore a brown sweatshirt; and yet (3) police found no
brown sweatshirt in Adamson's possession or evidence that he smoked.
We can now apply Bayes' Theorem to this embellished hypothetical
example to demonstrate that the attention the trial participants do-or,
predictably, do not-give to the non-matching evidence could be the
difference between an accurate, reasonable-doubt acquittal and a false
conviction. Suppose that after hearing the female neighbor's testimonyand taking due account of the fact that the man she saw might not have
been the killer, and that her albeit confident and unshakeable identification
might be mistaken-the jury concludes there is an 85% chance Adamson
was the killer. After hearing additional evidence that the victim's stocking
tops were missing and Adamson had non-matching stocking tops in his
possession, the jury raises the probability that Adamson is guilty to 98% and

58. Id. (listing "risk[s] of overvaluing" trace evidence matching the defendant: (i) at trial,
where only a single suspect is in view, matching evidence looms larger than it more
appropriately does during investigations when the possibility of multiple suspects, many of
whom may match the trait, is front of mind; (2) too little attention is paid to evidence at the
scene that does not match a known suspect; and (3) "leav[ing] it to the defense to fill out the
context to offset any tendencies of the evidence to mislead" exposes defendants "to risks of
inadequate defense representation").
59. See id.

20131

THE EVIDENCE OF THINGS NOT SEEN

is prepared to convict. The jury (predictably) is not much moved by defense
evidence and argument emphasizing the non-exclusionary non-matches,
and thereafter lowers the probability of guilt only to 97%.
Finally, suppose the trial judge takes two highly unusual steps. First, she
gets special verdicts from the jury with the probabilities noted above.
Second, at a hearing on Adamson's motion for relief from a judgment of
conviction, she lets a defense expert present evidence, based on census data
and information mined from nearby surveillance cameras and retail sales,
that 1 i% of adult males in the area are left-handed or ambidextrous; 5%
own brown sweatshirts; and io% smoke cigarettes. Based on this data, and
on the 98% probability of guilt that the jury estimated after hearing the
prosecution's case, the expert calculates the effect on the jury's estimate of a
proper evaluation of the five non-matching traits: the left-handedness clue;
the male neighbor's description of a short, balding forty-year-old at the
victim's house; the shopper's encounter with a green-eyed sprinter; the
brown sweatshirt; and the cigarette.
The expert begins with Bayes' Theorem, which demonstrates
mathematically that the probability of an event-here, Adamson's guiltafter each new bit of evidence is the prior odds of the event multiplied by the
probative value of the new bit of evidence. Probative value is measured using
the likelihood ratio introduced above: the probability that the new piece of
evidence would be present if the defendant is guilty (P(E/G)) divided by the
probability that the same evidence would appear if the defendant is not
guilty (P(E/not G))60:
(priorodds of guilt) x (likelihood ratio associated with new evidence) = subsequent odds of guilt
Or: (priorodds of guilt) x (P(E/G)/ P(E/not G)) = subsequent odds of guilt
The expert treats the prior odds of guilt as 98-to-2, corresponding to

the 98% probability of guilt that the jury found after hearing the state's case.
The expert then analyzes the effect of each non-match, starting with the
detective's initial belief that the killer administered the fatal blows with a left
fist. Laying aside credibility issues for now, the expert estimates the
likelihood-ratio numerator-the chance that the assailant would have
delivered such powerful blows left-handed if he, like Adamson, were righthanded-as 5%. The expert then estimates the denominator probabilitythat the evidence would be present if someone other than Adamson
committed the crime-as 15.45%. This number represents the rate of nonright-handers in the population (11%), plus the rate of right-handers (89%)
multiplied by the 5% possibility that a right-hander used his left hand to
beat the victim (.o5 x.89 = 4.45 %).

6o.

For additional discussion of the likelihood ratio as a measure of probative value, see

supranotes 56-59 and accompanying text.
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As for the male witness's description of a short, balding forty-year-old
outside the victim's home, the expert conservatively posits a 75% probability
that, assuming Adamson is guilty, someone would have seen a man outside
the victim's house just before the crime and recalled him as 5'3", balding,
and forty-ish, though Adamson is '8", hirsute, and twenty-nine years old.
Assuming that a witness's recollection of the features of a man seen recently
are somewhat more likely to be accurate than not, the expert rates the
denominator probability-that the "short, bald, forty-ish" description would
have been made if someone besides Adamson were guilty-slightly higher at
8o%.6' The expert likewise rates the probability of a woman seeing someone
running from the crime scene who is not Adamson (given his non-matching
eye color) as lower if Adamson is guilty (the numerator) than if he is not
guilty (the denominator) because the latter, but not the former, probability
includes the possibility that the sprinter was the fleeing assailant. The expert
estimates the numerator as io% and the denominator as 20%.
Next, given that neither the victim nor Adamson smokes, the expert
rates the numerator probability of finding a cigarette in the victim's house if
Adamson is guilty as fairly low-say 2o%. But if Adamson is not guilty, the
probability is higher that the killer left a cigarette behind at the scene-say
30%. Finally, reasoning that the killer likely discarded his tell-tale outer
clothing while escaping, the expert estimates a 7o% numerator probability
that, assuming Adamson is guilty, police would have found no brown
sweatshirt around him when he was arrested, though a brown-sweat-shirted
man was seen at the victim's house just before she screamed. Based on
information mined from surveillance cameras and retail sales revealing that
only 5% of men in the area wear brown sweatshirts, the denominator
probability-that the police would find no brown sweatshirt on or around an
innocent Adamson-is 95%.
The expert then uses Bayes' Theorem to calculate the effect on the
prior odds of each non-match, starting with the left-handed blows, which
reduces the odds of guilt from the jury's 98-to-2 (98%) to 15.8-to-i, or 94%:
(98/2)(5/15.5) = 490/31 = 15.8:1 -4 15.81(15.8 + I) = 94.1 %

Next, the male witness's description of the short bald man reduces the
15.8-to-i odds of Adamson's guilt to 14.1-to-i, or 93.7%:
(98/2)(5/-5.5)(75/8o)= (3 6, 750/2,48o) = 14.8:1 . 14.81(14.8 + 1) = 93.7 %

61.

If there is a 75% chance, assuming Adamson's guilt, that a witness would have seen

someone-Adamson or another person-outside the victim's home and described the person
as short, bald, and forty-ish, though Adamson is none of those things, then the chances must be
higher that the same thing would have happened if someone else were guilty. The two
possibilities are the same, except that the former includes the chance that the man seen was the
killer (Adamson) who was badly misdescribed, and the latter includes the somewhat greater
possibility that the man seen was the killer who was accurately described.
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In like fashion, the shopper's encounter with a green-eyed sprinter
reduces the probability to 88.1%; the cigarette reduces it to 83.2%; and the
sweatshirt evidence reduces it further to 78.5 %.62
When considered in isolation, the expert notes, none of the nonmatches is very probative. In the aggregate, however, the evidence may be
powerful enough to reduce the probability of innocence from a negligible
2% to more than a one-in-five chance, which would give most observers a
reasonable doubt. The expert acknowledges that little weight should be
placed on her precise estimates, in part because they ignore the possibility
that the jury doubted the veracity of one or another witness. The expert's
point, however, is not that her estimates and calculations are exact-a jury
would be free to substitute others-but only that the non-matches make a lot
more difference in the aggregate than separately. If, therefore, our
hypothesis is correct that the jury, unaided, is likely to consider and dismiss
each "small" non-match piecemeal-especially if the jury never hears about
some of them and downgrades the credibility of others due to excessive
confidence in the prosecutors' "big" evidence-there is reason to doubt the
jury's guilt determination. Part V provides support for each of these "if'
statements.
B.

R v. ADAMS REmStTED

Our stylized Adamson example illustrates how aggregative analysis of
non-exclusionary non-matches may reveal that a seemingly straightforward
case for a guilty verdict actually merits a reasonable doubt favoring the
defendant. A recent English case, R v. Adams, demonstrated the same
potential in practice. Although, channeling Collins, the British courts
ultimately rejected aggregative analysis, an examination of Adams suggests
what a number of British applied statisticians have said about the result: that
the cause of truth was ill-served. 63

62.

The effect of the five non-matches is as follows, depending upon the starting odds

after the state presented its case:
Percent Probability of Guilt
98

99

97

+ Left-handed blows

94.1

97.0

91.3

+ Short bald man at scene

93.7

96.8

90-7

+ Runner passing shopper

88.1

93.8

83.1

+ Cigarette

83.2

90.9

76.6

+ Brown sweatshirt

78.5

88.1

70.7

Prior probability (ID + stocking tops)

63.
See, e.g., MICHAEL LYNCH ET AL., TRUTH MACHINE: THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF DNA
FINGERPRINTING 218-19 (2008); Peter Donnelly, Appealing Statistics, 47 MED. SCI. & L. 14
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The rape victim in Adams described her assailant as a white, cleanshaven twenty to twenty-five year old, with a local accent. 64 After the police
arrested thirty-seven-year-old Denis Adams for reasons that are not entirely
clear from the opinions in the case, the victim could not pick him out of a
6
lineup and said he definitely was not her attacker, who was much younger. 5
The prosecution nonetheless conducted a DNA analysis, which generated a
match of Adams's nine genetic markers and the same nine found on a
vaginal swab taken the night of the rape. Those nine markers, the
prosecution told the jury, are present in only 1 in 2oo million men. 66 Adams
presented the victim's statement denying that Adams was her attacker, an
alibi corroborated by his girlfriend, and evidence that he had a brother
whose DNA might also match but was never tested. At trial, the prosecution's
experts admitted that the chances that Adams and his brother had the same
collection of genetic markers-1 in 22o-were close to ioo,ooo times
greater than the prosecution's i in 200 million figure. 67 Defense experts
testified that the "1 in 200 million" figure was itself ioo times too low, due to
sampling errors and use of sample sizes too small to provide confidence in
68
prosecution's estimate.
Adams and his attorneys were rightly concerned that the "1 in 200
million" probability based on nine matching markers would convince the
jury to dismiss as mistaken the victim's belief that Adams wasn't her rapist
and reject as perjured the alibi testimony of Adams's girlfriend. Defense
experts offered two responses. First, they countered with their own estimates
of 1 in 2 million (assuming sampling problems were corrected) and 1 in 220
(given the possibility that Adams's brother was the culprit). 69 Second, an
expert used Bayes' Theorem to show that even fairly modest chances that
the victim and girlfriend were telling the truth could substantially diminish
the probability of guilt from 5 5-to-1, or 98% (derived from the i-in-220
estimate) to 1-to-2, or only 33%.70 In essence, the defense expert used
Bayesian analysis as a mechanism for diminishing the effect of multiplying
the probabilities of the nine non-unique genetic-marker matches by
extending the equation to capture the contrary effect of the non(2007); L.A. Foreman et al., InterpretingDNA Evidence: A Review, 71 INT'L STAT. REv. 473 (2003);
J.P. Henderson, The Use of DNA Statistics in CriminalTrials, 128 FORENSIC SC. INT'L 183 (2002).
64. SeeR v. Adams (Adams 1),[1996] 2 Crim. App. 467 at 468 (Eng.).
65. See Donnelly, supra note 63, at 14.
66. See Adams 1, 2 Crim. App. at 468 ('The prosecution case rested entirely upon expert
evidence in relation to the DNA sample which was challenged by the defence,").
67. R v. Adams (Adams II), [1998] Crim. App. 377 at 379 (Eng.).
68. See Adams , 2 Crim. App. at 470 (discussing the defense estimate of the incidence of
the group of nine genetic markers in the population as 1 in 2 million); Adams II, Crim. App.
at 379 (discussing defense claims that the sample size was too small and that the prosecution
expert improperly used a pen to draw in a DNA band).
69. See supra notes 67-68.
7o. Adams I,
rim. App. at 477.
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exclusionary non-matches: the victim's contrary description of the culprit
and inability to identify Adams's and his girlfriend's alibi testimony.
Disregarding the expert testimony, the jury convicted Adams.
On appeal, the court reversed, finding that the trial judge had not
properly instructed the jury on how to use Bayesian analysis.7' On remand,
the trial judge walked the jury more carefully through the expert's analysis
and gave the jurors calculators to use in their deliberations.7 The jury
convicted again. On a second appeal, again alleging that the jury was
improperly instructed, the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal
affirmed. This time the court banned the use of Bayes' Theorem in future
criminal trials. In doing so, it validated dicta in its earlier decision that jurors
should "evaluate evidence and reach a conclusion not by means of a
formula, mathematical or otherwise, but by the joint application of their
individual common sense and knowledge of the world to the evidence
before them."7s English jurors had never before used Bayes' Theorem in
their deliberations, the court noted, and allowing them to do so would
"deflect[] them from their proper task."74
Ironically, this new canonical statement of Anglo-American courts'
reluctance to use aggregative analysis to add rigor to a jury's consideration
of non-exclusionary non-matches arose in a case in which the only evidence
of guilt was the statistically aggregated effect of a series of matches of nonunique genetic traits. Absent aggregative analysis-the very "mathematical
formulas" to inform jury deliberation that the court rejected in the process
of upholding Adams's conviction-the defendant could not have been
convicted or even charged with a crime. We reflect further on this irony in
Part IV, after delving more deeply into Anglo-American judicial resistance to
aggregative analysis in Part III.
III. JUDICIAL RESISTANCE TO AGGREGATIVE ANALYSIS OF MATCHES AND NONMATCHES

A.

OBJECTIONS TO PROBABILISTIC PROOFGENERALLY PEOPLE V. COLLINS

The classic American judicial decision rejecting aggregative analysis in
criminal cases is Collins, announced in 1968.75 At trial, the prosecutors called
a college mathematics instructor as an expert witness to quantify the
probability of the confluence of a set of traits shared by the interracial
couple that committed a Los Angeles robbery and the defendant couple,
generating a number indicating that there was a vanishingly small

71.

Id. at 482.

See Donnelly, supra note 63, at 16.
73. Adams 1, 2 Crim. App. at 481.
74. Adams II, i Crim. App. at 384 (quoting R v. Doheny, [1997] 1 Crim. App. 369 at 374
(Eng.) (quoting Adams 1, 2 Crim. App. at 48 1)).
75. People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968).
72.
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probability of finding a matching couple at random in Los Angeles and thus,
it was suggested, a vanishingly small chance that there was any other such
6
couple that could have committed the crime.7
The California Supreme Court overturned the resulting conviction.77 In
doing so, the court could have taken a narrower route, criticizing the
prosecutors for inventing an excuse to emphasize the one, weak, and
potentially prejudicial fact that they had to go on: that both the perpetrator
couple and the defendant couple were interracial. Alternatively, the court
might have rested its decision on methodological problems it identified with
the state's amateurish use of statistical evidence: the probabilities used were
estimated without data;78 the expert failed to show that the frequency of
each identifying trait was independent of the frequency of all others, or to
acknowledge that his analysis was invalid if the frequencies were not
independent (for example, he assigned separate probabilities to the fact that
the man had a beard and also a moustache, though the frequency of
moustaches is not independent of the frequency of beards) ;79 and the expert
asked the wrong question (how likely it is that a couple chosen at random
would have the traits of the culprit couple, though the defendant couple
were not arrested at random), rather than the correct question (how many
such couples there are in the relevant suspect pool: greater Los Angeles).8o
Instead, the court went on to give three reasons why even properly
implemented quantification was a bad idea: the jury would give undue
weight to statistical evidence presented by an expert in numeric form; 8' such
analysis was beyond the ken of the defense to understand and effectively
rebut;82 and most crucially, probabilistic evidence could never answer the
question presented, namely, "Of the admittedly few such couples [in Los
Angeles], which one, if any, was guilty of committing this robbery?"8s

76. Id. at 36-37. A blonde woman with a ponytail stole a woman's purse, then escaped in a
car driven by a black man with a moustache and beard. Id. at 34. Neither eyewitness could
identify the defendants, Malcolm Collins and his wife, Janet, as the perpetrators. Id. at 36.
Operating without data, the expert witness estimated frequencies for each trait of the
perpetrator couple that matched the defendant couple (e.g., oo for "[i]nterracial couple in
car") and multiplied the frequencies to provide an overall probability that a random couple
matching all of the traits would be found in Los Angeles in 1964. Id. at 36-37 & n.1o. The jury
found the defendants guilty. Id. at 33.
77. Id.
78. Id.at 38.
79. Id. at 38-39.
8o. Id. at 4o; see supra note 76 and accompanying text.
81.
Collins, 438 P.2d at 40-41 ("Confronted with an equation which purports to yield a
numerical index of probable guilt, few juries could resist the temptation to accord
disproportionate weight to that index....").
82. Id. at 41.
83. Id. at 40 (emphasis omitted) ("[N]o mathematical equation can prove beyond a
reasonable doubt (s) that the guilty couple infact possessed the characteristics described by the
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In the decades since Collins was decided, it has been approvingly cited
by courts in many American jurisdictions for the proposition that
aggregating probabilities associated with different items of matching
evidence is impermissible.8 4 The decision's reach and authority were
enhanced when the law clerk who assisted in its preparation, Laurence
Tribe, joined the Harvard Law faculty and wrote an extensive defense of the
decision that added a fourth argument even more sweeping than the
others.85 In Tribe's view, any assault on the admitted myth that trials can
achieve certainty, and any quantification of even a high probability of guiltand, perforce, any acknowledgement of even a minuscule probability of a
our system's deepest
convicted
defendant's innocence-violates
to
"fairness,"
trial
by
jury,
the
adversarial
system, and much
commitments
else that our criminal justice system holds dear.8 6 Tribe's 1971 article
extended this critique, which Collins had applied to the multiplication rule
used there, to a proposal to avoid the foibles of the multiplication rule by
using more sophisticated Bayesian analysis.87 Since then, many other
scholars have debated, and mainly endorsed and extended, Tribe's
objections to the use of systematic aggregative analysis to establish identity in
criminal process 8s

People's witnesses, or even (2) that only one couple possessing those distinctive characteristics
could be found in the entire Los Angeles area.").
84. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 444.
85. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARv. L. REV. 1329 (1971).

86. See id. at 1358-78; cf id. at 1330 n.2 ("I am, of course, aware that allfactual evidence is
ultimately 'statistical,' and all legal proof ultimately 'probabilistic,' in the epistemological sense
that no conclusion can ever be drawn from empirical data without some step of inductive
inference ....

").

87. See id. at 1331-78 (criticizing the proposal in Michael 0. Finkelstein & William B.
Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970), to use
Bayesian analysis to help resolve identity issues in criminal trials).
88. For a sampling of the voluminous literature, see generally PROBABILITY AND INFERENCE
IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: THE USES AND LIMITS OF BAYESIANISM (Peter Tillers & Eric D. Green

eds., 1988); Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87
VA. L. REV. 1491 (2001); Ronald J. Allen, On the Significance of Batting Averages and Strikeout
Totals: A Clarification of the "Naked Statistical Evidence" Debate, the Meaning of "Evidence," and the
Requirement of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1093 (1991); Lea Brilmayer &
Lewis Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 16
(1978); L. Jonathan Cohen, Dialogue, Subjective Probabilityand the Paradox of the Gatecrasher,1981
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 627; Eric D. Green, Foreword, Symposium, Probability and Inference in the Law of
Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REV. 377 (1986); David Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasherand Other Stories,
1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. loi; Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1357 (1985); Daniel Shaviro, Commentary, StatisticalProbabilityEvidence and the Appearance ofJustice, 103 HARV. L. REV. 530, 547-50 (1989); Peter
Tillers, Decision and Inference, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 253 (1991); articles cited infra note 444.
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OBJECTIONS TO AGGREGATIVE ANALYSIS OFMA TCHES AND NON-MA TCHES

Tribe's fourth critique can be subdivided into three parts: First, the use
of aggregative methodology offends fundamental principles, such as the
presumption of innocence9 or the principle that we punish people based
only on proof of what they did, not proof that they are members of a class.9o
Second, even if aggregative analysis has a place in the criminal justice
system, it is so complicated and difficult and so likely to be applied
incorrectly that we should categorically exclude it.9, Embedded in this
critique is the assumption that lay decision makers, the hallmark of our
democratic and decentralized system of criminal justice, do not have the
ability and cannot be trained to use the information reliably or to keep from
being unduly swayed by large numbers.92 Finally, we have no hard data on
the frequency of most of the possibilities with which criminal jurors must
contend-for example, how often men in a particular neighborhood wear
brown sweatshirts-so the values we plug into equations will be sheer
conjecture or at least not "quantified 'exactly.'"93
In the next Part we show that aggregative analysis has an established
place in our criminal justice system, such analysis can be used correctly, and
data limitations are exaggerated. One surprising ally in our argument is the
adversarial system itself. When nearly the same arguments were initially
made against aggregating small probabilities into big numbers in the process
of admitting inculpatory DNA evidence,94 the adversarial system quickly
elicited workable solutions. We suggest that a similar process-along with
modern data-mining techniques and new ways of helping lay audiences
understand statistical insights-can enable our criminal justice institutions
to develop and refine appropriate methods for aggregating the small
89. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 85, at 1355-67 (arguing that Bayesian analysis compromises
the presumption of innocence by requiring jurors to consider the opening odds of guilt); infra
notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
go. See Tribe, supra note 85, at 1359-61 (arguing that Bayesian analysis would
compromise the right to be convicted based on individual, not class, evidence by permitting
juries to convict a defendant even after acknowledging, say, a 3% chance that she is innocent);
see also RONALD L. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES 164-65 (4 th ed. 2oo6);
sources cited infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
91.
See Tribe, supra note 85, at 1335-37.
92. See id. at 136o-6i.
93. People v. Louie, 205 Cal. Rptr. 247, 262 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1984) (quoting
People v. Celia, 188 Cal. Rptr. 675, 684 (Ct. App. 1984)); see also, e.g., L.Jonathan Cohen, Can
Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?, 4 BEHAv. & BRAIN SC. 317, 329 (1981);
Tribe, supra note 85, at 1361-63.
94. For early criticism of the use of DNA in court, see People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985,
996-99 (Sup. Ct. 1989); Eric S. Lander, Commentary, DNA Fingerprintingon Trial, 339 NATURE
501 (1989); Stephen M. Patton, DNA Fingerprinting:The Castro Case, 3 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 223
(199o); Janet C. Hoeffel, Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientifc Evidence Meets
the CriminalDefendant, 42 STAN. L. REV. 465 (199o); Peter J. Neufeld & Neville Colman, When
Science Takes the Witness Stand, Scd. AM., May s9go, at 46.
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probabilities associated with non-exclusionary, non-matches into valuable
proof of innocence.
IV. STANDARD IDENTITY EVIDENCE AS AGGREGATIONS OF MATCHES AND
NON-MATCHES
A.

THE CoMPATmiBrmy OFAGGREGATIVE ANALYSIS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Aggregative analysis of matches and non-matches of "small" bits of nonunique, non-dispositive evidence is not anathema to our criminal justice
system but a core feature of accepted modes of proving identity in criminal
cases. Indeed, the new "gold standard" of identity evidence-DNA
matching-depends on exactly this kind of analysis.
i.

Confessions, Eyewitness Identifications, and Fingerprints as
Aggregative Evidence

Under the usual understanding, police, prosecutors, and jurors seeking
to identify the perpetrator of a crime work to match a unique trait of the
culprit to the accused. Fingerprints embossed in blood on a knife embedded
in the victim's heart and ballistics linking the physical properties of the
barrel of a gun owned by a suspect to striations on the bullet found in a
gunshot wound are familiar examples.95 Older examples are eyewitness
identifications matching the witness's memory of the culprit to a suspect and
confessions or informant testimony matching known facts about the crime
to a description of it by someone who claims to have committed it.
In fact, the power of all of this evidence is not due to a single match of a
unique trait of the criminal. It is a result of the confluence of many matches of
traits that are not unique to the defendant, no single one of which is
dispositive or, often, very interesting. A fingerprint is powerful because the
collection of many tiny lines and intersections found in a latent partial
fingerprint at a crime scene match those taken from a suspect.96 Lines and

95.

See, e.g., Kathryn E. Carso, Amending the IllinoisPostconviction Statute To Include Ballistics

Testing, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 695, 7oo n.43 (2007); Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons
from the Law's FormativeEncounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. I o6g, 11 o

(1998).
96.
See, e.g., COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY. ET AL., NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH

FORWARD 53, 100, 141-44 (2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesi/nij/grants/
228o91.pdf (criticizing as not scientifically validated the longstanding use by fingerprint
analysts of subjective evaluation of overall friction-ridge patterns, and calling for the
aggregation of numerical scores for the many individual elements of latent fingerprints);
Jennifer L. Mnookin et al., The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REv.
725, 731, 734-35 (2011) (reaching similar conclusions about fingerprint analysis and other
pattern-identification disciplines); Laura Spinney, The Fine Print, 464 NATuRE 344, 346 (2010)
(reporting that some forensic experts believe that the only way to avoid false-positive fingerprint
matches is for "fingerprint evidence [to] be interpreted in probabilistic terms," using data on
"how fingerprint patterns vary across populations and how often various components or
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intersections on a bullet embedded in the victim's heart are powerful if they
match imperfections on the inside of the barrel of a gun seized from the
defendant.97 The same goes for a match between multiple features of a
burglary committed by a masked intruder and of a known burglar's
8
and of intersections between
classically admissible modus operandi,9
attributes of a series of similar crimes or possibly criminal events and those
in the life of a single suspect that are admissible when they are too
numerous and unusual to be coincidental.99
This insight is not new. Centuries ago, English philosopher William
Paley noted that "[a] concurrence of well-authenticated circumstances
composes a stronger ground of assurance than positive testimony,
unconfirmed by circumstances, usually affords. Circumstances cannot lie." ' oo
As in Paley's case, this claim typically is made to refute the idea that
"circumstantial" evidence is inferior to "direct" evidence. ° 1 Our point is
stronger-that the power of most or all direct evidence is due not to its
uniqueness but a concurrence of small bits of individually inconclusive
evidence. 02 Illustrating confusion about the "uniqueness," "directness," and
presumptive strength of certain kinds of evidence is the assumption in
popular culture that DNA, fingerprint, and other forensic "matches," which

combinations of components crop up," for example, "a particular configuration of bifurcations,
ridge endings and the like [is] found in 40% of a given population"); infta note 285 and
accompanying text.
97. See Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Why No Research?, 38 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 503,
513-18 (2oo) (arguing that the Daubert standard for admitting scientific evidence will
eventually require use of more rigorous scientific and statistical principles in fingerprint,
handwriting, ballistics, document, and other forensic analysis).
98. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mack, 258 F. 3 d 548, 554 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[Sltandard
conduct, although not particularly unusual by itself, may, in combination, present an unusual
and distinctive pattern constituting a 'signature.'"); People v. Haston, 444 P.2d 91, soo (Cal.
1968) ("[An] inference of identity arises when the marks common to the charged and
uncharged offenses, considered singly or in combination, logically operate to set the charged
and uncharged offenses apart from other crimes of the same general variety .. ").
99. See RICHARD 0. LEMPERT ET AL., A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS,
TRANSCRIPTS AND CASES 351-54 (4 th ed. 201 1) (discussing admissibility of "common scheme"
evidence). James Baldwin's criticism of the use of "common scheme" evidence to convict Wayne
Williams as a serial killer of young children in Atlanta gives this Article its tide. See BALDWIN,
supra note t.
10O.
WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 932 (Liberty
Fund 2002) (1785).
sos. See infra Part V.C.I (discussing judicial definitions of "direct" and "circumstantial"
evidence that suggest a preference for the former).
102.
See Simon A. Cole, Forensics Without Uniqueness, Conclusions Without Individualization: The
New Epistemology of Forensic Identification, 8 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 233, 234-37 (2009)
(criticizing forensic experts who claim that forensic markers are unique to individuals, though
they actually can only locate a suspect in a larger or smaller class of possible culprits).
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conceptually are on the "circumstantial" side of the divide, instead qualify as
presumptively stronger "direct" or "unique" evidence.I°s
This point doesn't end at modus operandi, "common scheme," and
forensic evidence. It extends, as well, to eyewitness identifications, the
quintessential direct or unique evidence. Identifications increase in strength
as the witness matches more and more of the suspect's traits to remembered
traits of the culprit. That we base our faith in identifications on the ability of
the eye to observe many traits at once and of the brain to process them
quickly into a single "aha!" conclusion that the third man from the right is
the attacker should not obscure the fact that the eye is seeing and brain is
assessing the combined effect of many matching features-most of them
uninteresting in themselves-and not a single, unique trait.'0 4 Similarly,
confessions increase in weight with each new match between actions and
instrumentalities known to have been associated with a crime and a
confessing suspect's uncontaminated narrative of what happened.'°5 In
these examples, as in the more obviously "circumstantial" ones described

103.
See Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the "CSI Effect" Effect: Media and
Litigation Crisis in CriminalLaw, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1335, 1340-41, 1364 (2009) (noting popular
assumption that forensic evidence is the strongest kind of evidence); Peter Tiersma & Mathew
Curtis, Testing the Comprehensibility of Jury Instructions: California's Old and New Instructions on
CircumstantialEvidence, 1 J. CT. INNOVATION 231, 253-58 (2008) (describing studies showing
that mock jurors instructed on the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence often
mischaracterize highly probative circumstantial evidence as "direct"); infra notes 3 64 -6 7 and
accompanying text.
oo
104.
See, e.g., Sylvester v. SOS Children's Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3 d 9 , 903 ( 7 th Cir. 2006)
("[A]II evidence, even eyewitness testimony, requires drawing inferences; the eyewitness is
drawing an inference from his raw perceptions. 'All evidence is probabilistic, and therefore
uncertain; eyewitness testimony and other forms of 'direct' evidence have no categorical
epistemological claim to precedence over circumstantial or even explicitly statistical evidence."'
(quoting Milam v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 166, 170 ( 7 th Cir. 1992))); DePass
v. United States, 721 F.2d 203, 207 ( 7 th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting) (arguing that
"almost all legal evidence is probabilistic" and that "probabilities that are derived from statistical
studies are no less reliable in general than [those] . . . derived from direct observation, from
intuition, or from case studies of a single person or event").
10 5 .
There is probative value in a confession without details ("I did it") or a lineup
identification by a victim who could not give a description. But as exonerations and empirical
research show, a suspect's willingness to confess or resemblance to a victim's memory of a
criminal-especially when proffered without supporting details-is not a unique trait of guilty
people, much less of any single guilty perpetrator. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo,
The Problem of FalseConfessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 919-20 (2004) (noting
that innocent suspects sometimes confess to stop exhausting interrogations, to please
authorities, or because of youth or mental disability); Stephen Greenspan, There Is More to

Intelligence than IQ

in CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: THE STORY OF A MURDER, A FALSE

CONFESSION, AND THE STRUGGLE To FREE A "WRONG MAN" 148 (Donald S. Connery ed., 1996)

(documenting how a suspect's youth, inexperience with the justice system, mental illness, and
suggestibility disposed him to confess falsely); Sarah Anne Mourer, Reforming Eyewitness
Identification Procedures Under the Fourth Amendment, 3 DuKEJ. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 49, 56-57
(2oo8) (discussing disposition of eyewitnesses to make inaccurate identifications to provide
closure).

IOWA LAWREVEW

[Vol 98:577

above, the inference of guilt moves beyond a reasonable doubt because the
probability that the many matches are a result of the defendant's guilt is so
high, and the probability that the matches are coincidental is so low.
Although our intuitions tell us that some evidence is powerful because it
reveals a match between a unique trait of the culprit and a suspect, the
power of the evidence is almost never due in fact to the uniqueness of the
evidential trait. The evidence is powerful because of the unusual aggregation
of matches of multiple non-unique, often quite common traits. The power of
the evidence derives from how each additional match of non-unique traits
increases, indeed multiplies, the probability of guilt-and similarly, we will
argue, the power of each additional non-match multiplies the probability of
innocence. We will argue, further, that in order to understand the extent of
the multiplier effect, intuitions again fail criminal justice actors, requiring
disciplined measures to expose the aggregate power of the multiple matches
or non-matches.
Calls for such measures have increased since DNA exonerations
°
revealed the frequency of false confessions and eyewitness identifications. 6
A central goal of these proposed improvements is to force into the open as
many individual details as possible, to permit an accurate assessment of the
number and quality of matches between the content of confessions and
eyewitness testimony and what is known about the crime and criminal. For
example, proposals to videotape confessions provide a way to catalogue
details to which the defendant claims to be confessing to see whether they
match the known features of the crime and verify that investigators did not
feed details to the suspect.'0 7 Similarly, proposals to document pre-lineup
eyewitness descriptions with sketch artists, and to cross-reference them to
descriptions other witnesses independently gave, help to specify and clarify
the many separate features that eyewitness identifications typically conflate,
exposing the number and weight of each match and non-match.os Although
measures of this sort are far from universally accepted, they are becoming
more common, and no one suggests they are inconsistent with basic
criminal justice norms.'°9

so6. See, e.g., GARRETr, supra note 36, at 14-83 (cataloguing confessions and identifications
later shown to be false); Gisli H. Gudjonsson, False Confessions and Correcting Injustices, 46 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 689, 69o-9s (2012).
107. For articles advocating the videotaping of interrogations, see supra note 41; infra notes
509-10.
i o8. See Neil Vidmar, James E. Coleman, Jr. & Theresa A. Newman, Rethinking Reliance on
Eyewitness Confidence, 94 JUDICATURE 16, 17 (201o). For parallel proposals in the fingerprint
context, see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
109.
See supra note 41 (noting the increasing number of jurisdictions that videotape
confessions).

2013]
2.

THE EVIDENCE OF THINGS NOT SEEN

The Courts' Enthusiastic Embrace of Aggregative Analysis: Inculpatory
DNA

Even more clearly establishing the centrality to modern criminal justice
of the systematic, mathematical aggregation of the probative value of
multiple non-unique traits is inculpatory DNA, the strongest known form of
identity evidence. Using none other than the multiplication rule pilloried in
Collins,~° inculpatory DNA derives its power entirely through the
aggregation of individually unimpressive probabilities of guilt associated
with multiple shared traits. Although absorbed into the public consciousness
as "DNA fingerprinting,"-' appropriating the common misperception of
fingerprint evidence as unique to a single person,2 inculpatory DNA
evidence does not depend on any unique feature of individuals. Instead, it
relies on a confluence of matches of individual DNA sequences, each of
which recurs in the relevant population with a known and considerable
frequency."s
Modern DNA profiling uses a Polymerase Chain Reaction ("PCR"),
followed by gel or capillary electrophoresis, to identify DNA sequences
known as short tandem repeats ("STRs") ."4 STRs are highly variable regions
of the human genome that are made up of short, repeating sequences of the
nucleotides that comprise DNA. For example, one STR is made up of the
short nucleotide sequence CATG that repeats over and over again (e.g.,
CATGCATGCATGCATG). A given STR is found at a discrete physical
location ("locus") in the human genome. Although that locus exists on
everyone's individual genome, the number of times the nucleotide sequence
repeats at that STR locus (in our example, the number of CATGs in a row)
varies among individuals. One person may have five repeats, another may
have six, and so on. Each different number of repeats is called an "allele.",5
See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Lander, supra note 94, at 505; William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA
Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45, 49 (1989).
1 1o.

112.

See supranote 96.

113. Although, with the exception of monozygotic twins, each individual has a unique
genome, forensic DNA profiling typically cannot examine enough of an individual's entire
genome to establish uniqueness. See HARLAN LEVY, AND THE BLOOD CRIED OUT: A
PROSECUTOR'S SPELLBINDING ACCOUNT OF THE POWER OF DNA 24 (1996)

(explaining that

testimony in connection with DNA evidence is "highly misleading if it leads us to believe that
the power of DNA analysis lies in its ability to identify... characteristics .. .unique to each
individual. Science does not yet have that power.").
As we note above, the idea that evidence needs to be aggregated to reveal its probative
value is not new to DNA and has been recognized for years, for example, in fingerprint analysis
and paternity cases. See supra notes 96-1oi and accompanying text. We use DNA to make the
point because of its widely accepted status as the gold standard of evidence.
114.

DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 178-91 (2010).

115.
MICHAEL J. SAKS ET AL., ANNOTATED REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
SECOND 676 (2005-2oo6 ed. 2000) (noting that each individual has two alleles at a given STR
locus, one from each chromosome).
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Variation in the alleles found at each STR locus can help discriminate
among individuals."

6

Individually, however, each allele is fairly common. In some cases, 25%
of the relevant population share a given allele., 17As a result, the presence of
a single match between an allele in DNA left at a crime scene and in the
DNA of a suspect is unremarkable and no more discriminating than, for
example, the fact that both the mid-twenties criminal and mid-twenties
suspect have male-pattern baldness or are left-handed." 8 When alleles from
multiple locations match, however, the power of DNA evidence emerges.
More exactly, the probability that a suspect arrested at "random" (i.e., for
reasons other than his genetic make-up) would have the matching number
of repeats at each of multiple STR loci is the product of the frequencies of
each individually rather common allele."9 The more STR regions that are
tested in an individual sample, the more discriminating the test becomes. If
matching STRs appear at thirteen different loci (the number of loci typically
examined in forensic DNA testing by the FBII2o), and if the incidence of
each STR is 20% (making each trait more common than left-handedness

and male-pattern baldness in twenty-five-year-olds), the probability of
selecting an individual at random with the same collection of STRs is less
than one in many trillions, '12 as the jury will be informed.
Going beyond the multiplication rule, several U.S. courts in civil and
criminal paternity cases have endorsed Bayes' Theorem as the most
acceptable way to update the "prior odds" estimate of paternity based on
non-forensic evidence with likelihood-ratio probabilities associated with
evidence of the defendant's DNA profile (i.e., the probability of the child's
genetic profile if the defendant is his father divided by the probability of the

116. KAYE, supranote 114, at 188.
117.
See, e.g., John M. Butler et al., Allele Frequencies for 15 Autosomal STR Loci on US.
Caucasian,African American, and HispanicPopulations,48J. FORENSIc Sci. 9o8, go- 1 (2003).
118. See Neufeld & Colman, supra note 94, at 50 ("A typical allele might be found in 1o
percent of the population, making it not all that unlikely that two random people will carry the
same allele. But if one looks at alleles at [multiple] sites, [a match at every site] becomes
increasingly unlikely .. ");see also Desmond C.C. Gan & Rodney D. Sinclair, Prevalence of Male
and FemalePattern HairLoss in Maryborough, 1oJ. INVESTIG. DERMATOL. SYMP. PROC. 184, 185-86
(2005) (reporting that approximately 17% of men in their twenties exhibited symptoms of
male-pattern baldness); Michel Raymond et al., Frequency-Dependent Maintenance of Left
Handedness in Humans, 263 PROC.: BIOLOGICAL Sc. 1627, 1627 (1996) (estimating frequency of
left handedness as 10-13%).
19. In DNA analysis, the researcher estimates "the frequency of the alleles at each locus
(the 'single-locus genotypes'), and then [via the 'Basic Product Rule'] combines those figures
to estimate the frequency of the combination of single-locus genotypes (the 'multiple singlelocus' or 'multilocus genotype')." KAYE, supra note 114, at 89.
120.
Id.at 189.
121.
Id.at187-88.
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profile if someone else is his father) .1t2 The cases have triggered a healthy
debate about how best to estimate the prior probability of paternity based on
non-scientific evidence-for example, one over the number of men with
whom the mother may have had sexual relations around the time the child
was conceived.123

We thus can add inculpatory DNA to our list of allegedly "unique"
evidence that inculpates not by way of a single match of a unique trait
exhibited by the perpetrator and suspect (e.g., an individual's genome) but
by way of a confluence of many matches (e.g., traits found at various loci on
the suspect's chromosomes). No single loci-match is dispositive or even
strongly indicative of the defendant's guilt, but taken together, multiple locimatches produce a high probability-though not a certainty-that the
defendant and the donor of the material found at the scene are the same
person. In principle, there is no reason why equally powerful results cannot
emerge from collections of other, individually unimpressive matching traits
of known frequency, such as height, handedness, hair loss, eye color, or earlobe configuration. By analogy to the DNA paternity cases, both Bayes'
Theorem and the multiplication rule could also be available for these
purposes.
There is, to be sure, a difference in practicebetween how jurors (as well
as police and prosecutors) experience a match of DNA alleles and how they
experience a confluence of other matching traits. In the case of DNA, an
expert biostatistician will represent the aggregate strength of the string of
matches as a number-the product of the probabilities associated with each
matching allele. In other words, an expert will help the jury or other
criminal justice actor to understand not only that each new item in a series
of matching traits increases the probability of guilt, but also the magnitude of
the "f multiplier" effect of each new match. In other cases, no such expert
assistance will be allowed. Even if the data needed to calculate the relevant
numbers are available-as in the case of a short, green-eyed, left-handed,
balding culprit-the Collins line of cases will prevent the prosecutor from
calling, and probably dissuade her from consulting outside of court, a
statistician to report a number.
Indeed, with the exception of testimony about the probability of a
random match of forensic traits such as blood types and DNA profiles, which
the courts have grown increasingly likely to allow,'-4 the general rule is to

122.

See, e.g., T.A.T. v. R.E.B. (In re Paternity of M.J.B.), 425 N.W.2d 404, 408-09 (Wis.

1988) (describing various statistical techniques).
123.
See 4 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 47, §§ 31:49-50 (describing use of Bayes' Theorem in
paternity cases); DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE §

12.4.3 (2004)

(same); infra text accompanying notes 175-79 (same).
124.
See, e.g., People v. Mountain, 486 N.E.2d 802, 8o4-o6 (N.Y. 1985) (reversing prior
precedent and allowing introduction of forensic blood-type matches and associated randommatch frequencies); Jonathan J. Koehler, When Do Courts Think Base Rate Statistics Are Relevant?,
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exclude testimony about the frequency of identifying traits. The result is to
preclude systematically aggregative analysis of the conjoint power of several
such traits. Unless the reference class for a frequency study of a non-forensic
trait "exactly" matches the facts of the case at hand, most courts forbid jurors
to consider the study. For example, courts may bar evidence in insurancefraud cases of how often particular medical diagnoses are made; the
probability of arranging a list of ten companies in the same, nonalphabetical order to prove that a search warrant, the application for which
arranged the companies in that order, was the forbidden fruit of a prior,
unlawful search; or the frequency of mistaken eyewitness identifications.-25
As Professor Jonathan Koehler has pointed out, such "reference class
requirements ...are so extreme that they would eliminate the use of
statistical evidence under nearly all conditions," including inculpatory DNA
itself.,26
We doubt that the distinctions courts currently draw among identifying
traits for purposes of quantifying and systematically aggregating randommatch probabilities will hold up over time. Even if some such distinctions
make sense, they are hardly stable and fundamental enough to sustain
Tribe's and others' claims that quantification and aggregation threaten the
foundations of our criminal justice system.' 7 At the heart of the critique is
the prediction that parties and the public will never accept verdicts that are
or appear to be based on the defendant's membership in a class-even a
very small class-of people who could be guilty, as opposed to a
determination that the defendant is "uniquely" guilty.2 a The verdict must

373, 388-89 (2002) ("Almost all courts find [forensic science base rates] to
be relevant and admissible."); Dale A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology and the Critique of Evidence
Theory, 87 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1612 (2001) (observing that "[m]ost criminal courts ...allow the
presentation of the random match statistic" (i.e., the frequency of a forensic trait in the general
population)).
125. See Koehler, supra note 124, at 391-92 n.io6 (citing cases). But see id. at 389-90
(citing decisions allowing statistical evidence of (1) the small probability of Sudden Infant
Death Syndrome, (2) a chance collection of cardiac arrests to establish criminal or civil liability
for multiple deaths in rapid succession in the same family or hospital, and (3) the small
probability of a particular pattern of accurate and inaccurate answers to prove cheating on a
test).
126. Id. at 392. The reference group the FBI and other agencies use to reveal the frequency
of particular STRs is not a random sample of any population, much less the population of
potential suspects in any given crime. See sources cited infra note 187. DNA evidence thus
arguably cannot satisfy the "reference class" requirements that bar aggregative analysis of other
evidence.
127,
See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
128. See Nesson, supra note 88, at 1378 ("[A] probable verdict may not be acceptable [to
the public], and an acceptable verdict may not be probable."); Tribe, supra note 85, at 1372-75
(claiming that probabilistic evidence "dehumanizes" justice and weakens public and party
support for the legal system).
42JURIMETRICSJ.

2013]

THE EVIDENCE OF THINGS NOT SEEN

609

convey to the public the message that the defendant is guilty, not that she
"probably" or "almost certainly" is.129
Our courts, however, have long acknowledged that criminal verdicts are
"merely" probabilistic. For years, judges have instructed jurors that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond any doubt or to an
"absolute ... certainty," and that the jurors may find the defendant guilty
though they are "fully aware" that their verdict is based on "probabilities"
and "may be mistaken.",so Inculpatory DNA cements the point. DNA
achieves its status as the "gold standard" of proof of identity by
mathematically aggregating probabilities associated with a series of
individually inconclusive matching traits to an overall probability less than
one that the defendant left the genetic material at the crime scene.
Recently, the Supreme Court even suggested that it would be error to
mislead jurors about the statistical realities of DNA evidence.' ' One such
reality is that DNA evidence can reveal only a probability less than one that
the defendant or the victim is the source of biological material found at the
crime scene or on the defendant and cannot reveal the probability of
guilt.,35 Second, there are a number of reasons why the probability that the
defendant is guilty is always lower than the probability that the defendant was
the source of the biological material, including the existence of a probability
greater than zero that investigators erred in collecting or analyzing the
evidence or that there was an innocent reason why the defendant's or
victim's genetic material was found in the incriminating location.'33 Despite
these realities, courts on both sides of the Atlantic have no problem
upholding convictions based on little more than a DNA match that actually
is a series of mathematically aggregated matches.,34
129.
See Nesson, supra note 88, at 139o (arguing that the goal of trials is to project
behavioral norms to the public by linking authoritative narratives about what happened to legal
consequences, and that probabilistic verdicts, no matter how accurate, undermine this goal);
Tribe, supra note 85, at 1372-73 (worrying that explicitly premising convictions on evidence of
probabilities less than one in criminal trials could undermine the policy of acquittal in the face
of reasonable doubt).
130. See, e.g., Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.s. 1, 18, 22-23 (1994) (upholding constitutionality
of a jury instruction that included this language).
131.
McDaniel v.Brown, 130 S. Ct. 665 (2010).
132.
See id. at 670; infra notes 169-7o and accompanying text.
133. See Norman Fenton & Martin Neil, Avoiding Probabilistic Reasoning Fallacies in Legal
Practice Using Bayesian Networks, 36 AUSTL.J. LEGAL PHIL. 114, 122-23 (2011) ("Errors in the
DNA typing process can result in a reported match where there is no true match. A true match
can be coincidental if more than one member of the population shares the DNA features
recorded in the sample; . . . even if the defendant was the source he/she may not be the
perpetrator since there may be an innocent reason for their presence at the crime scene."
(footnote omitted)); infra notes 171-74 and accompanying text. See generally Jonathan J.
Koehler, Errorand Exaggerationin the Presentationof DNA Evidence at Trial, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 21
(1993).
134. See, e.g., Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 775, 782 (Va. 1989) (affirming capital
verdict premised mainly on a match between Spencer's genetic profile and that of semen at the
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Clearly, our criminal justice system exhibits no blanket preference for a
false certainty over estimated probabilities as a matter of liberal-democratic
fundaments, and it should forbear applying any such preference when life
and liberty depend on the accuracy of verdicts. Nor are plain statements in
trials about the probabilistic nature of verdicts-and plain demonstrations of
the ability to build a powerful case of guilt or innocence by systematically
aggregating individually unimpressive probabilities associated with each of a
string of matching or non-matching traits-in any way subversive of our
justice system or dissuasive of party participation in and public acceptance of
the system.
To be sure, as we discuss in Part V, human beings do seem to exhibit a
cognitive preference for a false certainty over accurately estimated
probabilities.'35 That cognitive bias, however, can lead us to accept
demonstrably false things as true. The bias arises not because we prefer
falsehood over truth but because we prefer the false sense of comfort that
6
our brains trick us into associating with certainty, however derived.3
Assuming that, instead of mimicking our cognitive foibles, the justice system
should help overcome them, achieving through legal tools what we cannot
accomplish with our bare hands and brains, its goal should be to process all
the information we have, aggregated probabilities included.37 We see
nothing in the fundamentals of our justice system that is inconsistent with
the goal of improving upon practical psychology.
B.

THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM'S ABILITY To DOMESTICATE AGGREGATVE ANALYSIS

The question remains, however, whether systematically aggregated
probabilities associated with non-exclusionary non-matches can actually help
reach accurate answers, and not simply confuse or mislead decision makers.
Here again, we argue that inculpatory DNA provides much of the answer. As
we have seen, inculpatory DNA combines strategic data mining to ascertain
the frequency of multiple non-unique identifying traces associated with a
crime and statistical methodology for aggregating those individually rather
high probabilities into a small chance of an accidental match between the
traces and a defendant.1s 8 In view of how often exonerations highlight
potentially identifying traces found during police investigations that did not
match the wrongly convicted defendant but did match the actual

crime scene and on testimony that the probability of a random match was one in 135 million).
Spencer was executed on April 27, 1994. See Searchable Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions (last visited Oct. 2, 2012); see also supra
notes 63-74 and accompanying text (discussing R v. Adams).

135.
136.

See infra Part V.A. 3 .c.
See infra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.

137.

See generally GERD GIGERENZER, RECKONING WITH RISK: LEARNING To LIVE WITH

UNCERTAINTY (2002).

138.

See supra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
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perpetrator-39 we propose a similar combination of data mining and
statistical analysis (in this case Bayes' Theorem) to aggregate the individually
"small" probabilities of innocence associated with each of a series of nonexclusionary non-matches into probabilities large enough to raise a
reasonable doubt about guilt.
Merely imagining this proposition calls to mind serious technical
questions akin to those that provided a sufficient and uncontroversial basis
for the Collins decision.4o Even with expert assistance, how can lay decision
makers reliably recognize non-matches, assign independent probabilities to
them, and aggregate those probabilities with prior odds of guilt that are
themselves of uncertain provenance and independence? In fact, the use of
DNA evidence to establish criminal identity and paternity initially raised
these same concerns, but over time the adversarial system worked hand-inglove with the relevant technologists (biologists and statisticians) to allay the
concerns. We suggest that the same give-and-take between proposed
methods, adversaries' objections, and responsive improvement of the state
of the art can work in this new context as well.J41
Although celebrated today, inculpatory DNA analysis initially was crude
and controversial. In People v. Castro,,42 an early case in which the technique
was mooted in court, Dr. Richard Roberts, a molecular biologist in the lab of
DNA pioneer and Nobel Prize Winner James Watson,43 validated other
prosecution testimony,44 including that of his colleague Dr. Michael Baird,
which placed "the odds of a random match between a bloodstain [on
Castro's watch band] and [the genetic profile of the badly beaten murder
victim] at one in ioo million."'45 Testifying for the defense, Dr. Eric Lander,
a Harvard and MIT mathematician and scientist and a MacArthur award
recipient,4 6 "examined the same data and arrived at odds of one in 24."'47
After appearing as opposing experts, Drs. Roberts and Lander met privately
while the case was in recess, decided that they both were wrong in part, and
jointly authored a statement that was subsequently introduced in court. The
statement called for further testing and analysis because "the DNA data in
See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
141.
See KAYE, supra note i 14, at 58-160 (describing early 199os disputes over admissibility
of DNA evidence); Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: PhotographicEvidence and the Powerof
Analogy, io YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 1, 70 (1998) (discussing analogous process through which
courts initially resisted, then accepted photographic evidence).
142.
People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
143. SeeLEvY, supra note 113, at42 (describing the Castrotrial).
144. Id. at 4 3.
145.
Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
146. See LEvy, supra note 1 13, at 43; see also Gina Kolata, Power in Numbers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2o12/01 /o 3 /science/broad-institute-director-finds-powerin-numbers.html (profiling Dr. Eric Lander).
147. Neufeld & Colman, supra note 94, at 48.
139.
140.
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this case are not scientifically reliable enough to support the assertion that
the samples ...do or do not match.",48 In a carefully reasoned decision in
August 1989, the trial judge concluded that DNA matching is a potentially
reliable form of identity evidence but that some of the DNA evidence
presented was inadmissible in the case due to a number of methodological
improprieties in data mining and statistical analysis.149 Later that year, Dr.
Lander published an article in the prestigious scientific journal Nature,
cataloging defects in the proposed use of DNA in the Castro case and
proposing improvements in data mining techniques, statistical analysis, and
courtroom procedures to avoid similar problems in the future.15o A 199o
Scientific American article by one of Castro's lawyers, Peter Neufeld, presented
an overlapping set of critiques and methodological and procedural
solutions.'s'
The defects identified in early cases and commentaries fell into four
categories. First, chemical, autoradiograph, and other data-mining
techniques were not discriminating enough to identify exactly what alleles or
other genetic traces or contaminants were present in samples from the
crime and defendant.5 Second, absent accepted standards, determinations
of whether autoradiographed reproductions of the same allele in the two
samples were sufficiently clear and similar in length to establish a match
were unreliably subjective.'53 Third, technicians used invalid statistical
methods to determine the chance of a random match, including (1) the
failure to sample enough human subjects to generate reliable frequencies of

148.

Lander, supra note 94, at 504 (internal quotation marks omitted); see LEVY, supra note

113, at47.

149. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 996-97, 999 (criticizing the prosecution's DNA evidence for
failing (i) to use proper probes when analyzing degraded biological samples; (2) to include
male and female controls when testing for sex of sample on the defendant's watch; and (3) to
test for non-human DNA in samples, rather than assuming all strands were of human origin).
15o. See Lander, supra note 94, at 501-04 (criticizing use of visual, rather than objective,
thresholds for declaring matches between crime-scene and suspect samples; poor
documentation of size of control-groups; conclusions drawn from a single degraded band of
DNA; avoidable risk of contamination from foreign DNA; and reliance on assumptions about
population genetics that, for example, ignore heterogeneity in Hispanic populations).
151.
See, e.g., Neufeld & Colman, supra note 94, at 50-53 (advocating (i) improved
methods to determine whether an allele from one sample is the same as that from another,
especially with small samples that prevent retesting; (2) avoiding misjudgments due to
contamination of crime-scene specimens, bacterial degradation, improperly prepared gels, and
over-concentrated samples without available control groups; (3)the standardization of methods
for sampling frequencies and population estimates across laboratories; and (4) studies to
determine whether differences in allele frequency among ethnic subgroups invalidate
statisticians' assumption of random mating across racial groups).
152.
See, e.g.,
Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 993-94; KAYE, supra note 114, at 51; Lander, supra note
94,at 502-03; Neufeld & Colman, supra note 94, at 51.

153. See, e.g., Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 994; Lander, supra note 94, at 502-03; Neufeld &
Colman, supra note 94, at 5 1; Hoeffel, supra note 94, at 479.
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particular alleles in different populations;54 (2) the segmentation of
reference samples only by race (e.g., African-American) or ethnicity (e.g.,
Hispanic), and not by potentially isolated subgroups within each race or
ethnicity, which creates a risk of non-independence among different alleles
found in both samples (e.g., Afro-Cubans might have a higher incidence of
clusters of particular alleles than blacks or Hispanics as a whole);,55
(3) improper assumptions about the source population for the trace found
at the scene (e.g., the assumption that a crime occurring in a predominantly
Hispanic part of the Bronx must have been committed by a Hispanic
defendant);5 6 and (4) the failure of private laboratories to reveal
"proprietary" assumptions about the frequency of alleles in different
populations, preventing cross-laboratory comparison and peer review.57
Fourth, laboratories failed to document instances and patterns of shoddy or
improper techniques in collecting, handling, and analyzing samples. ,58

In all four cases, public and private technicians charged with collecting
and analyzing samples and attaching probabilities to them, and prosecutors
and judges responsible for their handling in court, quickly set about solving
or debunking the problems. Their efforts were aided by panels convened by
the National Research Council, the National Academy of Sciences, and
other independent bodies.'59 Under constant adversarial scrutiny from
defense lawyers in court, following Peter Neufeld and Barry Scheck's lead in
Castro, and to allay doubts expressed in scientific and legal publications and
the press, 6o law enforcement and the courts developed workable solutions
to all of these problems and others recognized later.
Data-mining techniques have drastically improved. The initial method
of isolating alleles for measurement and comparison was based on an
unproven assumption that particular chemical probes would isolate material
at only a single locus on the crime scene and the suspect's samples and,
thus, that the radiographs taken of the two samples could be compared to

154.

See Patton, supranote 94, at 236 n.41.
See, e.g., Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 992; KAYE, supra note 114, at 124; Lander, supra note
94, at 504; Patton, supra note 94, at 236; Hoeffel, supra note 94, at 489-9 o .
156. See, e.g., People v. Pizarro, 1o Cal. App. 4 th 57, 93-94 (Ct. App. t992); D.H. Kaye,
Logical Relevance: Problems with the Reference Population and DNA Mixtures in People v. Pizarro, 3
LAw PROBABILITY & RISK 211, 214 (2004).
155.

157.
158.

See, e.g., People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 4 5 1, 4 63 -6 4 (N.Y. 1994) (Kaye, C.J., concurring).
See, e.g., Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 997; KAYE, supra note 114, at lol; Hoeffel, supra note

94, at 493-95; Neufeld & Colman, supra note 94, at 53.
159. See COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCI. ET AL., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA
TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992) [hereinafter NRC I]; COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN
FORENSIC So.: AN UPDATE, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA
EVIDENCE (1996) [hereinafter NRC II].
s6o. See LEVY, supra note 113, at 49 ("To this day, much of the lingering popular
perception that DNA evidence is somehow flawed has its origin in the press coverage of the
Castrocase); sources cited supra note 94.
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see if they matched. Responding to defense attorneys' and judicial concerns,
analysts more clearly established that the chemical probes used would bind
only with a single locus, assuring for the first time that radiographs
generated by each of the two samples permitted apples-to-apples
comparisons.' 6' Additionally, more automated and repetitive techniques
require less genetic material and eliminate much of the subjectivity
associated with previous methods for determining whether the gene
sequences in the two pictures were sufficiently distinct and similar in length
to establish a match, permitting independent replication in more cases. 6 .
Adversarial and scientific criticism and judicial oversight also prompted
solutions to most of the problems in the third, statistical category. Many
more reference samples were collected, and the same standard was used to
confirm the presence of an allele in members of reference populations as in
comparing crime-scene and suspect samples, making random-match
statistics more reliable, transparent, and uniform across labs.' 63 A variety of
sophisticated methods of adjusting random-match probabilities based on the
size of the database of reference samples have also been developed.' 64
Interdependence worries based on the possibility that particular alleles
and clusters of alleles are more common in racial and ethnic sub-groups
than within racial and ethnic populations as a whole took longer to dispel.
Initially, analysts adopted a conservative estimation technique called "ceiling
frequencies," which used the highest estimate of the frequency of each allele
in any known sub-population as the frequency for all populations. As a
result, the actual aggregate probability of a random-match was likely to be
much lower in fact than the conservative probability offered in court.' 65
Simultaneously, researchers experimented to see if greater specificity in
reference samples (e.g., sampling individuals of Afro-Cuban descent, instead
of only sampling blacks or Hispanics as a whole) changed the estimates of
the frequency of particular alleles and clusters in particular populations.
Soon "specificity concerns were allayed by empirical demonstrations that
increases in reference class specificity made little difference."' 66

161. See, e.g., KAvE, supra note 1 14, at5o.
162. See id. at 178-8o.
163. Seeid. at138.
164. See, e.g.,JOHN M. BUTLER, FUNDAMENTALS OF FORENSIC DNA TYPING 244-49 (201o).
165. See NRC I, supra note 159, at 82-85 (concluding that ceiling frequencies are a
scientifically acceptable alternative to sampling every conceivable subpopulation); NRC II, supra
note 159, at 5-8 (identifying database alternatives when a particular subpopulation has no
available sample set).
166. Koehler, supra note 124, at 394. Professor Koehler noted that in the 199os, defense
lawyers often challenged DNA random-match probabilities ("RMPs") on the ground that DNA
base rates derived from reference classes "did not account for substructuring, i.e., variability in
the frequency of genetic profiles across ethnic subgroups," but that "research quickly convinced
most scientists that substructure affected RMPs in [only] minor ways." Id. at 393; see also Eric S.
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Most controversies now are in the final, more mundane category of
faulty implementation of accepted data-mining and statistical methods. An
example is the so-called "prosecutor's fallacy," which occurs when a
prosecutor or witness transforms the conditional probability of a random
match (say, i%) into the probability of the defendant's guilt (99%).67 This
transposition ignores the prior odds. Even if 99% of all lawyers carry
briefcases and other people rarely do, the probability that a randomly
selected briefcase carrier is a lawyer is much less than 99%, given the vast
proportion of the population made up of (albeit infrequently briefcaseencumbered) non-lawyers. To figure out how likely it is that a given
briefcase carrier is a lawyer, we must also know the
a priori likelihood of being a lawyer. Similarly, to draw conclusions
about the probability [that] a criminal suspect is guilty based on
evidence of a [DNA] 'match,' we must consider not just the
percentage of people who would match but also the a priori
6
likelihood that the defendant in question is guilty.' 8

That requires consideration of the number of possible suspects whose
biological profile is unknown and the strength of the other evidence or guilt
or innocence. It thus takes "Bayes' theorem ... to calculate the amount one

should revise one's prior estimate of the probability of a suspect's guilt after
receiving [DNA] evidence accompanied by incidence rate statistics."' 69 The
Supreme Court's recent recognition that allowing jurors presented with
DNA to operate under the prosecutor's fallacy when evidence may be
"fundamentally unfair" will no doubt accelerate the search for solutions,
including potentially the routine use of Bayes' Theorem to highlight the
role of prior odds.' 70
Bayes' Theorem helps formalize two related problems. Properly
calculating the likelihood-ratio denominator-the probability that a match

Lander & Bruce Budowle, DNA FingerprintingDispute Laid To Rest, 371 NATURE 735 (1994)
(similar).
167. SeeMcDaniel v. Brown, 13o S. Ct. 655, 670 (2010) ("[I]fajuror is told the probability
a member of the general population would share the same DNA is i in lo,ooo (random match
probability), and he takes that to mean there is only a 1 in io,ooo chance that someone other
than the defendant is the source of the DNA found at the crime scene (source probability),
then he has succumbed to the prosecutor's fallacy."); William C. Thompson & Edward L.
Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor's Fallacy and the
Defense Attorney's Fallacy, 11 LAW& HUM. BEHAv. 167, 169-71 (1987).
168. Thompson & Schumann, supra note 167, at 170.
169. Id. at 17on.2.
170. See McDaniel, 130 S. Ct. at 665, 670-76 (acknowledging that a prosecutor's resort to
the prosecutor's fallacy in closing argument could mislead jurors, potentially making the trial
"fundamentally unfair," but denying relief because the issue had not been properly raised
below); Christopher M. Triggs & John S. Buckleton, Comment, Why the Effect of Prior Odds Should

Accompany the Likelihood Ratio When Reporting DNA Evidence, 3 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 73, 76
(2004).
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would appear though the defendant is innocent-requires consideration
not only of the random-match probability but also (1) the frequency of
laboratory false positives,7' and (2) the possibility that the defendant's DNA
was at the scene for reasons other than his commission of the crime, for
example, that he lived there or was framed.,72 Courts now address the first
part of the problem by admitting evidence of error rates for particular
laboratories and analysts.M73 The Supreme Court's recent recognition that it
is "error" for prosecutors to equate the probability of guilt with the random
match probability without taking account of the possibility of innocent
reasons for the presence of the defendant's DNA may motivate solutions to
the rest of the problem, again potentially including use of Bayesian analysis
to highlight the key considerations.74
Nor is it fanciful any longer to contemplate the routine use of Bayes'
Theorem in criminal cases. As we note above, a combination of DNA and
Bayesian analysis presented by experts has revolutionized proof of
paternity,75 including proof of identity in rape cases involving minors or
severely disabled nursing-home patients who give birth to a child.,7 6 DNA
analysis can provide solid numbers for the numerator and denominator of
the likelihood ratio in the paternity context but cannot provide the prior
odds of paternity. The jury must estimate those odds using non-scientific
evidence of the number of possible sexual partners of the mother of the
child in question and other information pointing to one possible partner or
another. To solve the "prior odds" problem in order to make full use of
Bayesian analysis, courts have adopted several competing strategies,
including allowing (i) experts to report results based on 50-50 prior odds,
while permitting the opposing side to offer expert testimony or requiring
the trial judge to give instructions inviting the jury to alter the 50-50
assumption;177 (2) experts for each side to propose prior odds based on
171.

SeeKoehler, supranote 124, at 394 & n. 118 (citing laboratory error rates ranging from

1 out of 67 to 1 out of 345 false positives),
172.

SeeJonathan J. Koehler, Why DNA Likelihood Ratios Should Account for Error (Even When a

National Research CouncilReport Says They Should Not), 3 7JURIMETRICSJ. 425, 431 (1997).
173. SeeKoehler, supra note 124, at 394-95 &nn.119, 124 (citing cases).
174. McDaniel, 130 S. Ct. at 670 ("It is . . . error to equate source probability with
probability of guilt, unless there is no explanation other than guilt for a person to be the source
of crime-scene DNA."); see also articles cited supranotes 167-72 (advocating full use of Bayesian
analysis to assure the accuracy of inferences juries draw from DNA evidence).
175. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., Griffith v. State, 976 S.W.2d 241, 245-46 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998).
177. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 476 N.E.2d 127, 138 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming conviction
premised on proof of the defendant's parental relationship to the victim, which was established
using Bayes' Theorem and a 50-5o estimate of the prior odds); Kammer v. Young, 535 A.2d
936, 940-42 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (permitting an expert's estimate of 5o-50 prior odds,
and inviting the defendant to offer evidence and argument attacking that assumption);
Commonwealth v. Beausoleil, 490 N.E.2d 788, 797 n.ig (Mass. 1986) (similar); Griffith, 976
S.W.2d at 245-46 (approving use of an estimate of 50-50 prior odds in a case involving a
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their understanding of the evidence and letting the jury choose between the
competing estimates or make its own;? 8 and (3)providing the trier of fact
with a chart indicating how any prior odds the jury might estimate based on
non-DNA evidence-from 1:99 (1%)

to 99:1 (99%)-would interact with

the scientifically generated likelihood ratio to produce specified subsequent
odds of paternity.' 79
It thus has taken only twenty years of trial, quickly recognized error, and
responsive refinement for the adversarial system to motivate scientists,
lawyers, and judges to devise workable solutions to the data-mining and
statistical problems that initially threatened the viability of DNA evidence., 8o
Statistical hurdles that have been overcome include several that Collins and
Tribe treated as nearly insurmountable obstacles to systematically
aggregating probabilities associated with identifying traits.' 8' Solutions
include the conservative estimation of frequencies to mitigate the
interdependence problem, the "chart" strategy for helping jurors integrate
subjective prior odds with "harder" data-mined probabilities, and
comparative-frequency testing of different reference groups to determine
the point where further sub-grouping does not much improve reliability. 8s
Because these solutions apply to the systematic aggregation of probabilities.
associated with all identifying traits, there is no reason to think they would
not be serviceable and further improve in response to adversarial pressure,
outside the DNA context.
severely retarded woman who became pregnant while institutionalized in a facility where only a
small number of men had access to her); cf ALLEN ET AL., supra note go, at 163 (criticizing the
5o-5o assumption and "assessment of the odds of guilt or liability before the receipt of...
evidence").
178. See, e.g., T.A.T. v. R.E.B. (In re Paternity of M.J.B.), 425 N.W.2d 404, 409-11 (Wis.
1988) (rejecting the 50-5o assumption as insensitive to particular cases and allowing both
parties to call expert witnesses to testify to their own and challenge the other's prior-odds
assumption).
179. See, e.g., State v. Spann, 617 A.2d 247, 253-54 (N.J. 1993) (ruling that an expert
witness testifying to probabilities in a criminal paternity case must list and explain the effect of
6 6
different prior probabilities); M. v. Marvin S., 5 N.Y.S.2d 802, 8og (Fam. Ct. 1997) (affirming
a paternity judgment that was based on testimony by an expert who "utilized the 'chart
approach'.., in showing the effect of a range of Prior Probability values on the actual genetic
test results"); Plemel v. Walter, 735 P.2d 1209, 12 19 (Or. 1987) (requiring a paternity expert to
identify outcomes based on prior odds estimates ranging from o to 1oo%); see also KAYE ET AL.,
supra note 123, § 12.4.3, at 493-95 (endorsing the chart approach); Dale A. Nance & Scott B.
Morris, Juror Understanding of DNA Evidence: An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for
Trace Evidence with a Relatively Small Random-Match Probability, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 403, 42936 (2005) (presenting the results of an empirical study showing that the "chart format" reduces
error by mock jurors using Bayesian analysis).
18o. See KAYE, supra note 114, at 19 o-1 (describing the courts' increasing impatience with
challenges to forensic DNA probabilities).
181, See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text; see also Tribe, supra note 85, at 1365
(predicting that mathematical analysis, even if based on accurate calculations of probabilities
and statistical odds, would make little headway in courts).
182. See supra notes 163-66, 175-79 and accompanying text.
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As for data-mining, it is true that genetic techniques are more advanced
and precise than those available to isolate and determine the frequency of
such non-forensic traits as shirt color and preferences among cigarette
brands. Recall, however, that early DNA analysis struggled to distinguish one
genetic locus from another and to determine objectively the length of the
tandem repeats at each locus, providing strong bases for objection in court.
It was only through the adversary system that those objections motivated the
invention of more exacting-if still imperfect-probes and other analyses.,83
Similar objections are beginning to force parties offering fingerprint
evidence to acknowledge its status and improve its performance as a method
for systematically aggregating the effects of multiple individually
inconclusive matches.' 8 4 The next Subpart discusses advances in a wide array
of data-mining techniques that adversarial scrutiny might similarly
domesticate to permit the reliable aggregation of probabilities associated
with a host of non-forensic identifying traits.
C.

MODERNDATA MINING AND THE BROAD AVAILABILITY OFFREQUENCY
INFORMATION

Start with an easy case. Suppose evidence indicates that the white adult
male who committed a rape was left-handed (as are about 9% of the white
male population), shorter than the 5'3" victim (as are 5% of that
population), green-eyed (13% of that population), and balding (27% of
that population). The perpetrator is among the subset of the population
that secretes blood-group antigens into bodily fluids such as semen (8o% of
the population), and the antigens secreted into semen found in the rape
victim reveal that the perpetrator's blood type is A-negative (6% of the
relevant population). Police receive an anonymous call from someone
claiming that an acquaintance-who is only described as a white male
currently standing alone on the northeast corner of Fifth and Main Streetstold her that he just raped a woman. The caller says she knows nothing
about where the rape occurred or who the victim might be. Police arrive at
that corner fifteen seconds later and stop a white adult male standing there
alone. He turns out to be left-handed, green-eyed, balding, and an Anegative "secretor." Assuming the information from the victim and
anonymous caller are accurate, and that left-handedness, eye color, height,
blood type, and secretor status are independent traits among white adult
males, the probability that a white adult male encountered "at random" (i.e.,
for reasons independent of the traits being matched) would be green-eyed,
5'3" or shorter, left-handed, bald, and an A-negative secretor is estimated by
multiplying the frequency of the identifying traits: .09 x. 13 X .05 x .27 x .o6
x.8, resulting in a probability ofjust under 8 in ,ooo,ooo.

183.
184.

See supranotes 161 -62 and accompanying text.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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Because information on these traits has been collected for years, their
use in this manner avoids much of the criticism leveled against the
mathematics instructor's testimony at the 1964 Collins trial for having no
evidentiary basis for, and simply making up, frequencies for traits such as
yellow sedans, pony-tailed white blonde women, and bearded black men in
Los Angeles.'8 5 DNA initially faced the same complaint: law enforcement
collected too few samples to permit reliable estimates of the frequency of
particular alleles in the population. 86 Forty years after Collins, however,
criticism of data mining runs in the opposite direction: we collect too
much.' 87 Mountains of collected information now allow us to construct
accurate estimates of the frequency of the identifying traits in all three
examples above-the rape case, DNA, and the Collins case-in the
population at large, and for the factors in the rape and Collins cases, in
particular neighborhoods or at particular intersections. A simple internet
search can produce frequency statistics for any number of reference
populations of characteristics such as left-handedness, male- and femalepattern baldness, cigarette smoking, car makes and models, eye color, size,
weight, and many others., 8 The cell phone, credit card, debt collection,
electronic mapping, insurance, internet sales, marketing, medical, private
investigation, security, search engine, social networking, and tracking (GPS)
industries have massive amounts of data about many human characteristics
and behaviors, including patterns of dress, tastes, habits, and other
preferences, much of which can be segmented by state, city, and postal
code.' 8 9

185.

See Tribe, supra note 85, at 1335 (criticizing the prosecution's probabilistic testimony

in Collins as devoid of empirical support for the probabilities used).
186. See KAYE, supra note 114, at 88 (citing early criticism of DNA evidence based on
inadequate DNA data sets using small samples from FBI recruits).
187. For civil liberties criticisms of government collection of DNA samples, see, for
example, Michael T. Risher, Racial Disparitiesin Databankingof DNA Profiles, GENEWATCH, July-

Aug. 2oo9, at

22;

Ben Protess, The DNA Debacle: How the Federal Government Botched the DNA

Backlog Crisis, PROPUBLICA (May 5, 2oo9), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-dna-debacle-

how-the-federal-government-botched-the-backlog-crisis-5o

5 ;Jeffrey Rosen, Genetic Surveillancefor

All, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2009), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/jurisprudence/
2009/03/geneticsurveillance-for-all.html.
188. See, e.g., supra note i18.
189. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment) (noting that "automatic toll collection systems create a precise record of the
movements of motorists," whose cars often have "devices that permit a central station to
ascertain the car's location," while "wireless carriers [can now] track and record the location of
users.. . [of] more than 322 million wireless devices" in the U.S.); id. at 957 (Sotomayor,J.,
concurring) (noting the frequency with which people now disclose phone numbers, URLs,
e-mail addresses, books, groceries, and medication purchases to cellular and Internet service
providers and online retailers). For a small sampling of the burgeoning literature, see generally
KRZYSZTOFJ. CIOS ET AL., DATA MINING: A KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY APPROACH (2007); ZDRAVKO
MARKOV & DANIEL T. LAROSE, DATA MINING THE WEB: UNCOVERING PATTERNS IN WEB CONTENT,
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Law-enforcement agencies themselves diligently collect information
capable of revealing the frequency of human traits.190 Police in London and
New York routinely use thousands of cameras at strategic locations to
monitor pedestrian and automobile traffic. The resulting photographs and
CCTV videotapes are instantly relayed to central databases and are of
sufficiently high resolution to distinguish faces; the color, make, and design
of clothing; and automobiles.'s' Many private stores, malls, business and
neighborhood associations, transportation hubs, and universities videotape
their own public spaces, enabling frequency data to be minutely segmented
by location, average age of individuals, and other criteria.192 Police officers
in Oakland, California, use body-mounted personal-video cameras to record
crimes, arrests, and traffic-stops.93 Hundreds of fixed and portable police
cameras in New York and elsewhere are sufficiently discerning to
"photograph [automobile] license plates at the rate of hundreds per minute
and then convert those images to data-letters and numbers-that...
computer[s] then compare[] ... to a so-called 'hot list' of information on
such things as stolen vehicles and other violations."'94 Law-enforcement
STRUCTURE, AND USAGE

(2007);

ROBERT NISBET ET AL., HANDBOOK OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

AND DATA MINING APPLICATIONS (2009).

19o. See, e.g., COLLEEN MCCUE, DATA MINING AND PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS: INTELLIGENCE
GATHERING AND CRIME ANALYSIS (2007); Monica C. Holmes et al., DataMining and Expert Systems
in Law Enforcement Agencies, 8 ISSUES INFO. SYS. 329 (2007); Hsinchun Chen et al., Crime Data
Mining: A GeneralFramework and Some Examples, COMPUTER, Apr. 2004, at 50.
191. See, e.g., Al Baker, Camera Scans of Car Plates Are Reshaping Police Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2o1 1/04/ 12/nyregion/ 12plates.html [hereinafter
Baker, Camera] (discussing London's and New York City's systems of security cameras linked to
police coordination centers).
192.
See, e.g., Duncan Graham-Rowe, Smart Statistics Keep Eye on CCTV, NEW SCIENTIST (Nov.
13, 2003), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn 4 3 8o-smart-statistics-keep-eye-on-cctv.html
(estimating that as of a 2003, there were 25 million CCTV cameras worldwide).
193. Erica Goode, Video, a New Toolfor the Police, Poses New Legal Issues, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011 / 1o/1 2/us/police-using-body-mounted-video-cayneras.
html?pagewanted=all.
194. Al Baker, License Plate Reading Cameras Gain Legal Backing, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2011),
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/ 2011/04/14/license-plate-reading-cameras-gain-legalbacking/. Consider a recent example in the news:
[F]or all Mr. Zeledon's evasiveness, the key to his arrest on murder charges in
came days before the killing even occurred-as he was driving his car.

2009

[P]hotos of [Zeledon's] 2004 red Nissan Sentra with Connecticut license plates
were captured and preserved by a network of police cameras and computers. Mr.
Zeledon then became the prime suspect in the fatal stabbing of Andy Herrera, 28,
onJan. 19, 2009....
...

...The clues were collected by a detective at i Police Plaza who had pulled them
from databases and flashed them on a screen-making a map with the suspect's
photo at its center and a web of white lines connecting him to all his known
locations, movements and associations.

2013]

THE EVIDENCE OF THINGS NOT SEEN

officials have long mined traveler data to construct drug courier profiles,
such as methods of paying for airline tickets, "source" and "destination"
cities, duration of stay, forms of baggage, and modes of dress. Now, they also
trawl airline records, checkpoints, and photographs for passengers who
meet the predefined criteria, and the resulting evidence is often admitted in
court.'95

Of course, these activities raise serious civil liberties issues and are
subject to proprietary, privacy, and security limitations on information
sharing.,96 Most of these concerns, however, relate to the use of information
to single out specific individuals for unwanted intrusions, such as a sales
pitch or a search and arrest. Fewer concerns surround the pooling of
information solely to identify frequencies of particular traits and behaviors,
such as the proportion of adult male pedestrians in a particular part of town
with mustaches who wear brown sweatshirts and sprint rather than walk
along the sidewalk at a given location between 3:oo and 5:00 p.m. in
April.197 Given the burgeoning use of artificial-intelligence technology to
sort data by features, these traits need not even be counted by humans,
though they can be.i98 In conjunction with other information markets,

Baker, Camera, supranote 191; see alsoJones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor,J., concurring) ("GPS
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person's public movements that
reflects a wealth of detail about [their] ... associations."); Heather Kelly, Police Embracing Tech
That Predicts Crimes, CNN (July 9, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2o12/o7/09/tech/innovation/
police-tech/index.html (describing a computer algorithm in use by police departments in the
U.S. that uses "locations of previous crimes, combined with sociological information about
criminal behavior and patterns" to predict and work to prevent crime in 5 oo-by-5oo foot zones
citywide, and also describing a process that involves using "microphones positioned around...
cit[ies] to detect gunshots and triangulate their location within 40 to 50 feet" to alert police of
the location).
195.
See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. s, io (1989) (affirming reasonableness of
search premised on the defendant's match to a drug-courier profile); MarkJ. Kadish, The Drug
CourierProfile: In Planes, Trains, and Automobiles; and Now in the Jury Box, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 747,
754-55 (1997).
196. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 947, 954 (holding that, absent a warrant, officers'
attachment of a GPS tracking device toJones's car and tracing his movements on public streets
for four weeks constituted an unconstitutional search and seizure); Daniel J. Solove, Data
Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 343 (2oo8).
197.
See, e.g., Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g (2oo6) (barring release of data with individual identifiers but permitting release, for
research and other purposes, of aggregate data from which individual identifiers have been
removed); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, 42 U.S.C.
§ 132od (2oo6) (similar).
198. For example, the InternationalJournal on Document Analysis and Recognition "includes
contributions dealing with computer recognition of characters, symbols, text, lines, graphics,
images, handwriting, signatures, as well as automatic analyses of the overall physical and logical
structures of documents, with the ultimate objective of a high-level understanding of their
semantic content." International Journal on Document Analysis and Recognition, SPRINGER,
http://www.springer.com/computer/image+processing/journal/10032 (last visited Oct. is,
2012).
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demand by police, forensic laboratories, prosecutors, defense lawyers,,99 and
courts surely could induce entrepreneurs and agencies to mine existing data
sources and create new ones to generate frequencies of detectible human
attributes in given reference populations. Indeed, Target Corporation, the
national retailer, has created offices and laboratories in Minneapolis and Las
Vegas that offerjust these services.

°°

Some will surely object that these methods lack sufficient acuity or
standards to distinguish videotaped, photographed, or otherwise recorded
traits reliably to determine their frequency in relevant populations. Who
counts as an adult, rather than a mature-looking teenager? Where do the
lines between brown, russet, and red sweatshirts lie? What is the difference
between a beard and a week's worth of stubble? But similar issues already
arise in court when surveillance footage is used for identification purposes,
and there is no reason in principle why they are any less amenable to

adversarial testing and increasing acuity and standardization than the
examination of radiographs of chemically probed DNA samples to
distinguish one allele from another based on length and thickness.o1 If
there is a will to aggregate the probabilities of thousands of human
attributes that can point to or away from particular criminal suspects, there
is a way to estimate them reliably.

199,

Both prosecutors and defense lawyers are already taking advantage of related

possibilities. See, e.g., 2oo9 NAT'L ASS'N JUSTICE INFO. SYS. CONFERENCE AGENDA, available at

http://najis.org/presentations/2oo9 (access by downloading zip file and opening "2009
agenda" file); Forensics 41I: How To Find Byte Marks, INNOCENCE PROJECT OF MINN.,
http://www.ipmn.org/forensics_41 l-2010.php (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). Topics at the latter
legal-training program included "recovering lost clusters of the digital DNA files ... from a
crime labs computers [sic]"; "Forensic Aspects of Cell Phones, IM, Mobile Technologies, and
Social Networking"; "Forensic Document Examination"; "Video Evidence in the Courtroom";
and an inventory of retail services for "forensic video, audio and image analysis" and "latent
print processing." Id.
200.
See Press Release, Target Corp., Forensic Overview (Apr. 14, 2009), available at
http://pressroom.target.com/pr/news/forensics-support.aspx?ncid=2462 2
(noting
that
Target's forensic labs in Minneapolis and Las Vegas received American Society of Crime Lab
Directors' "[ajccreditation for digital evidence (video analysis, audio analysis and image
analysis) and latent fingerprint analysis"); Target Corp., Presentation at National Association
for Justice Information Systems Conference: Intelligence: Gathered, Analyzed, Disseminated &
Managed (Sept. 15-17, 2009), available at http://najis.org/presentations/2oo 9 (access by
downloading zip file and opening "NAJIS Handout Sept. 15-17 200911] target" file); see also
Brandt Williams, Target's State-of-the-Art Forensics Lab Catches More than just Shoplifters, MINN. PUB.
RADIO (Oct. 21, 201 1), available at http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/
2011 /1 O/21/target-forensics-lab/

(discussing the details of Target's Minneapolis-area forensics

lab).
201.
See, e.g., United States v. Shabazz, 564 F. 3 d 280, 286-87 ( 3 d Cir. 2009) (admitting
testimony on whether the defendant did or did not appear in surveillance footage);
Washington v. State, 961 A.2d ilo,
i14-19 (Md. 2oo8) (treating admission of compiled
images from surveillance videotapes as non-harmless error, given the lack of authentication);
supranotes 142-84 and accompanying text.
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A GGREGA TiVE USE OFNON-EXCLUSIONARY NON-MATCHES OUTSDE OFCOURT

Our discussion thus far has focused on using aggregative analysis to
reveal a reasonable doubt in court. As non-exclusionary non-matches in the
DeLuna case reveal, however, police and prosecutors are at least as likely to
underuse aggregative analysis as the courts. 20 2 Unlike the parties in criminal
trials, police detectives are not legally constrained in their use of statistical
techniques in their investigations.203 Yet, police often do not notice, much
less capture, the raw materials for such analysis: the full array of potential
identifying markers associated with a crime that may or may not match lateridentified suspects. For reasons we develop below, police (as well as everyone
else) are congenitally more interested before the fact in "big" evidence, such
as confessions and eyewitness identifications, than "small" matches. Then,
after the fact, police have no incentive to attend to or disclose what turned
out to be "small" non-matches.204 Notwithstanding our own and the wider
academic literature's fascination with the possibility of aggregative analysis in
court, the uses and benefits of those techniques outside of court are even
more important to factor into our analysis below.
V.

COGNITIVE, STRUCTURAL, AND LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS To USING NONEXCLUSIONARY NON-MATCHES

Above, we posit a burglary-murder case in which police base an
apparently strong case of guilt against a suspect on an eyewitness
identification and a combination of the female victim's missing stocking tops
and discovery of different stocking tops in the defendant's possession. We
then show how probabilities associated with a series of non-exclusionary
non-matches-evidence suggesting that the fatal blows were administered
left-handed, though the defendant is right-handed; a cigarette butt found in
the victim's foyer, though neither she nor the defendant smokes; and
features of the defendant that do not match descriptions of a man seen at
the crime scene-could aggregate to a reasonable doubt that might escape
notice absent systematic aggregation.°5 In this Part, we explain why, in the
absence of systematic aggregation, it is likely that powerful cognitive,
structural, and legal forces will lead actors in the criminal justice process to
undervalue "small" non-match evidence and risk convicting the innocent.

See supra Figure 2.
For example, good police practice calls for investigators to lay down a fine-meshed
grid at crime scenes, then to videotape and meticulously examine the contents of each cell. See
infra note 499.
204.
See infra notes 329-57, 396-407 and accompanying text.
205.
See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
202.

203.
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COGNITIVE RESISTANCE

Heuristic Economization

1.

Human heuristic biases are unconscious cognitive tendencies to
oversimplify the evaluation of uncertain probabilities in all facets of decision
making. Such biases help explain the overvaluation of "big" matches and
undervaluation of "small" non-matches.
laureate

Daniel

Kahneman,

a

rich

°6

Starting with the work of Nobel

literature

documents

the

human

tendency to reach judgments that seem intuitively correct but are logically
and empirically false because they screen out categories of information that
basic physical rules of the universe make crucial to the achievement of

accurate judgments.07
2.

The Representativeness Bias

Consider the representativeness bias, which strongly predisposes human
decision makers inaccurately to estimate the probability that individuals in
category

"A"

(defined

by

one

or

more

personal

traits)

also

have

characteristic "B" (defined by a different trait or set of them) by asking how
often individuals with characteristic B also have characteristic A.-0s Imagine a
police detective assessing the probability that the person who committed a
robbery (characteristic A) for which there are many possible suspects has a
prior record of robbery convictions (characteristic B). Because characteristic
B (being a robber) is "representative" of, or resembles, characteristic A
(committing a recent robbery), the intuitive assessment of the probability

2o6. See, e.g., Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REv. 683, 704 (1999) ("Because our cognitive limitations preclude us from thinking
deeply about more than a small fraction of the issues that bear on our values, behavior, and
welfare, we rely on mental shortcuts that leave us misinformed in many contexts, even seriously
wrong."); Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: UnderstandingPerceived Risk, inJUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 464-65 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)
("[H]euristics ...are employed to reduce difficult mental tasks to simpler ones. Although they
are valid in some circumstances, in others they lead to large and persistent biases with serious
implications for decision making....").
207.
See, e.g.,
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 7-8 (2011); Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, inJUDGMENT AND DECISION
MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 35 (Terry Connolly et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000).

2o8. See Daniel Kahneman

& Amos Tversky,

Subjective Probability: A Judgment of

Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430, 431 (1972) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky,

Subjective Probability] ("A person who follows this heuristic evaluates the probability of an
uncertain event, or a sample, by the degree to which it is: (i) similar in essential properties to its
parent population; and (ii) reflects the salient features of the process by which it is
generated."). For example, presented with a description of an individual with traits
stereotypically associated with librarians and asked to assess whether it is more likely that the
person is a farmer, salesman, physician, or librarian, subjects consistently, but mistakenly, pick
librarian. Even if only a small fraction of salesmen are "bookish" while nearly all librarians are, a
"bookish" person is more likely to be a salesman than a librarian because there are so many
more salesmen than librarians. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 207, at 35.

2013]

THE EVIDENCE OF THINGS NOT SEEN

that a "known" prior robber committed a recent robbery tends to be very
high. In fact, however, the probabilistically correct answer depends not only
on the prior robber's resemblance to the current robber but also on the
base rate of people in the suspect pool with characteristic B (having a prior
robbery conviction). Although a past robber probably is more likely than the
average person with no prior record of robbery to commit a new robbery,209
it is not necessarily true that a recent robbery was more likely than not
committed by someone with a prior robbery conviction. Because the
proportion of prior robbery convicts in the pool of all possible suspects is
likely to be fairly low-most people with access to the crime scene probably
have no criminal record-it may be more likely that a recent robbery was
committed by a first-timer than by a repeat offender. The representativeness
bias thus disposes observers-police, prosecutors, and jurors included2
focus on the fact that a convict-suspect is more likely to be the robber than
any one of the potential suspects without a criminal record and to ignore the
more important fact that the culprit is more likely to be a member of the
group of potential suspects who do not have a prior record. An intuitively
satisfying but probabilistically risky effort to search for more evidence to
implicate the prior convict-or even his arrest-may ensue, rather than
additional investigation of all suspects, which could well be called for. More
generally, and regardless of occupation and expertise, human decision
makers seem to be hardwired to use only resemblance-the seemingly more
"individualized" or "personalized" evidence-and not base-rate information
'-to

when both have valuable information to contribute.'1

Bayes' Theorem helps to formalize the mistake the representativeness
bias impels. Adapting one of Kahneman's famous experiments,212 suppose
we know that X, an unidentified bank robber, exhibits behaviors associated

209.

See LEMPERT ET AL., supra note 99, at 483 n.251

(discussing recidivism rates for

robbery).
210. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles to, and Opportunitiesfor,
Police Getting the Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right, 8 OHIO ST.J. CRIM. L. 7, 42-45 (2010)
(discussing susceptibility of police to cognitive biases); see also Gudjonsson, supra note 1o6, at
695 (claiming that the lower the base rate of guilt among those interrogated by the police, the
greater the risk of a false confession because police interrogate more innocent persons).
21 1.
See, e.g., Ward Casscells et al., Interpretationby Physicians of Clinical LaboratoryResults, 299
NEW ENG. J. MED. 999, 1000 (1978) (finding that Harvard Medical School faculty tended to
neglect base rates when estimating the effect of a specified rate of false-positive diagnoses for a
particular disease); Itiel E. Dror & David Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC
IDENTIFICATION 6oo, 612 (2oo6) (demonstrating "the vulnerability of experts to contextual
effects"); Richard H. Thaler, Illusions and Mirages in Public Policy, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION
MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER, supra note 207, at 85, 90 ("Cognitive illusions
influence representatives, senators, presidents-even so-called experts are not immune.");
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 207, at 50 ("The reliance on heuristics and the prevalence of

biases are not restricted to laymen. Experienced researchers are also prone to the same
biases ... ").
212. See Tversky & Kahneman, supranote 207, at 35.
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with the stereotype of a radical bookseller (say, for example, he seems to be
a fan of obscure utopian novels like those found in the getaway car) and we
want to know how likely it is that X is a bookseller in order to decide
whether to expend resources investigating members of that occupation.
Bayes' Theorem provides the correct equation for answering this question:
the prior odds that an individual in the suspect pool is a bookseller (B)stated as the ratio of booksellers to non-booksellers in the relevant
population-multiplied by the likelihood that X is a bookseller given that X
has characteristics stereotypically associated with radical booksellers. The
latter likelihood is also a ratio: the probability (P) that the evidence (E)
would exist if the culprit is a bookseller (B) divided by the probability the
evidence would exist if the culprit is not a bookseller.213 More simply, the
likelihood ratio is the probability that booksellers behave in the way X did
divided by the probability that non-booksellers behave that way. The
calculation police detectives might make before deciding to infiltrate or
surveil book shops can be represented as follows:
PriorOdds x Likelihood Ratio = Subsequent Odds
(Bs in suspect pool/non-Bs in suspect pool) x (PE(B)) / (P E(not B)) = Subsequent Odds

Assume that booksellers comprise 5% of the suspect population, so the
prior odds are 5 to 95 (1 to 19) that X is a bookseller. Even if 97% of
booksellers tend to exhibit the behavior X exhibited, and only 6% of the
rest of the population do, there still is a less than even chance (46%) that X
is a bookseller:
PriorOdds x Likelihood Ratio = Subsequent Odds " Odds Stated as Percent Probability
1/1 9 x .97/.o6 = .97/1.14 ) 46%

Although X probably is not a bookseller, the representativeness bias will
lead most observers to the opposite conclusion. Round up (or, at least,
investigate) the nearest booksellers! The representativeness shortcut is to
focus on the probative value of X's bookish trait-that is, how much greater
the likelihood-ratio numerator is than the denominator (.97 vs. .o6)-and
ignore the effect of the priorodds.
Consider next the effect of the representativeness bias in a criminal case
in which the evidence against the defendant is an eyewitness identification
as to which there is small chance of a mistake, say 2%. The probability of
guilt is the prior odds that the defendant is guilty multiplied by the likelihood
ratio associated with the identification. The prior odds are at least partly a
function of the number of suspects. If the defendant is one of five suspects,
each as likely as the other to have committed the crime, the prior odds of
guilt are I to 4. If the defendant is one of 5ooo such suspects, the prior odds

213.

See supra notes 6o-62 and accompanying text.
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are i to 4999. Here, the representativeness bias may lead police,
prosecutors, and jurors to treat the identification as equally powerful,
whether there are ioi possible suspects or only 3, even though in the
former case the probability of guilt is at best only 33% (i/oo

x

1/.02

1/2

33 %), while in the latter case the probability of guilt approaches 96%
(1/2 X I/.o2 = I/.o4 " 96%).
This last example helps explain why study subjects tend to value
eyewitness identifications and confessions more than circumstantial
evidence that is as strong or stronger, such as a ballistic match.214 Unlike an
individual who admits guilt or was singled out as the culprit by an eyewitness,
a bunch of striations on a hunk of metal do not resemble our idea of a
criminal. The overvaluing of "personalized" evidence relative to even strong
forensic evidence holds true even when experimental subjects are presented
with information quantifying the prior odds of guilt or liability, the
probabilities associated with the forensic or other evidence, and the
probability that an eyewitness is mistaken given a documented history of
perceptual mistakes in the same situation.15 Even when the possibility of
inaccurately estimated subjective probabilities is removed, study subjects give
more weight to "individualized" or "representative" eyewitness and
-4

confession evidence than to other stronger evidence.

214.

6

2
1

See, e.g., Heller, supra note 36, at 244-45, 248-50 (discussing studies, including one in

which "jurors overestimated the accuracy of eyewitness identifications by more than 5oo%"
(citing John C. Brigham & Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of ProspectiveJurors To Estimate the
Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 19, 24 (1983))); Deanna L. Sykes &
Joel T. Johnson, ProbabilisticEvidence Versus the Representationof an Event: The Curious Case of Mrs.
Prob's Dog, 21 BASIc & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 199, 208 (1999)

(discussing limitations of

subjective evidence); Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability
Enough?, 62J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSCHOL. 739, 742 (1992) (similar).
215. In an influential experiment, Professor Wells presented mock jurors with two
scenarios in a civil case involving a dog that was run over by a bus. Wells, supra note 214, at 741.
The bus could only have been operated by either the Blue or Grey Bus Company, and each
company had the same number of vehicles. Id. In one case, a weigh station official logged in a
"Blue Bus" on the road in question ten minutes before the dog was run over, a ten-minute drive
down the road, but the official acknowledged that his records mistake Grey for Blue Buses 2o%
of the time. Id. In the other case, tire-track marks at the scene of the accident were found to
match 8o% of the Blue and only 20% of the Grey Buses. Id. at 743. Although Wells designed
both scenarios to create an equal, 8o% probability of Blue Bus liability, judges, psychology
students, and business students were, respectively, four, five, and nine times more likely to find
the Blue Bus Company liable in the eyewitness case than in the tire-track case. Id.
216. See Heller, supra note 36, at 244, 255-58 (arguing that juror overvaluation of
eyewitness compared to forensic testimony is due not to misevaluation of evidence but to a
"psychological" tendency to ignore certain kinds of evidence); see also David L. Faigman & A.J.
Baglioni, Jr., Bayes' Theorem in the Trial Process:InstructingJurors on the Value of StatisticalEvidence,
12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 14 (1988) (discussing studies documenting "individuals' reluctance

to use statistical information when making causal attributions"); D.H. Kaye & Jonathan J.
Koehler, CanJurors Understand ProbabilisticEvidence?, 154 J. ROYAL STAT. SOc'Y 75 (1991 ); Brian
C. Smith et al., Jurors' Use of ProbabilisticEvidence, 2o LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 49, 52-54 (1996)

(discussing studies showing persistence of heuristic mistakes even after jurors were trained in
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When presented with an eyewitness identification, confession, or other
personalized evidence that "represents" a guilty person, human decision
makers intuitively anchor on the likelihood ratio associated with the
evidence-and especially, as we argue below, on the numerator value of that
ratio-and ignore the prior odds or effect of the number of potential
suspects. When the evidence is overtly probabilistic, however, the bias does
not come into play, and intuitive decision makers are likely to be more
attentive to whether there are other suspects who might match the evidence.
The representativeness bias will particularly disadvantage the defense
relative to the prosecution, obscuring reasonable doubt that exists, in the
common situation in which the prosecution's case is primarily based on an
identification or confession and the defendant's evidence is mainly based on
a collection of only "small" non-matches.17 The disadvantage likely will
remain even if the non-matches undermine the personalized evidence itself,
as when traits of a suspect identified by an eyewitness do not match the
witness's initial description of the culprit or a confession includes details
contrary to the known facts of the crime.
Adding to the problem, experimental studies show that human decision
makers do not simply overvalue eyewitness identifications and confessions by
ignoring prior odds while giving other evidence of guilt the correct weight.
Human intuitions systematically give evidence of guilt that is not "direct" or
is quite evidently "circumstantial"-including some kinds of forensic
evidence-less weight than Bayes' Theorem shows it deserves. 18s Professor
Kevin Jon Heller's comprehensive review of the research exposed "an
unsettling paradox": although circumstantial evidence of guilt "is far less
likely to lead to a false conviction than direct evidence, jurors are...
reluctant to use it to convict," to the point of risking "false acquittal."19
The representativeness bias helps explain why "direct" evidence is
overvalued relative to a correct Bayesian analysis, but it does not explain why
"circumstantial" evidence is undervalued. The next three Subparts discuss
Bayesian analysis); Smith et al., supra note 43, at 413 (concluding that jurors often overvalue
weak and ambiguous forensic evidence). But see infra Part VI.A (discussing research indicating
that graphic and other simplified representations of Bayesian analysis can substantially increase
lay decision makers' use, understanding, and accuracy in applying Bayesian reasoning).
217.
See supra notes 1-44 and accompanying text (discussing Matthews/Hayes and DeLuna
cases); infra notes 314-2o and accompanying text (discussing Mayfield case).

218.

See Heller, supra note 36, at 251-52 (describing a study involving a hypothetical

murder case in which five groups of mock jurors were invited to use blood-typing evidence to
assess the probability of the defendant's guilt and underestimated the probative value of the

evidence relative to the Bayesian norm by 8o-ioo%, with the disparity being "greatest when the
evidence was the most incriminating" (citing Jane Goodman,Jurors' Comprehension and Assessment
of ProbabilisticEvidence, 16AM.J. TRIAL ADVOC. 361, 368-73 (1992))); see also Paul Bergman, A
Bunch of Circumstantial Evidence, 3o U.S.F. L. REV. 985, 986 (1996) (noting public
misconceptions about the weakness of "circumstantial evidence"); Lisa L. Smith et al., supra
note 43, at 410, 414 nn.9-1 1, 15 (citing sources).
219.

Heller, supra note 36, at 244-45.
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other cognitive biases that explain the latter effect, particularly the
undervaluation of non-exclusionary non-matches.
3.

The Simulation, Confirmation, and Certainty Biases

Professor Heller has identified three heuristic biases-simulation,
confirmation, and certainty-that dispose jurors to undervalue
circumstantial evidence of guilt and overvalue identifications, confessions,
and other direct evidence. Although Heller's juxtaposition of undervalued
"circumstantial" and overvalued "direct" evidence of guilt is different from
our distinction between undervalued "small" non-match evidence of
innocence and "big" evidence of guilt, including "circumstantial" DNA and
fingerprints as well as "direct" identifications and confessions, his analysis
aids our argument and bears summary.
a.

The Simulation Bias

The simulation bias leads individuals who imagine a scenario in which
X is true (e.g., that candidate X will beat candidate Y in an election) to
believe thereafter that the probability of X is higher than she previously
believed it to be.-20 This tendency holds even when subjects are presented

with information that, from a Bayesian perspective, should make them
22
realize that the pre- and post-simulation probabilities are the same. '
Heller argues that eyewitness identification testimony and confessions
trigger the simulation bias by providing a "high-coverage" narrative about
what happened that automatically, if not always accurately, increases the
intuitive decision maker's assessment of the probability that the scenario is
true.222 By contrast, "circumstantial" evidence of guilt, even fingerprint or
DNA evidence that Bayesian analysis reveals to be stronger, has no
simulation effect.".3 It wears a counter-factual on its sleeve: the possibility,

however small, that someone else has the same web of lines in a part of his
or her fingerprint, or that a different firearm was used that leaves the same

220.
See John S. Carroll, The Effect of Imagining an Event on Expectations for the Event: An
Interpretation in Terms of the Availability Heuristic, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 88, 9o-92
(1978) (describing research indicating that imagining a scenario increases subjects' assessment
of its likelihood); Heller, supra note 36, at 26o-61; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The
Simulation Heuristic, inJUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supranote 2o6,
at 20 1; see also Philip Broemer, Ease of Imagination Moderates Reactions to Differently Framed Health
Messages, 34 EUR.J. SOCI.PSYCHOL. 103, 115-16 (2004) (showing that anti-smoking and other
public-health messages are more likely to affect behavior when they force viewers to imagine
particular behaviors and outcomes). The hindsight bias is a version of the simulation bias when
experiencing an actual event makes it seem more foreseeable than it was. See, e.g., Hartmut
Blank et al., Hindsight Bias: On Being Wise After the Event, 25 SOC. COGNITION 1 (2007).

221.

SeeHeller, supra note 36, at 26o-61.

222.
See id. at 296. "Coverage" refers to the proportion of the overall event that the
evidence portrays or "covers."
223. See id.at 265.
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pattern of striations on bullets it fires as the firearm in evidence in the case,
or that the defendant was framed. Adding to the disparity, direct evidence in
the form of an eyewitness identification or confession is "vivid," meaning
that it is "representational" or seems to present a single reality; "narrative" in
that it comes in the especially accessible form of a relatively coherent story;
"univocal" in that it points in a single direction; and appears to be
"unconditional."224

By

contrast,

circumstantial

evidence

is

"pallid,"

"abstract," or, one might say, class-based because it reports what is true of
categories of phenomena; "rhetorical" in that it comes in the harder-todigest form of an argument (if X, then probably Y); "polyvocal" because it
suggests multiple possibilities; and "probabilistic."225
The vividly simulating effect of eyewitness statements and confessions is
likely to sway police and prosecutors when they decide whom to arrest and
charge, especially when that evidence is the only high-coverage scenario
before them. Once they are exposed to such a scenario that reasonably
seems to explain almost everything that happened, they will "tend to cease
the simulation process and fail to consider alternative scenarios that may
' 6
The effect may be somewhat mitigated at trial
imply a different outcome."22
because defense counsel during trial and jurors during deliberations can
offer alternative theories about what happened and emphasize the regret
jurors should feel if they convict an innocent person-two mechanisms that
can diminish the simulation effect.2-7 Insofar, however, as the alternative

theory is based either on circumstantial evidence or reasonable doubt (i.e.,
is pallid, abstract, rhetorical, polyvocal, and probabilistic) it will not supply a
compelling counter-narrative or get any of the extra "simulation" or
"representativeness" bounce that eyewitness and confession evidence gets. 28
Additionally, the tendency of jurors to overvalue the reliability of what
people say, especially about themselves, gives eyewitness and confession
evidence an additional systematic advantage over "circumstantial"
evidence.229
224.

See id. at 264-69.

See id.; see also Richard K. Greenstein, DeterminingFacts: The Myth of Direct Evidence, 45
Hous. L. REv. 18ol, 1815 (2009) (offering a similar explanation of the "linguistic trick" that
leads people to treat a witness's "nam[ing of] the 'fact of consequence' directly" as providing
more immediate access to the truth than circumstantial evidence, which "names a different fact,
which is connected to the fact of consequence [only] by inferential steps").
226. See Edward R. Hirt & Keith D. Markman, Multiple Explanation:A Consider-an-Alternative
Strategyfor DebiasingJudgments,69J. PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL. 1o69, 1084 (1995).
227.
See Heller, supra note 36, at 281 (noting that "priming"-calling to mind alternative
scenarios-"is determined by two factors: whether the structure of the decision-making task
encourages the consideration of alternative scenarios; and whether the nature of the decision
itself involves 'negative affect' such as fear or regret").
228.
See id. at 292-96 (arguing that reasonable-doubt and circumstantial-evidence defenses
deprive jurors of the sorts of evidence that are most capable of combatting confirmation bias).
229.
See id. at 285-88. Heller describes experimental evidence of "truth bias," a tendency to
believe another's autobiographical statements regardless of their truthfulness, id. at 285-86,
225.
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b.

The ConfirmationBias

Even if police, prosecutors, and jurors recognize that the scenario
provided by an eyewitness or confessing suspect may be mistaken or
fabricated, the "belief-perseverance" aspect of the confirmation bias still may
deter them from considering alternative theories. Once humans adopt a
theory, they tend to search for and give excessive weight to evidence that
confirms it and to discount new evidence or interpretations of existing
evidence that undermine it.3

°

Professor Barbara O'Brien asked subjects to

read a hypothetical criminal case file. Partway through reading the file, half
of the participants were prompted to specify the person they believed
committed the crime. The other participants identified the perpetrator only
at the end. O'Brien found that the former subjects remembered more facts
consistent with the guilt of their identified suspect than the latter subjects,
picked more lines of investigation focused on that suspect, and interpreted
ambiguous evidence to be more consistent with that suspect's guilt.2s3
Even when an investigator is driven to find every bit of evidence she
can, the confirmation bias disposes her to organize the search based not on
how much evidence she can find that points to all possible suspects but on
how much she can find that points to the particular suspect who she initially

and "narrative transportation," which leads listeners to accord more weight to the credibility of
statements in the form of stories. Id. at 287-88. Because of truth bias, for example, jurors barely
outperform chance when trying to detect whether a witness is lying or mistaken and become
even less effective when told to be suspicious of particular categories of witnesses. Id. at 285; see
also Melanie C. Green & Timothy C. Brock, The Role of Transportationin the Persuasivenessof Public
Narratives,79J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 701, 719 (2000) (" [T] ransportation is unlikely in

response to even very good rhetoric [but] .. .can readily occur in response to a moderately
compelling narrative."); Heller, supra note 36, at 287-88 (presenting evidence indicating that
when a hearer becomes immersed in a story, "all of her mental systems-attentive, imagistic,
emotive-converge on its events" and "her ability to think critically about the narrative is
reduced, making her more likely to believe that it is authentic").
230.
See, e.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 207, at 209-12 (discussing the illusion of validity); Karl
Ask & Pdr Anders Granhag, Motivational Sources of Confirmation Bias in CriminalInvestigations: The
Need for Cognitive Closure, 2

J.

INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOL. & OFFENDER PROFILING 43, 46 (2005);

Alafair S. Burke, Improving ProsecutorialDecision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1587, 1594-6o (2oo6) [hereinafter Burke, Improving ProsecutorialDecision
Making]; Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 512, 516-20 (2007); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of
Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2oo6 WIS. L. REV. 291, 309-17; Gudjonsson, supra note to6, at
699; Charles G. Lord et al., Consideringthe Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for SocialJudgment, 47 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1231,

1232-40 (1984); Mark Snyder & William B. Swann, Jr.,

Hypothesis-TestingProcesses in Social Interaction, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1202, 1205
(1978) (finding that simply phrasing an inquiry as whether a person is an "extrovert" or instead
whether she is an "introvert" affects the conclusions reached); Paul C. Giannelli, Confirmation
Bias, CRIM.JUST., Fall 2007, at 6o, 61.
231.
See Barbara O'Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors That Aggravate and
Counteract Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 315, 328-29
(2009).
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identified.23s Once the representativeness and simulation biases lead
investigators or jurors to overvalue an eyewitness's or a confessing suspect's
narrative about what happened, those individuals will tend to "adhere to
their beliefs [though] the original evidential basis of the beliefs is shown to
be flimsy, false, or nonexistent,"33 and this obeisance will likely deter them
from searching for alternative theories even after finding out that the
witness may well be mistaken or untruthful.34 The perseverance of beliefs
based on visibly discredited evidence gets even stronger when the
discredited information is part of a "coherent, causally related account in
which a single or minimal correction has a significant impact on the
construal of meaning."235 The bias is stronger, therefore, when triggered by
evidence in the form of even a weak narrative and is less strong when
6
triggered by even powerful but isolated chunks of evidence.13
Notice that every attribute of "circumstantial" evidence that keeps it
from getting the artificial representativeness, simulation, and confirmation
bounces even more clearly diminishes the weight decision makers are likely
to accord to the non-exclusionary non-match evidence of innocence that
interests us here. Non-exclusionary non-matches are as pallid, abstract,
rhetorical, non-transporting, polyvocal, and probabilistic as evidence can
be.237 They are non-representational and non-narrative; often fall in a

232.
See id. at 318;Joep Sonnemans & Frans van Dijk, Errors in JudicialDecisions:Experimental
Results, 28J.L. ECON. & ORG. 687, 712-13 (2012) (reporting results indicating that mockjurors
stop searching for additional evidence even when rewarded for finding more and are disposed
to convict before reaching a reasonable probability of guilt).
233. Martin F. Davies, Belief Persistence After Evidential Discrediting: The Impact of Generated
Versus Provided Explanations on the Likelihood of Discredited Outcomes, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 561, 562 (1997); see also Craig A. Anderson, Abstract and Concrete Data in the
Perseveranceof Social Theories: When Weak Data Lead to Unshakeable Beliefs, 19J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 93, 95 (1983).
234. See Heller, supra note 36, at 292-93 ("Once jurors conclude that the defendant is most
likely guilty, . . . a confirmation bias sets in that limits their ability to recognize evidence
inconsistent with that conclusion." (emphasis omitted)); Derek J. Koehler, Explanation,
Imagination, and Confidence in Judgment, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 499, 503 (1991) (presenting
experimental evidence that once human decision makers gain confidence in a belief, "inertia
sets in, which makes it more difficult to consider alternative hypotheses impartially").
235. Heller, supra note 36, at 289 (quoting Hollyn M.Johnson & Colleen M. Seifert, Sources
of the Continued Influence Effect: When Misinformation in Memory Affects Later Influences, 20 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:

LEARNING MEMORY & COGNITION

1420,

1432

(1994))

(internal

quotation marks omitted).
236. Id. at 290 (" [B] elief-perseverance is strongest when the evidence supporting a belief is
concrete and causally coherent. Circumstantial evidence is neither . . . ."); see also Sykes &
Johnson, supra note 214, at 209-10 (noting that "comprehension of probabilistic information
does not mandate a belief in the reality of a specific event," while comprehension of a narrative
of what happened does mandate that belief, so "a belief engendered by an assertion about an
event is more difficult to mutate than a belief based solely on statistical probabilities").
See supra notes 223-29.
237.
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demeaned category of the "absence" or "negation" of evidence;3 8 typically
qualify as "small" evidence given their limited probative weight; by definition
come with obvious explanations for why they are present without bearing on
guilt or innocence (e.g., that someone besides the culprit left the trace at
the scene, or that small discrepancies in witnesses' memories are inevitable);
and gain strength only by being statistically aggregated with other evidence.
The tendency of all circumstantial evidence of guilt to invite convincing
counter-theories and thus carry the seeds of its own destruction is
particularly true of non-exclusionary non-match evidence of innocence.39
The effect of the simulation, truth, and confirmation biases may be
formalized in the same Bayesian terms as we used to formalize the effect of
representativeness. A Bayesian analysis of evidence of guilt multiplies the
prior odds of guilt by the likelihood ratio, with the latter defined as the
probability that the evidence would exist if the suspect is guilty divided by
the probability that it would exist if the defendant is innocent. When
triggered by narrative evidence such as a confession or eyewitness testimony
identifying a culprit, the representativeness bias leads lay decision makers to
ignore the prior odds variable in the equation. When triggered by the same
narrative evidence, the simulation and confirmation biases seem to lead lay
decision makers to anchor on the likelihood-ratio numerator (the
probability that the incriminating evidence exists because the defendant is
guilty) and to discourage consideration of the denominator (the probabilities
associated with counter-scenarios under which the evidence exists though
the defendant is innocent).
c.

The Certainty Effect

Another bias, the "certainty effect,"4o helps explain why lay decision

makers give less weight to circumstantial evidence than a proper Bayesian
analysis requires. When facing risks, intuitive decision makers accord greater
value than is rationally warranted to outcomes they believe are "certain"
(i.e., that do or purport to eliminate the risk entirely). People tend to
"overweight outcomes that are considered certain, relative to outcomes

238.

See Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences
1o 1, 1019-21 (1978) (criticizing the use

Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 CALIF. L. REV.

of negative inferences from the absence of evidence in making factual determinations in court
cases).
239. Heller, supranote 36, at 299-300. Professor Heller stated that "jurors generally find it
relatively easy to imagine [counter-theories] in a circumstantial case. The polyvocity of
circumstantial evidence means that the prosecution's own evidence is available for use in
[counter-theories], and strong priming normally ensures that jurors will pay close attention to
any" competing evidence and counter-theory offered. Id. at 300.
240.
See KAHNEMAN, supra note 207, at 311-12; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 17, 19-22 (Daniel

Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
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which are merely probable"24, and "greatly undervalue a reduction in the

probability of a hazard in comparison to the complete elimination of that
hazard."242

There is a built-in fudge factor, as well. Naive decision makers tend to
treat the nearly complete reduction of even a very serious risk as if it removed
all risk, creating a false sense of security.243 "[S]tudies of insurance markets

have shown that we tend to ignore small risks until their probability passes a
certain threshold, at which point we overspend wildly to prevent them."244
Additionally, differing ways of describing identical risks can nudge
individuals into perceiving the situation as either presenting an excessively
comforting zero risk-"pseudocertainty," Tversky and Kahneman call it245- or an excessively worrisome probability of harm. Subjects asked to say
whether they would volunteer to receive a vaccine that halves the risk of
contracting a serious disease expected to afflict 20% of the population are

substantially less likely to volunteer than subjects invited to receive a vaccine
that would reduce to zero the probability of contracting one of two equally
serious strains of the disease but have no effect on the other strain when
each strain afflicts io% of the population.246 Although the risk reduction in
both cases is the same-from 20 to io%-the description of a treatment as
reducing one of two equal risks to zero evidently makes it more attractive
than a treatment described as reducing the same overall risk by half.
Professor Heller hypothesizes that jurors faced with eyewitness
testimony about what happened or a defendant's confession are much more
likely to treat the evidence as establishing a "certainty" of guilt than even
very strong circumstantial evidence that creates a much higher probability of
guilt.247 Jurors may reach a certainty conclusion about eyewitness and

241.

Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 240, at 20.

242.
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, in CHOICES, VALUES,
AND FRAMES, supra note 240, at 9; see also Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 2o6, at 707 ("Because

people attach intrinsic value to certainty, their well-being improves more when the probability
of an adverse effect drops from 1.o% to zero than when it drops from 2.1% to i.o%."); George
F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 276 (2001) (showing that
individuals will pay far more to reduce their risk of poisoning "from 5 in i o,ooo to o than from
15 in 1o,ooo to 5 in 1O,OOO," though the latter reduction is twice as large); Thaler, supra note
21 1,at 87-88 (similar).
243.
See Paul Slovic et al., Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect,
Reason, Risk, and Rationality, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 311, 318 (2004) ("[R]esponses to uncertain
situations appear to have an all or none characteristic ... ").
244. Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Cass Sunstein Wants To Nudge Us, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (May 13,
201o), http://www.nytimes.cOm/2010/05/16/magazine/ i 6Sunstein-t.html?-r=-2&pagewanted=al
(discussing RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008)).

245. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framingof Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,
SCIENCE 453, 455 (1981).
246. Paul Slovic et al., supra note 2o6, at 48o-8 s (discussing vaccination study).
247. Heller, supra note 36, at 283-85.
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confession evidence, Heller suggests, because such evidence establishes a
ioo% probability of guilt as long as the testimony is accurate, and because
the simulation and confirmation biases and the ability to blame the
witness-not themselves-if the testimony is wrong gives jurors more
confidence in the accuracy of the evidence than it deserves.148 By contrast,
circumstantial evidence of guilt-no matter how reliable the testimony
presenting it-always comes with some doubt.249 That doubt is magnified by
the stress jurors experience when contemplating the possibility of an
inaccurate verdict.5o As a result, Heller reasons, 'jurors will dramatically
underweight the 'merely probable' circumstantial case and dramatically
overweight the 'considered certain' direct case-making the circumstantial
case seem far more likely to result in a false conviction," though the opposite
often is true.2 5A

There is a problem with Heller's argument that he acknowledges but
does not entirely solve: "the probative value of direct evidence is never
i.o ....[s]ince the credibility of a witness always rests in part on
circumstantial evidence," which, by hypothesis, always carries with it a
possibility that the eyewitness or confession testimony is in error. 5 If
certainty arises only in the perceived absence of any overt possibility that the
hazard will generate a harm,253 there is no reason why a i% chance that a
witness is lying should trigger any less anxiety than a 1%, or even
o.ooooool% chance that someone else besides the defendant also shares
the same fingerprint or alleles as the perpetrator. Although Heller makes a
strong case that jurors greatly underestimate the probability that
eyewitnesses are mistaken or lying, or that a confession is untrue, and
overestimate the risk of error posed by "circumstantial" evidence, he doesn't
fully explain how these decision makers get beyond the "possibility" of
witness inaccuracy to a certainty that the truth is known. Heller notes that
"[t]he certainty effect says that jurors 'overweight outcomes that are
considered certain,' not outcomes that are certain."254 But Heller does not
predict when a false certainty will or will not arise, especially in the face of
steps-cross-examination, closing argument, and the heterodox perceptions

248.

See id. at 268; supra notes 220-21, 233-36 and accompanying text.
See Heller, supra note 36, at 268.
250. See id. at 282 ("Jurors believe that they 'should make accurate determinations with
respect to the actual guilt or innocence of the defendant,' and they experience considerable
stress in trying to comply with that self-imposed mandate. Moreover, jurors consistently report
that choosing a verdict is the most stressful aspect of a criminal case." (quoting William C.
Thompson et al., InadmissibleEvidence andJuror Verdicts, 40J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 453,
454 (1981) (footnote omitted))).
251.
Id. at284 .
252.
Id. at 284-85 (internal quotation marks omitted).
253.
See supra notes 240-46 and accompanying text.
254.
Heller, supranote 36, at 285 (quoting Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 240, at 20).
249.
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of a dozen demographically diverse jurors255-designed to rub jurors' noses
in facts of uncertainty.
Part of the problem, we believe, lies with Heller's distinction between
"direct" evidence (primarily eyewitness testimony and confessions) and
"circumstantial" evidence (such as fingerprints and DNA). The more telling
distinction, we believe, is between what we have called "big" evidenceincluding DNA and fingerprints, as well as eyewitness testimony and
confessions-and "small" evidence, such as non-exclusionary non-matches.
More precisely, the difference is between evidence with opposite profiles in
regard to the Bayesian likelihood ratio. On the one hand is evidence that
leads jurors to anchor on a high numerator probability that the evidence is
present because the defendant is guilty, and to ignore the denominator
possibility that the evidence appears although the defendant is innocent. On
the other hand is evidence that is so likely to be present under all
circumstances that the high denominator value obscures the fact that the
numerator probability is even higher. At the limit, the difference is between
two kinds of evidence that would provide lay decision makers with the
irresistible security of true certainty. The first is evidence that lay decision
makers assess as having a high number in the numerator and a zero in the
denominator. This condition would characterize a "unique" and certain trait
of the perpetrator that the defendant shares. The second is evidence lay
decision makers assess as having a high denominator and a zero in the
numerator. This condition characterizes traces that are likely to arise in the
regular course of everyday life and have no relation to the crime-a dust
mote found at an outdoor crime scene. In the next Subpart, we hypothesize
that the certainty intuitive decision makers crave leads them to embrace
what others have exposed as the powerful myth of "uniqueness" or
"individualization" in regard to "big" evidence, placing it in the former of
these two imaginary categories, with a high numerator and no denominator.
In the following Subpart, we hypothesize the opposite craving, namely the
comforting ability to treat individually "small" evidence as entirely irrelevant,
with a high denominator and no numerator.
4.

The "Uniqueness Fallacy"

The "pseudocertainty" effect reveals that intuitive decision makers can
be persuaded that certainty exists when in fact it does not.5 6 We hypothesize
that intuitive decision making might itself do the persuading. Note that the
certainty effect is not so much a cognitive bias that generates demonstrable
mistakes as an irrational preference that leads to sub-optimal outcomes. The

255. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, Truth,Justice, and theJury, 26 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
143, 153 (2003) ("Juries that begin deliberations holding heterogeneous verdict preferences
tend to have more in-depth deliberations than juries that begin with a more homogeneous view
of the evidence.").
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dynamic is the one Samuel Johnson famously associated with second
marriage: the triumph of hope over experience. Johnson referred not to an
unrealized mistake but to an advertent preference for what one would like
2
to be true over an opposite possibility that one knows is probably true. 57
If the "certainty" achieved by reducing risk to zero creates vastly more
advertent pleasure for people than other comparable or greater reductions
of risk,255 then it would not be surprising if our brains, preferring hope over
experience, look for ways to obtain the security inherent in zero-risk
situations by finding certainty where it does not exist. This could explain
why individuals respond favorably to advertised pseudocertainty, when risks
obviously remain. When identity is the issue, a particularly powerful way to
achieve certainty is to conclude that characteristics matching perpetrator P
and suspect S are unique, and thus that S is P. There may be important
psychological benefits to believing in the truth of that equation, triggering
the "certainty" bounce even in the face of an obviously more accurate
judgment that may generate an anxious indecision, namely, that there is a
strong probability that S is P, but a real possibility that he is not. We know
jurors agonize over the possibility of making a mistake that leaves a killer at
large or convicts an innocent person, giving them every psychological
incentive to find shelter in even a false sense of certainty. 9
The Bayesian equation (prior odds x likelihood ratio = subsequent odds)
again helps model the heuristic process we describe. The values in the
likelihood ratio (the probability that evidence would exist if the fact of
consequence were true divided by the probability that the evidence would
exist if the fact of consequence were not true) generate an intuitive and
easily calculated measure of the probative weight of evidence through
another equation:
(numerator- denominator)/ numerator = probative value.2

°

256.

See supra note 245 and accompanying text.

257.

JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 301 (David Womersley ed., Penguin

Books 2008) (1791).
258. See supra notes 240-46 and accompanying text.
See supra note 25 o and accompanying text.
26o. See Lempert, supra note 53, at 1047. As we note above, it is conventional to define
probative weight as the likelihood ratio itself (i.e., its numerator divided by its denominator). See
supra note 53 and accompanying text. We prefer here, however, to use a different definitionnumerator minus denominator-to provide a simple reflection of the fact that probative weight
is based on a comparison of the strength of the numerator and the denominator probabilities:
if they are equal, there is no probative weight; if they are very different in size, probative weight
is high. Subtracting one from the other thus nicely illustrates probative value in a
computationally simple way: if Judge A evaluates a piece of evidence by estimating a numerator
value of .7 and a denominator value of .2, and ifJudge B provides a different estimate of, say, .5
for the denominator and .4 for the numerator, it is easy to see thatJudge A values the evidence
five times more (. 7 -. 2 = .5) than Judge B (.5 - .4 = .z). When, however, the comparison isn't
between two different assessments of the same evidence but between two assessments of different
259.

638

IOWA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 98:577

Notice that a high numerator is necessary to a very high probative value
but is not sufficient for it. Very weighty evidence requires a low denominator
as well. This construct suggests a shortcut that the mind may take when it
discerns uniqueness where none exists. A very high numerator-a high
probability that evidence would exist if the defendant were, say, dangerous
or guilty-triggers decisive action irrespective of the denominator, as if the
denominator is zero or close to it. The shortcut is to 'Jump to the numerator
conclusion" when the numerator is high and ignore or underestimate the
denominator value. The result, we argue, is the uniqueness fallacy: to act
decisively upon realizing that the defendant is behaving the way a guilty or
dangerous person behaves without stopping to consider whether an
innocent or benign person might also behave that way.
This dynamic helps explain the irrational impulse towards certainty
triggered by "direct" evidence. Eyewitness testimony and confessions trigger
the representativeness, simulation, and confirmation biases, which in turn
trigger a confidently high numerator probability that the evidence would
exist if the defendant was guilty, which in turn triggers the cognitive
economization of not wasting time considering the denominator. The result
is to perceive the evidence as unique to the bad guy: a high numerator over
a nonexistent denominator. Unlike Heller, however, we expect this
phenomenon to accompany all high-numerator evidence, including DNA
and fingerprints, as well as identifications and confessions.
One demonstration that human decision makers seem to anchor on
large numerator probabilities to the exclusion of the denominator is
Kahneman's famous "Linda" experiment.261 Test subjects read a profile of
"Linda," who was a "31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright" woman
who was a philosophy major in college, worried about "discrimination and
social justice" and "participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations." 262 Subjects
were then asked to predict the most factually likely of two descriptions of
Linda: that "Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement" or
that "Linda is a bank teller."26 3 Most subjects committed the logical fallacy of

believing that the former probability is greater than the latter, though the
category of bank tellers is perforce larger because it contains the category of

pieces of evidence, it is necessary to use the more complicated equation in text to provide a
common scale for comparison: subtracting the denominator from numerator then dividing by
the numerator. More precisely, we should say that probative weight is the absolute value of that

result of that equation, reflecting the fact that a numerator of .7 and a denominator of .2 yields
evidence that is equally weighty as evidence with a numerator of .2 and a denominator of .7.
The former evidence supports a hypothesis of guilt, and the latter supports a hypothesis of
innocence, but the evidence in each case is equally strong.
261. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The
ConjunctionFallacy in ProbabilityJudgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 293, 297 (1983).
262.
Id.
263. Id. at 299.
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bank tellers active in the feminist movement. 64 Using our Bayesian model, it
appears that the proper answer to this problem requires observers to add the
numerator (the evidently large probability that a bank teller concerned with
socialjustice is a feminist) to the denominator (the lower probability that the
average bank teller is a feminist), but that most people anchor on the former.
Even as accomplished a scientist as Stephen Jay Gould admits falling prey to
this fallacy: "I know [the right answer], yet a little homunculus in my head
continues to jump up and down, shouting at me-'but she can't just be a
bank teller; read the description.'" 65 We hypothesize that Gould's
homunculus is the uniqueness fallacy: the intuitive tendency of the very high
numerator to control, though it should be logically obvious that adding even
a tiny denominator will produce a probability higher than the numerator by
itself.
A study by Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff provides further evidence that
decision makers pay closer attention to the numerator than the
denominator probability.266 They asked subjects to identify information that
they would like to have when assessing the likelihood that a man drawn at
random from a list of business executives and professors was a professor
given that the man was a member of the Bear's Club.26 7 Two of the pieces of
information that subjects could request were the percentage of professors at
the party who were members of the Bear's Club (in Bayesian terms, the
numerator probability) and the percentage of business executives at the
party who were members of the Bear's Club (the denominator
probability) .268 Most subjects wanted to know the former probability; few
6
cared about the latter one.2 9

The "uniqueness fallacy" also appears to be a prevalent and
longstanding concern in everyday trials. Consider Federal Rules of Evidence
404 through 41 1. The first of these rules forbids jurors to rely on an

inference all of us draw every day: the propensity, or representativeness,
inference of action in conformity with a trait of character inferred from
prior bad acts.2 7o The rest of these rules forbid jurors to rely on an inference
of guilt or liability from evidence of a consciousness of guilt on the part of
some actor, as when someone follows-up an accident with a so-called

264.
Id. at 299-300; see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 207, at 328-29 (discussing
"denominator neglect").
265.
STEPHEN JAY GOULD, BULLY FOR BRONTOSAURUS: REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY
469 (1991).
266. Ruth Beyth-Marom & Baruch Fischhoff, Diagnosticity and Pseudodiagnosticity, 45 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1185 (1983).
267. Id. at1186.
268. Id. at 1187.
269. Id. at1188.
270. FED R.EVID. 4 04(a) (1),
404(b) (1).
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"subsequent remedial measure,"'27 offers to settle a civil claim,272 pays the
medical expenses of an accident victim,273 cops a plea to a crime,274 or
insures himself against liability for accidents.275 In the same category are
evidence doctrines discouraging inferences of a consciousness of guilt from
silence in the face of a criminal accusation,7 6 from a suspect's flight from
arresting police officers,277 or from a refusal to take a polygraph test.27 s
Each of these rules is typically justified as a way to neutralize jurors'
tendency to jump to the conclusion that someone who did something bad in
the past is likely to offend again or that people who act guilty are guilty,
without considering innocent explanations for the behavior.279 Rephrased in
Bayesian terms, the law fears that jurors will treat the evidence as a
confession of guilt and (via the representativeness, simulation, and other
biases) erroneously jump to a conclusion based on the high numerator
probability without considering a non-inconsequential denominator
probability. The law consequently excludes the evidence to be sure that
jurors do not treat it as unique to guilty people (i.e., as having a high
numerator value and a denominator worth no attention). Because
blameworthy people so often take remedial measures, cover their tracks, run
away, or stay silent in the face of accusations, the law expects jurors to
assume that anyone who has done one of these things is guilty and ignore
the fact that innocent people often do them too. Careful people, that is, may
quickly repair unanticipated hazards, and innocent people may worry that
polygraphs will mistake nervousness for guilt, but the law expects the high
numerator value to keep jurors from considering these possibilities.
Notice two things about the triggers for these common forms of juror
misestimation. First, as Heller predicts, the simulation and, we would add,
the representativeness biases are strongly at play.28 ° The forbidden evidence
either reveals a trait resembling that of a guilty person (prior bad acts) or
271.

Id. 407.

272.

Id. 4o8(a) (2).

273.

Id.409.

274.

Id. 41o(a)(i).

275.

Id. 41'.

276. See, e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 61o, 61g (1976) (White, J,, concurring) (barring
inferences of guilt from silence following arrest and Miranda warnings); Griffin v. California,
38o U.S. 6og, 615 (1965) (barring inferences of guilt from an accused's failure to testify).
277. See, e.g., KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENcE 406-o7 (6th ed. 2oo6).
278. See, e.g., deVries v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 716 F.2d 939, 945 (ist Cir. 1983)
(holding inadmissible a witness's refusal to take a polygraph exam); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Barnett
Bros., Inc., 289 F.2d 30, 34 (8th Cir. 1961) (same). See generally BROUN et al., supra note 277, at
403-13 (noting the evidence rules' resistance to inferences of a consciousness of guilt from
conduct).
279. See, e.g., LEMPERT ET AL., supra note 99, at 279-81, 333-41 (discussing that evidence
rules are designed to counteract jurors' tendency to overestimate the value of evidence of
conduct in which guilty people often engage).
28o. See supra Part V.A.2.
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simulates the endgame of many crimes (actions to avoid apprehension).
Second, contrary to what Heller predicts,28 ' every one of these examples is
triggered by "circumstantial"-rather than "direct"-evidence: by inferences
of a consciousness of guilt from action that has multiple interpretations.
Clearly, the law assumes from long experience that human decision makers
are disposed to turn what obviously is circumstantial or probabilistic
evidence into unique evidence.
To be sure, as Heller argues, the same thing happens with eyewitness
identifications and confessions, which are thought to be "direct,"
"individual," and "unique," but are not. Contrary to Heller's assumption,
however, they are "circumstantial" not only because they depend upon
probabilistic inferences of witness credibility s 2 but also because they depend
8
upon aggregations of many only modestly "probable" individual matches.1S
An eyewitness identification is powerful because the suspect matches
multiple known attributes of the perpetrator, any one of which (e.g., small
eyes or bushy eyebrows) is uninteresting. A confession is powerful because
the details of the confessor's story match so many of the known details of the
crime, any one of which (a dog barked, then a light was turned on) is
uninteresting.
The same thing also happens, however, when none of the heuristic
biases Heller discusses applies, and yet a disposition arises to treat merely
probabilistic matches between traces associated with a crime and a suspect as
if they involve a unique trait of a single human being. This occurs, for
example, when DNA is treated as a "genetic fingerprint," though it is
powerful only because of a non-unique aggregation of traces, each of which
is no more telling than the fact that both the perpetrator and defendant are
balding or left-handed.2S4 Recent scholarship also criticizes the myth of
"uniqueness" and "individualization" as to tool marks, handwriting, bite
marks, shoe prints, and fingerprints.28 5 Fingerprints are especially
281.

See supra text accompanying notes 247-51.
See Heller, supra note 36, at 247 (assuming that credible eyewitness identifications and
confessions have a probative value of 1,or too%).
283.
See supra PartIV.A.i.
284. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text; see also LEVY, supra note 113, at 26
(noting the misimpression of DNA as "agenetic fingerprint" that "isindividually specific" and
"does not belong to any other present or future person on earth"); Jonathan J. Koehler, When
Are People Persuaded by DNA Match Statistics?, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 493, 5o8-09 (2001)
(finding that when told that the probability of a coincidental match between DNA found at a
crime scene and a suspect's DNA is low, mock jurors assume the probability of a coincidence or
error is essentially zero); Smith et al., supra note 43, at 410, 414 nn.9-s1, 15-16 (noting that
jurors' tendency to "under-value . . . probabilistic evidence when compared to a Bayesian
calculation" does not hold for DNA); Neufeld & Colman, supra note 94, at 50 (decrying the
misimpression that DNA "identifies the 'genetic code' unique to an individual and indeed is as
unique as a fingerprint").
285.
See, e.g., Simon A. Cole et al., Beyond the Individuality of Fingerprints:A Measure of
Simulated Computer Latent Print Source Attribution Accuracy, 7 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 165, 165
282.
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interesting. Although powerful only because of a confluence of many
individually uninteresting matches of lines and intersections, fingerprints
are so reflexively thought of as unique that "fingerprint" and "unique" are
dictionary synonyms.s 6 Our "uniqueness fallacy" thus explains what the
biases Heller describes cannot fully elucidate: why criminal process decision
makers overvalue not only narrative or "direct" evidence that invokes the
simulation bias, but also entirely circumstantial evidence that does not
invoke that bias, such as drops of blood and mazes of lines left by oily
human hands. The "uniqueness fallacy" fools jurors into treating all such
"big" evidence as if it captured a "unique," certainty-assuring property of the
perpetrator when it does not.
5.

The "Irrelevance Fallacy"

The flip side of the "uniqueness fallacy," which disposes naive decision
makers to perceive uniqueness where none exists, is an "irrelevance fallacy,"
which leads them to assume that the weight of "small" evidence-nonexclusionary non-matches, for example-is so small that the evidence bears
no consideration at all. There are hints of this fallacy in a study of the weight
subjects give to a match between a rare blood-type and hair characteristics of
an unknown perpetrator and an identified defendant.3 7 The authors were
"most surpris[ed]" by "how easily people can be persuaded to give no
weight" at all to such evidence when presented with the so-called "Defense
Attorney's Fallacy." 88 An example of this fallacy is the statement that "even
though only 2% of the population has characteristic X, in the entire
population of this city, there are hundreds of people with that rare trait." 8 9
This is a fallacy because the realistic number of suspects in most cases is
smaller than the entire population, so that it remains true that any member
of the suspect group is unlikely to have the rare trait.
Consider as well how the numerator-focused dynamic we describe above
likely works against defendants relying on "small" non-matches. Assume that

(2oo8); Cole, supra note 102, at 234-36, 242 (juxtaposing a so-called "fingerprint examiner's
fallacy" to "broad" scholarly agreement "that individualization and uniqueness [do not]
constitute the proper conceptual foundations for forensic identification"); Jonathan J. Koehler
& Michael J. Saks, IndividualizationClaims in Forensic Science: Still Unwarranted, 75 BROOK. L. REV.
1 187, 1191-94 (2010); Michael J. Saks &Jonathan J. Koehler, The IndividualizationFallacy in
Forensic Science Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199, 203-o8 (2oo8) (criticizing the "individualization
fallacy"); sources cited supra note 96.
286. Definitions for Fngeoprin4 DEFINMONS, http://www.definitions.net/definition/Fingerprint
(last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (providing one of Random House Webster's College Dictionary's
definitions of fingerprint as "any unique or distinctive pattern that presents unambiguous
evidence of a specific person, substance, disease, etc."). But see supra note 96 and accompanying
text (explaining why fingerprint evidence is not unique).
287. See Thompson & Schumann, supra note 167, at 182 n.6.
288. Id. at 182.
289. See id. at 171 (offering a similar example).
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police find a partially smoked cigarette at the scene of a crime with which D
is charged, and that D is a non-smoker. In considering the likelihood ratio
associated with the cigarette butt-a ratio D claims has a larger denominator
than numerator, meaning the evidence tends to prove innocence--the jury
will quickly see that the numerator is quite large. The probability of finding
a cigarette butt at a crime scene is high whether or not the perpetrator
smokes. Given the high numerator, the jury may fail to realize that the
denominator is modestly larger because it includes all of the innocent ways
the butt could have gotten there, plus one guilty way: being left behind by a
smoker-culprit who is not the defendant. Indeed, a disposition to ignore the
denominator here is very similar to the bias the "Linda" study reveals.9 The
evidence is weak, to be sure, because the difference between the numerator
and denominator is small. But the irrelevance fallacy predicts that the jury
will assume the evidence would be present even if the non-smoker
defendant was guilty (anchoring on the numerator) and ignore-treat as
irrelevant-the slightly higher denominator. If D tries to trigger the
simulation effect by arguing to the jury that the affray must have dislodged
the cigarette from the mouth of a smoker-perpetrator who is not the
defendant, the prosecutor can easily counter with far more likely scenarios
in which a non-perpetrator dropped the butt.
Now, assume there are two such non-matches-the cigarette butt and a
stray maroon button at the scene that is not associated with the victim's
clothing or with the defendant's clothing when he was arrested right after
the crime. As we develop above, although both non-matches are weak
evidence of innocence, they can gain probative steam if the jury will consider
them together, aggregating the individually small probability of innocence
associated with each. If, however, the irrelevance fallacy leads jurors to reject
each non-match as unworthy of their cognitive attention, there are only
zeros to aggregate.
Recent studies by Lisa L. Smith and colleagues are also of interest here.
They asked jury-eligible subjects to rank the value as proof of guilt of certain
DNA, fingerprint, and bloody-shoeprint evidence found at or near a crime
scene that matched a suspect.2 9I Each subject considered several examples

that differed in terms of whether the evidence was highly "relevant" (likely
to have been left at the scene by the perpetrator) or weakly "relevant" (many
innocent explanations for the suspect's blood, fingerprint, or footprint
being there) and of whether the evidence was highly "mobile" (easily could
have been migrated to the crime scene apart from the crime) or not very
"mobile" (evidently was left during the crime) .292 Based on these features,
the authors created four categories of evidence (high relevance/low

290.

291.
292.

See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text.
Smith et al., supra note 43, at 410.
Id. at 41o--11.
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mobility, low relevance/low mobility, etc.) that ranged from being likely to
reveal a match of a "unique" trait to being likely to be coincidental or
"irrelevant."93 Evincing considerable facility with circumstantial evidence,
subjects drew sharp and appropriate distinctions among different items of
evidence, recognizing that some were strong, some were weak, and some fell
in between.294
In a second study, the researchers presented three groups of subjects
with descriptions of evidence at a murder trial.95 Each group received the
same evidence (mainly witness statements) with one exception.n96 One
group was told that strong DNA evidence (high relevance/low mobility)
linking the defendant to the crime was also present.97 Another group was
told that moderately probative DNA evidence (high relevance/high
mobility) was present. A third group was told that weak DNA evidence (low
relevance/high mobility) was present.9 8 The mock jurors estimated the
strength of the evidence twice: after hearing all the evidence and after
hearing closing statements.99 At the latter stage, the subjects also rendered a
verdict.3oo Again, the three groups of mock jurors appropriately
distinguished the cases based on the relative strength of the forensic
evidence, estimating a slightly higher probability of guilt in the strong than in
the moderately strongDNA cases and a much smaller probability of guilt in the
weak DNA case.30 So far the news is all of the dog-bites-man variety.3o2
The study ends, however, on a man-bites-dog note. In rendering
verdicts, the mock jurors were much more likely to find the strong DNA
defendant guilty (40%) than the moderately strong DNA defendant (23%),

even though their estimates of the probability of guilt were only slightly
different in the two cases. 03 And they were not that much more likely to find
the defendant guilty in the moderately strong DNA case than in the weak
DNA case (15%), though they recognized that the probability of guilt was
much greater in the former case.3° 4 Notwithstanding the mock jurors'
rational estimates of the probability of guilt based on differences in the
strength of the DNA evidence, when reaching a verdict the subjects paid less
attention to the probabilities than to the ease with which they could reach a

293.

Id.

294.

See id. at 411.

295.

Id. at 411-12.

296.
297.

Id. at 412.

298.

Id.

299.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 4 12-13.
See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
Smith et al., supranote 43, at 413.
Id.

300.
301.
302.

303.

304.

Id.
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"uniqueness" conclusion (proving guilt) or could identify alternative
explanations for the DNA evidence and ignore it (leading to acquittal).s5'
This may provide evidence of the uniqueness fallacy in the former case and
the irrelevance fallacy in the latter one.
A final set of experimental studies suggests that we have understated the
tendency of decision makers to misevaluate the importance of "small"
evidence, such as non-exclusionary non-matches. Rather than treating weak
evidence of a factual proposition as having no value, lay decision makers
seem to treat it as having a negative value (i.e., as enhancing confidence in
the contrary proposition). These studies also support a hypothesis
introduced above, that the irrelevance fallacy increases the impact of the
uniqueness fallacy.
Each of the studies in question presents subjects with two scenarios, one
involving only strong evidence, say, of a defendant's guilt, plus weak
evidence that either supports the same proposition or supports a contrary
conclusion. In each study, subjects gave the weak evidence the opposite
effect that Bayesian analysis requires. When the strong and weak evidence
both supported the same conclusion, the inclusion of the weak with the
strong evidence made decision makers less likely to accept the proposition
than when only the strong evidence was presented. When the strong
evidence supported one proposition and the weak evidence supported a
contrary conclusion, the inclusion of the weak evidence made decision
makers substantially more likely to reach, and more confident in, the
conclusion supported by the strong evidence then when the strong evidence
was considered by itself.306 Of course, if decision makers were proceeding in

305. See id. at 412-13; see also Sonnemans & van Dijk, supra note 232, at 27 (reporting
research conclusions showing that jurors are good at estimating relative probabilities but tend
to ignore them when reaching a verdict, jumping to stronger conclusions than warranted). The
uniqueness and irrelevance fallacies help explain why jurors overvalue eyewitness identifications
because they appear to match a unique trait of the defendant to that of the perpetrator but
underappreciate an eyewimess's inability to identify the defendant. See supra notes 251-53 and
accompanying text; see also Hunter A. McAllister & Norman J. Bregman, JurorUnderutilization of
Eyewitness Nonidentifications: Theoretical and PracticalImplications, 71 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 168,
169-70 (1986).
3o6. See, e.g., Philip M. Fernbach et al., When Good Evidence Goes Bad: The Weak Evidence Effect
in Judgment and Decision-Making, s19 COGNITION 459, 460, 462-63, 465 (2o 1) (providing
experimental evidence of the "weak evidence effect," and concluding that the presentation of
.weak positive evidence . . . could actually be deleterious"); James Friedrich & Paul Smith,
Suppressive Influence of Weak Arguments in Mixed-Quality Messages: An Exploration of Mechanisms via
Argument Rating, Pretesting, and OrderEffects, 2o BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 293, 293--94,
298-302 (1998) (citing numerous studies as well as their own findings that "[wleak arguments
were not simply ignored or discarded; they actually undermined the persuasiveness of the
message as a whole"); Adam Harris et al., "Damned by Faint Praise". A Bayesian Account, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 31 ST ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY 292, 292

(N.A. Taatgen & H. van Rijn eds., 2009), available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/
publications/harris/FPconference.pdf (citing studies supporting the "Boomerang effect" of
weak evidence); Lola L. Lopes, ProceduralDebiasing,64 AcTA PSYCHOLOGICA 167, 170 (1987)
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the additive fashion that Bayesian logic requires, the result would be the
opposite: strong evidence bolstered by weak evidence would be slightly more
persuasive than the stronger evidence by itself, and strong evidence
diminished by weak contradicting evidence would be slightly less likely to
convince than the strong evidence by itself.37 The studies further reveal that
(1) the more weak evidence that is presented, the greater the "boomerang"
effect it has;3oa (2)

the bias arises even when both the strong and weak

evidence are obviously "circumstantial";°9 and (3) the bias appears even
when experimental conditions rule out the possibility that subjects treated
the weakness of the evidence of X as proof that X probably was not true, as
might occur if subjects assumed that stronger evidence of X would have
been presented if X were true.3' 0
This so-called "weak evidence effect" appears to result from an increase
in confidence in the proposition supported by the strong evidence when its
power is compared to that of the weak evidence.3" Decision makers, that is,
seem to act as if each new item of weak evidence supporting the same
proposition as the strong evidence is averaged into the numerator value in
the Bayesian likelihood ratio, causing probative value to diminish,312 while
each weak item supporting a proposition contrary to the strong one is
treated as representing the denominator value, causing the estimated
probative value of the evidence to increase because the difference between

(citing studies); Craig R.M. McKenzie et al., When Negative Evidence IncreasesConfidence: Change in
Belief After Hearing Two Sides of a Dispute, 15J. BEHAv. DECISION MAKING 1, 2, 4, 7-8, 13 (2002)
(discussing and presenting studies demonstrating the "reverse impact" of weak evidence).
307. See Harris et al., supra note 3o6, at 292 ("[A]ssuming the evidence is not known to be
misleading, evidence in favor of the hypothesis, no matter how weak, can never decrease the
person's degree of belief in the hypothesis.").
3o8. See, e.g.,
Friedrich & Smith, supra note 3o6, at 294 (citing studies finding that belief in
the proposition supported by weak evidence "did, in fact, diminish as increasing numbers of
weak arguments were added").
309. See, e.g., McKenzie et al., supra note 3o6, at 6-8 (using examples involving evidence
that is conventionally understood as direct and evidence conventionally understood as
circumstantial).
310.
See, e.g.,
Fernbach et al., supra note 3o6, at 462 ("The results are inconsistent with the
pragmatic explanation that weak evidence is interpreted as negative with respect to a default
expectation [of stronger evidence than was presented]."); Friedrich & Smith, supra note 3o6, at
298-300; McKenzie et al., supra note 3o6, at 6-8, 14 (noting questions put to subjects
indicating that they understood the weak evidence as (weakly) suggesting innocence, even
though its introduction made them more likely to convict than when the weak evidence was not
presented); cf Harris et al., supra note 3o6, at 292, 296 (identifying circumstances in which the
reverse effect of weak evidence is consistent with a reasonable inference that the evidence
presented would not be weak unless the opposite proposition were true under the
circumstances).
311. See, e.g., McKenzie et al., supra note 3o6, at 2-13.
312.
See, e.g., Lopes, supranote 3o6, at 170 (discussing studies in which subjects appear to
be engaging in such averaging).
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the numerator and denominator seems to have increased.3's Weak contrary
evidence thus appears to operate by magnifying the "uniqueness" effect of
"big" evidence-causing the evidence to appear stronger-even as the
irrelevance fallacy leads the decision maker to ignore "small" evidence
entirely.
An example of how the uniqueness and irrelevance fallacies can lead
law enforcement astray in a case involving "big" circumstantial evidence of
guilt and "small" non-match evidence of innocence is the FBI's materialwitness arrest of Brandon Mayfield. Mayfield was an Army veteran and family
lawyer in suburban Portland, Oregon, who had married an Egyptian woman
and converted to Islam.3,4 With great fanfare, the FBI arrested Mayfield and

held him for nineteen days as a material witness in connection with the
March

2004

Al Qaeda bombings of the Madrid commuter rail system.3,5

The FBI based Mayfield's arrest on a "ioo% match" between his
fingerprint and partial prints that Spanish authorities had found on a bag of
detonating devices shortly after the explosions.3, 6 The match initially
overwhelmed several non-exclusionary non-matches: Mayfield had no known
expertise as a bomb-maker or access to bomb-making equipment or terror
suspects, had not left the country since 1994, and was rejected as a suspect
by Spanish authorities who contested the fingerprint match and identified
an Algerian immigrant with no connections to the United States as the likely
bomber. Only after Spanish officials examined and rejected Mayfield's
fingerprints a second time did the FBI release him, though it continued to
subject him and his family to intensive surveillance.317

313.
See, e.g., McKenzie et al., supra note 3o6, at 4-7, 14 (presenting findings suggesting
that the extent of the reverse effect of weak evidence increases as the difference in probative
value between the strong and weak evidence increases).
314. See STEVEN T. WAX, KAFKA COMES TO AMERICA: FIGHTING FORJUSTICE IN THE WAR ON

TERROR 6 (2008).

315. See Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1026-27 (D. Or. 2007) ("On
March 11, 2004, in Madrid, Spain, terrorists' bombs exploded on commuter trains, murdering
191 persons, and injuring another i6oo ...."),vacated, 599 F- 3 d 964 ( 9 th Cir. 201o); Susan
Schmidt, American Held in MadridBombings, DAILY (University of Washington) (May 7,2004), http://
dailyuw.com/archive/200 4 /0 5 /0 7 /imported/american-held-madfid-b mbings#.UJ6TGYIe4W8.
316. Mayfield, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1029. "Using standard protocols and methodologies, FBI
fingerprint examiners determined that the latent fingerprint [from Spanish authorities] was of
value for identification purposes" and was "linked to Brandon Mayfield," a result that was
"independently ... confirmed by an outside experienced fingerprint expert." Press Release,
FBI, Statement on Brandon Mayfield Case (May 24, 2004), available at http://www.fbi.gov/
news/pressrel/press-releases/statement-on-brandon-mayfield-case; see also Steven T. Wax &
Christopher J. Schatz, A Multitude of Errors: The Brandon Mayfield Case, CHAMPION, Sept.-Oct.
2004, at 6 ("FBI Senior Fingerprint Examiner Terry Green manually compared the [twenty]
potential matches with the digital image of Latent Fingerprint No. 17 and found a 'too
percent' match with... Brandon Mayfield.").
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OVERSIGHT & REVIEW DIv., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A
317.
REVIEW OF THE FBI'S HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE 82-83 (2oo6), available at
http://wviw.justice.gov/oig/special/so6o 1/final.pdf.
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Mayfield's ensuing lawsuit unearthed FBI records revealing that it had
identified twenty Americans whose fingerprints were "similar" to the Madrid
prints, triggering surveillance of all twenty. Mayfield's name ranked fourth
on the list,3s. perhaps in part because he was married to an Egyptian woman,
converted to Islam, and had provided legal services in a child-custody case to
a man sentenced to prison for attempting to travel to Afghanistan to join the
Taliban.s,9 The FBI subsequently settled the lawsuit for $2 million,
apologized to Mayfield, and blamed the mishap on "an unusual similarity"
between Mayfield's fingerprint and a copy of a print associated with the
Madrid bombings.320
Mayfield's case was rife with heuristic traps. The representativeness and
simulation biases associated with Mayfield's conversion to Islam and
representation of a man with pro-Taliban sympathies evidently triggered a
powerful, if imaginary, scenario of a turn towards Islamic terrorism that
blinded officials to the other suspects in the FBI database with "similar"
fingerprints, not to mention additional suspects that a simple extrapolation
of that number to international databases would have suggested. Via the
confirmation bias, the "ioo% match" and accompanying scenario invoked
the uniqueness fallacy that the fingerprint was personal to Mayfield and the
irrelevance fallacy as to the various, non-exclusionary non-matches. Apart
from the fortuity of parallel Spanish and U.S. investigations, it is unclear
whether or how quickly Mayfield would have been cleared of the many
capital crimes of which he was suspected.
Supplementing the many studies of cognitive fallacies is a growing
literature on practical steps institutions, including the justice system, use or
could use to head off debilitating biaseS.sy' Above, we note how Federal
See Mayfield, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1o27.
SeeWAX, supra note 314, at 6-7.
See Dan Eggen, U.S. Settles Suit Filed &y Ore. Lawyer, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2oo6),
320.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 2oo6/i 1/2 9 /AR2oo6112901179
.html; see also Mayfield v. United States, 599 F. 3 d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing FBI's
agreement to pay compensatory damages of $2 million, destroy the fruits of its surveillance, and
apologize); Apology Note, WASH, POST (Nov. 29, 2oo6), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2oo6/1 1/29/AR2oo6112 9o 115 5 .html.
318.
319.

321.

See, e.g., COMM. ON BEHAVIORAL & Soc. SCI. RESEARCH TO IMPROVE INTELLIGENCE

ANALYSIS FOR NAT'L SEC. ET AL., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS FOR
TOMORROw:

ADVANCES

FROM

THE

BEHAVIORAL

&

SOCIAL

SCIENCES

84-87

(2011)

(recommending various ways of quantifying and aggregating probabilities to increase the rigor
and performance evaluation of intelligence analysis); KAHNEMAN, supra note 207, at 417-18
("Organizations are better than individuals when it comes to avoiding [heuristic] errors,
because they naturally think more slowly[,] . . . have the power to impose orderly
procedures[,] ...[and] can institute and enforce the application of useful checklists, as well as
more elaborate exercises, such as reference-class forecasting and the premortem."); THALER &
SUNSTEIN, supra note 244, at 177-78; Burke, Improving ProsecutorialDecision Making, supra note
23o, at 1613-31 (proposing procedures prosecutors and courts can use to mitigate
confirmation bias in deciding whom to charge and whether to produce exculpatory evidence);
Colin Camerer & Ad Vepsalainen, The Economic Efficiency of Corporate Culture, 9 STRATEGIC
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Rules of Evidence 404 through 411 diminish the representativeness bias and
tendency to overvalue the numerator and undervalue the denominator in
assessing evidence.s22 Likewise, "devil's advocate" mechanisms can mitigate
simulation, certainty, and confirmation bias.s2

Such mechanisms force

people to imagine scenarios and present arguments that counter their initial
dispositions,s34 or assign decisions to large and diverse groups likely to
generate competing scenarios on their own.35 This literature raises two
questions. First, do our existing legal procedures and rules sufficiently

MGMT. J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 115 (1988); Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on
Corporate Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1407 (2002) (discussed infra note 325);
Kenneth R. Hammond et al., Improving Scientists'Judgments of Risk, 4 RISK ANALYSIS 69, 72-77
(1984); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 20912 (2oo6) (arguing for legal policies that help eliminate problems generated by "bounded
rationality" and cognitive biases); Lopes, supra note 3o6, at 173, 178-79 (presenting evidence
that the weak-evidence effect can be diminished by causing decision makers expressly to
acknowledge the value (however weak) and the direction of the inferences supported by weak
evidence before considering it along with other evidence); Jesse M. Pines, Profiles in Patient
Safety: Confirmation Bias in Emergency Medicine, 13 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 90, 92-93 (2006)
(listing ways hospital emergency physicians can combat confirmation bias); Michael J. Saks &
Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processingand Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 123, 131 (198o) (describing many areas in which decision aids are utilized to prevent
bias).
322.
See supra notes 270-75 and accompanying text.
323. The name, of course, comes from mechanisms that the Catholic Church has long used
to increase the reliability of canonization decisions. THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (Charles G.
Herbermann et al. eds., 1907) (stating that the duty of "Advocatus Diaboli" is "to prepare in
writing all possible arguments, even at times seemingly slight, against the raising of any one to
the honours of the alter"); see also, e.g., Craig A. Anderson &JamesJ. Lindsay, The Development,
Perseverance, and Change of Naive Theories, 16 SOC. COGNITION 8, 24 (1998) (using a "counterexplanation" process in which the subject "imagines and explains how a different [scenario] is
(or might be) true" to counteract confirmation bias); Burke, Improving ProsecutorialDecision
Making, supra note 23o, at 1618 (encouraging prosecutors to avoid cognitive bias "by
generating pro-defense counterarguments to [their] own ... interpretations of the evidence");
Michael R.P. Dougherty et al., The Role of Mental Simulation in Judgments of Likelihood, 7o
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 135, 136 (1997); Lord et al., supra note
230, at 1238-4o (finding that telling experimental subjects to consider the opposite of their
initial hypothesis induced more accurate results than instructing them to be fair and unbiased).
324. See, e.g., Findley & Scott, supra note 23o, at 371; Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B.
Moskowitz, Counterfactualsas BehavioralPrimes: Primingthe Simulation Heuristicand Considerationof
Alternatives, 36J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL 384, 391 (2000) (noting the ameliorative effect
of "priming" study subjects with plausible alternatives); Keith E. Niedermeier et al.,Jurors'Use of
Naked StatisticalEvidence: Exploring Bases and Implications of the Wells Effect, 76 J.PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 533, 541 (1999) (similar).
325. The Constitution arguably adopts this strategy in criminal cases by requiring thatjuries
be comprised of at least six people chosen from venires representing the entire community. See,
e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231-32 n.io (1978) (concluding, based on studies
showing that the chance of convicting an innocent person increases as the number of jurors
decreases, that criminal juries of fewer than six persons violate the Constitution); Diamond,
supra note 255, at 153; cf Dallas, supra note 321, at 1402 (arguing that heterogeneous
corporate boards are less susceptible to confirmation bias because they harbor more competing
views).
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counteract the biases and fallacies we have discussed? If not, then, are there
other measures that could succeed? The next two Subparts conclude that,
on balance, existing procedures and rules aggravate the problem. Part VI
suggests measures that might have an ameliorative effect.
B.
1.

STRUCTURAL DISADVANTAGES

Reasons To Doubt the Adversarial Antidote

By constantly confronting jurors with counter-scenarios and competing
arguments, adversarial processes are supposed to provide an effective
antidote to the heuristic biases described in this Article.326 To whatever
extent investigators, forensic analysts, and prosecutors may commit
themselves, including via heuristic biases, to the "whodunit" theory the state
offers at trial, the defense commits itself and works to commit jurors to
equally vivid alternative possibilities. Sorting through the competing
presentations is expected to induce jurors to focus on relevant aspects of the
base rate, numerator, and denominator in resolving the dispute. There are
two reasons, however, why adversarial procedures do not provide effective
antidotes to the biases against aggregative analysis of non-unique evidence.
First, even experts trained to recognize the ill-effects of cognitive biases
unwittingly succumb to them.327 We should not assume, therefore, that
lawyers are immune and can effectively wean jurors from these errors. Even
if both sides are equally prone to mistakes, there is no reason to expect the
mistakes as a whole to neutralize each other in regard to the search for the
truth in a given case.
Second, the opposing sides of a criminal case are unlikely to be similarly
situated in relation to the representativeness, simulation, confirmation,
certainty, uniqueness, and irrelevance heuristic advantages that we describe.
A party blessed with eyewitness testimony, a fingerprint, or some other kind
of "big" evidence that obscures the aggregation of many only modestly
probative matches and triggers the uniqueness fallacy has numerous
heuristic advantages. Even if the other side has an equally strong case from a
Bayesian perspective, if making that case requires aggregation of the weight
of many bits of "small" evidence, that party will get no uniqueness bounce

326. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 34, 39-40 (H.
Berman ed., 2d ed. 1971) ("An adversary presentation seems the only effective means for
combating the natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which
is not yet fully known." (internal quotation marks omitted)); John Thibaut et al., Comment,
Adversary Presentationand Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REV. 386, 396-97 (1972)
(arguing that adversarial procedures counteract decision-maker bias more effectively than
inquisitorial procedures).
327.
See KAHNEMAN, supra note 207, at 417 ("[M]y intuitive thinking is just as prone to
overconfidence, extreme predictions, and the planning fallacy as it was before I made a study of
these issues."); supra note 2o6 and accompanying text.
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and instead will be disadvantaged by multiple irrelevance fallacies.328 Indeed,
as the next Subparts demonstrate, together with the various heuristic
fallacies, the state's monopoly over crime-scene evidence and first crack at
key witnesses causes exactly this uneven distribution of advantages to recur,
systematically favoring the prosecution over the defense.
2.

The Biasing Effect of the State's Monopoly over the Initial Investigation

The DeLuna case discussed above329 illustrates the government's
monopoly control over initial criminal investigations and its uneven effect
on the fight for heuristic advantage between prosecution and defense. The
murder victim in the case, a store clerk, called 911 to report a "Mexican"
man with a knife in her store. She was heard begging someone to take the
store's money, then screaming and struggling. When police arrived
moments later, they found her drenched in blood and near death after an
assailant had stabbed her and tried to wrestle her into a back room.330
A police audiotape captured the 91 1 call and subsequent radio traffic
while police hunted for a man who had been seen fleeing the store on
foot.33' Prosecutors played the 911 tape at DeLuna's trial but falsely
informed defense counsel that the manhunt portion of the tape had been
recorded over without being saved.3s3 When the manhunt tape came to light
years after DeLuna was executed, it revealed that police had chased another
man along a different path for twenty-five minutes before a call about
DeLuna diverted

attention

to him.333 Multiple

aspects

of the dress,

grooming, and direction of flight of the man police initially chased matched
a description they had from the only eyewitness to the crime: a mustachioed,
shabbily dressed "derelict" who raced north and west behind the store. The
description did not match the clean-shaven, well-dressed DeLuna who was
seen two blocks east of the store seconds after the killing.334 At trial, DeLuna

testified that he had been with a man named Carlos Hernandez earlier that
evening and had seen him attack the convenience store clerk.s33

The

prosecutor branded DeLuna a liar and Hernandez a "phantom,"3 6 and the
jury heard nothing more about Hernandez or anything about his history of
armed convenience store robberies and knife violence, physical resemblance
to DeLuna, or his repeated admissions to stabbing the convenience store

328.

See supranotes

329.

See supra notes 17-34, 44 and accompanying text.

330.
332.
333.
334.

See Liebman et al., supra note 17, at 91 o.
Id. at 736.
id. at 949-50.
Id. at 9 5 1-5 2.
See supranotes 19-2o and accompanying text.

335.
336.

See supranote
See supranote

331.

256-32o

23
25

and accompanying text.

and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
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clerk.337 Nor did the jury learn that at least ten features of the eyewitness's
description of the attacker that did not match DeLuna did match
8
Hernandez.33
When police arrested DeLuna forty minutes after the crime, they
decided against a station-house lineup and took him to the crime scene for a
nighttime show-up identification in a poorly lit parking lot. On the ride over,
DeLuna told the arresting officer he did not commit the crime but knew
who did. Police never followed up or questioned DeLuna.339 When the
squad car arrived at the convenience store, the eyewitness was initially too
scared to view the suspect, but relented when officers surrounded him and
let him view the seated, shirtless and hand-cuffed suspect through the squad
car window while flashlights were trained on his face. After observing
DeLuna for fifteen seconds, the Anglo witness identified him as the
culprit.340 Years later, the witness admitted he had trouble telling one Latino
from another and said he was only "seventy percent sure" of the
identification and would have been only "fifty-fifty" if police had not told
him beforehand that they had found DeLuna cowering under a pickup
truck.34'
Meanwhile, a lone detective and a police photographer had entered the
store where the killing took place. Evidence the two overlooked, never tested
forensically, or failed to disclose to the defense is listed above.342 The
detective found the lock-blade buck knife used to kill the victim, wet with
blood and flesh, but tested it for fingerprints at the scene with graphite
powder, an improper technique for recovering prints from wet and oily
surfaces.343 No prints were found, and the graphite spoiled the knife for
later lab testing performed with proper materials.44 None of the prints
found elsewhere at the scene matched DeLuna.345 Shortly after learning that
an eyewitness had identified DeLuna, and barely an hour after the scene
investigation began, the detective ended it and turned the store back to the
employees.346 They scrubbed it down overnight-wiping away a bloody

handprint, unnoticed by police, on the inside of a window-and opened on

337.

See Mills & Possley, A Phantom, supra note 17.

338.
339.

See supra Figure 2.
See Liebman et al., supra note 17, at 766.

340.

See id. at 762.

341.

343.
344.

See id. at 765 .
See supra Figure 2.
See Liebman et al., supra note 17, at 925.
Id.

345.

Grieg, supra note 17, at 95.

346.

See Liebman et al., supra note 17, at 926.
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time the next morning.47 No one ever saw the intact crime scene in
daylight.34 8
These facts suggest how heuristic biases may affect police officers,
forensic analysts, and prosecutors when they exercise their monopoly over
the initial handling of vast amounts of potential evidence, and the heuristic
advantage that the monopoly affords the state. As we note above, lawenforcement officials are themselves subject to the representativeness,
simulation, and other biases and instinctively expect jurors to be as well.349

Because a case premised on seemingly unique, "big" evidence linking the
defendant to the crime appears to be far stronger than one relying on an
aggregation of "small" evidence, a central law enforcement objective from
the start is to use its exclusive first crack at the crime scene and witnesses to
obtain "unique" evidence: a confession, eyewitness identification, DNA hit,
or fingerprint match. The DeLuna detective's blundering haste to find
fingerprints on the knife is one example. Another is the lengths police went
to secure an eyewitness identification, passing up a more reliable lineup in
favor of a suggestive nighttime show-up, cluing in the witness to the
compromising circumstances of DeLuna's arrest, and allowing the
frightened witness to view the seated, shirtless, and handcuffed suspect
through the window of a squad car while a circle of police officers provided
protection against the presumed-guilty suspect and spotlighted his face with
flashlights.35o
If "big" evidence implicating a suspect does not immediately appear,
police can keep looking for it without adversarial interference, which only
formal charges can trigger. Once a big-evidence anchor for the state's case
appears, the uniqueness fallacy diminishes investigators' disposition to look
for additional "small" evidence matching the suspect, particularly because
such evidence might not corroborate the "big" evidence and, therefore,
might weaken the state's case. Investigation that does take place tends, at
least subconsciously, to "confirm" what the "big" evidence has simulated and
"represents," namely the suspect's guilt.35' Meanwhile, the irrelevance fallacy

renders invisible any non-matching evidence that already has accumulated.
Given obvious reasons why the non-match could occur though the
defendant is guilty---given, that is, the high numerator value-the modestly
greater denominator probability of innocence will be ignored, leaving
nothing to aggregate with other such evidence into a reasonable doubt.W2
In DeLuna, for example, when the detective ended her scene
investigation upon hearing of the "big" show-up identification, she left
347.

See id. at 912.

348.

See id. at 9o8-27.

349.

See supra note 2o8 and accompanying text.
See Liebman et al., supranote 17, at 761-66.
See supra notes 230-36 and accompanying text.
See supra noteS 287-305 and accompanying text.

350.

351.
352.
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behind numerous undiscovered bits of evidence of identity that may have
matched DeLuna, or may not have matched him and even yielded an
exclusionary non-match. We know about these lost items only by the
happenstance of a rare post-execution investigation. They include a bloody
handprint washed away by a store employee whom no one interviewed at the
time and several items spotted in previously undisclosed police photographs:
" A clump of hair. The eyewitness told police the assailant at one point
had the female victim by the hair, but this was never confirmed. No
mention was made at trial of the absence of foreign hair in DeLuna's
fingernails and on his clothing at the time of his arrest.

53

" Bloody shoeprints. The victim was barefoot, so bloody shoeprints
found inside the store and on the sidewalk outside the store were not
hers. Police made no casts, close-ups, or measurements of the
unnoticed shoeprints and never compared them to DeLuna's blood354
free tennis shoes.
" A wad of chewed gum. The gum evidently was disgorged during the
struggle because it landed on a blood-stained calendar that itself was
55
knocked onto the floor during the melee.3

" Cement or cinderblock shards on a carpet mat where the struggle
occurred. Lab technicians analyzed DeLuna's shoes but were not
3 56
asked to look for rock fragments and reported none.

Also unexplored were several non-exclusionary non-matches that had
appeared before the scene investigation ended: DeLuna's claim that he had
seen another man commit the assault; numerous non-matching aspects of
the eyewitness description, including the culprit's dress, grooming, and
direction of flight; a maroon button at the scene that didn't match DeLuna's
or the victim's clothes; and the absence of even a scintilla of blood on
DeLuna's hands, clothing, and hair, despite the bloodbath officers found at
the crime scene.357
Once a suspect is arrested and counsel is appointed, the process veers
sharply from inquisitorial to adversarial. But the "fair fight" the adversarial
system imagines at this point still may not materialize. The government's
monopoly over the initial investigation already will have allowed it alone to
shape the first and best shot anyone will get at the crime scene and
witnesses, with the goal of obtaining seemingly "unique" evidence of a
suspect's guilt and all the heuristic advantages such evidence affords. As in
DeLuna, the state may have made vital decisions about how many
353.

354.

355.
356.
357.

SeeLiebman et al., supranote 17, at 914, 921 fig.29-B.
See id. at 917-21 & figs.27, 29-A, 29 -B.
Seeid. atgi6-17 &fig.25.
See id. at 916 fig.2 5 ; supra Figure 2.
See Liebman et al., supranote 17, at 731-49, 775-82, 9o8-38; supra Figure 2.
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professionals to assign to the scene investigation, how long and thoroughly
to search, how best to lift fingerprints, and what evidence to preserve and
test. Eyewitnesses also will have been solely at the state's disposal at a point
when their memories were freshest, and things police said and procedures
used forever colored the witnesses' view of what happened. After the state
obtained unique-seeming evidence of a suspect's guilt, it may have allowed
substantial amounts of additional "small" and even "big" evidence to go by
the boards, such as bloody hand and shoe prints and a chance to apprehend
and question alternative suspects. Unique access to the crime scene and
unilateral control over the decision to end the investigation there thus will
have maximized the state's access to "big" evidence and heuristically
powerful scenarios, and let it choose when its theory likely "covered"358 the
highest possible proportion of found "small" evidence, deterring a search
for more. In important respects, the state's monopoly over the initial
investigation will have given it the exclusive power to determine whether
much of the evidence even exists-including "big" evidence pointing away
from the state's prime suspect and a plethora of "small" evidence.
Conversely, the defense may never have a shot at the crime scene or
witnesses that police failed to identify, and the defense will speak to many
found witnesses only after police have shaped their belief about what
happened.359 The only scenario-generating evidence to which an innocent
defendant is assured access is whatever heuristically disadvantageous "small"
non-matches law enforcement happened to discover before shutting down
the investigation and decided to disclose under discovery rules built to apply
only to "big" evidence.36o Even apart from chronic resource disparities,
therefore, the innocent defendant will find it difficult to reconstruct the
clues the state missed or withheld, and with so little to go on, will likely end
up with no scenario to offer and only the weakest of defenses, namely
6

reasonable doubt.3 '

There are other heuristic skews as well. The very job of a detective and
prosecutor is to simulate a "bad guy's" guilt and to rely, if possible, on
evidence that seems to be "unique" to the defendant. Just by describing what
the defendant did in an arrest warrant or indictment, the detective and
prosecutor solemnly commit to the validity of their evil-defendant theory.
Doing so both fuels and feeds off of the simulation, confirmation, and
certainty biases, as well as the uniqueness fallacy as to any "big" evidence on
which they rely. Defense lawyers, by contrast, exist to offer "alternative
hypotheses." The only proposition a defense counsel need embrace is
358.
359.

See Heller, supra note 36, at 296; supra note 222 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra notes 340-41 and accompanying text. State's witnesses are not obliged

to speak to defense counsel and are often advised of that fact by police officers who themselves
typically decline to talk to the defense.
36o.

361.

See infra Part V.C. 3 .
See supra note 228 and accompanying text.

IOWA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 98:577

reasonable doubt. Because defense lawyers trade in the pallid probabilities
necessary to avoid conviction, there is less chance that the zeal they exercise
for their clients will be fortified by the heuristic biases that feed police
officers' and prosecutors' zealous protection of "the People" and "the State."
There is, then, heuristic truth behind the stereotypes of the hard-charging
white knight of a prosecutor pursuing evil without a hint of doubt about the
justness of her cause, and the cynical defense lawyer representing guilty
defendants with his fingers crossed behind his back.
Because many decisions to prosecute and all trials call for an up-ordown decision on a single suspect, rather than a comparison of all possible
suspects, they present decision makers with a single, prominent theory
encapsulated in a prior arrest warrant or indictment and in the state's
opening arguments, case-in-chief, and summation. The question is not
"Whodunit?," but "Did the defendant do it?" From the start, the adversarial
process "simulates" the guilt of one person. In contrast to the numerous
possible answers to the state's initial "whodunit" inquiry-including "we
don't know and are still looking"-the "did the defendant do it?" drama that
the adversarial system presents has only two possible answers: either the
defendant did it or the culprit escaped justice. Of those options, the former
is far more likely to feel like a success than the latter.
For these reasons, and because the obligations of both the prosecution
and defense are satisfied by a belief that the state's "whodunit" narrative is
probably true, almost everything about prosecutions and trials conspires to
imbue the decision maker with the representativeness, simulation, and
confirmation biases. Those biases in turn invest "big," seemingly "unique"
evidence with a false sense of certainty and demean individually "small" nonmatches as irrelevant, whatever their aggregate force. Once infected by
heuristic bias, therefore, key aspects of the adversarial process conspire to
negate the chief protection it claims to offer defendants through the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
The neural hardwiring that prompts us to take cognitive shortcuts is a
final reason to doubt the power of the adversarial system as currently
implemented to neutralize them. The system assumes that by constantly
modeling a battle between sides committed to alternative truths, it can deter
jurors from taking shortcuts and focus them intuitively on counterweights to
biases, such as alternative scenarios, base rates, and denominator values
slightly higher than numerators. As we have seen, however, much of the
heuristic damage occurs during the initial investigation before the
adversarial system kicks in. Worse yet, even true "experts," and surely lay
jurors, succumb to the heuristic homunculus that jumps up and down even
in Stephen Jay Gould's head.362

362. See supranote 266 and accompanying text; see also supra note 211 and accompanying
text (noting that even scientists and other "experts" are susceptible to heuristic biases).
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The question remains whether other existing legal doctrines, such as
the evidentiary rules mentioned above,36s achieve a proper balance,
knocking "big," seemingly "unique" evidence down to size and adding clout
to seemingly "irrelevant" non-exclusionary non-matches. In the next
Subpart, we identify several existing doctrines that actually aggravate the
problem. But all is not lost. In the following Part, we identify steps to achieve
the desired effect.
C.

LEGAL OBSTACLES

Apart from evidence that is irretrievably lost or wiped away, one might
expect legal rules to compensate for structural failings and blind spots. Far
from curing the heuristic inflation of "big" evidence and deflation of
aggregations of "small" evidence, however, legal rules affecting each stage of
a criminal case exacerbate or succumb to these mistakes. We begin with a
common legal categorization of evidence that epitomizes and
institutionalizes the problem. Then, we identify additional offending rules at
each stage of the criminal process.
1. Rules Distinguishing "Direct" and "Circumstantial" Evidence
The law does not recognize a distinction between "big" and "small"
evidence or privilege one over the other. But jury instructions in nearly all
jurisdictions draw a related distinction between "direct" and "circumstantial"
evidence.364 For example, ConnecticutJury Instruction 2.4-1 juxtaposes "two
kinds of evidence, direct and circumstantial," the former defined as
"testimony by a witness about what that witness personally saw or heard or
did," and the latter defined as "indirect evidence.., from which you could
find that another fact exists, even though it has not been proved directly."3 65
California distinguishes "direct" evidence that "can prove a fact by itself'
from "circumstantial evidence" that "does not directly prove the fact to be
decided, but is evidence of another fact or group of facts from which you
may ...

conclude the truth of the fact in question."366

Following the modern trend, both Connecticut's and California's
instructions (in the words of Connecticut's) say there is "no legal distinction
between direct and circumstantial evidence as far as probative value" and let

363.
See supra notes 270-79 and accompanying text.
364. See 1 BARBARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
§ 1:8 (1 5 th ed. 1997) (collecting instructions distinguishing "direct" and "circumstantial"
evidence).
365. Connecticut Criminal jury Instructions § 2.4-1 ( 4 th ed. 2010), available at
http://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/criminal/.
366. Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (CALCRIM) No. 223 (2o0 2)
[hereinafter
CALCRIM],
available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/
calcrim_.juryins.pdf.
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jurors "give equal weight to both."367 But both still tend to confuse jurors

and convey the opposite message. Both juxtapose the encomium "direct"
with the often pejorative "indirect," and suggest that the former is more
straightforward (revealing what actually happened or what the witness
"personally saw," compared to "evidence from which you could find that
another fact exists, even though it has not been proved directly")368 and more
powerful ("prov[ing] a fact by itself' versus "not directly prov[ing] the
6
fact"3 9).37o No wonder, then, that jurors continue to associate "direct" with
"strong" and "circumstantial" with "weak" evidence.37' In one study, subjects
presented with scenarios involving strong circumstantial evidence or weak
direct evidence and then given California's direct-versus-circumstantial
2
instruction categorized the evidence incorrectly 45% to 85% of the time.37
Subjects incorrectly defined evidence as direct or circumstantial 38% of the
time when given modern instructions like Connecticut's and California's,
and 49% of the time when given old-fashioned, jargon-filled instructions.373
Worse, a substantial minority of American jurisdictions invites jurors to
privilege "direct" over "circumstantial" evidence by defining direct evidence
as the norm and circumstantial evidence as something the law merely
tolerates, giving jurors lengthy directions about how to decide whether to
accept circumstantial evidence as proof, or failing to instruct jurors that
circumstantial evidence can be as weighty as direct evidence.374
No jurisdiction tells jurors the truth-that all evidence is indirect and
circumstantial and that all evidence of identity, including eyewitness
identifications and confessions, gains strength through the aggregation of
"circumstantial" matches between the defendant and what is known about
the crime or criminal.375 Instead, every criminal case arises with the
prospect-and those decided at trial often end with the reality-of an
authoritative legal statement nudging jurors to put more stock in the norm
367. Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions, supra note 365, § 2.4-1; see also CALCRIM,
supra note 366, No. 223 ("Both direct and circumstantial evidence are acceptable types of
evidence to prove or disprove the elements of a charge . . . and neither is necessarily more
reliable than the other ... [or] entitled to any greater weight than the other."); Greenstein,
supra note 225, at 1803 nn.6-7 (citing federal and state case law affirming this proposition).
368. Connecticut CriminalJury Instructions, supra note 365, § 2.4-1 (emphasis added).
369. CALCRIM, supra note 366, No. 223.
370. See Tiersma & Curtis, supra note 103, at 257 (presenting study results indicating that
all direct versus circumstantial instructions risk reinforcing the "popular misconception that
circumstantial evidence is weak").
371. Id. at 246-56 (finding that plain-language as well as jargon-laden instructions
distinguishing "direct" and "circumstantial" evidence, even those rejecting any legal preference
between the two, consistently lead some jurors to treat direct evidence as stronger and more
reliable, and circumstantial evidence as weaker).
372.
Id. at 251-56, 259-61.
373. Seeid. at 25o.
374. See Greenstein, supra note 225, at 1803-04 & n.7 (citing examples and cases).
375. See supra notes 46, 95-123 and accompanying text.
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of "big" evidence, which seems to portray actual, "unique" events or traits of
the perpetrator, and to put less stock in evidence that presents itself as only a
building block, requiring acts of construction or aggregation to make
something out of them. In this way, the law marches decision makers into
the uniqueness fallacy in favor of "big" evidence and the irrelevance fallacy
against "small" non-matches.
2.

Rules Regulating Police Investigations

From a heuristic perspective, the worst thing investigators, forensic
analysts, and prosecutors can do in a "whodunit" case is to settle on a
scenario before all potential clues and witnesses have been queried, with
results preserved and analyzed. Any such scenario triggers the unwarranted
confidence associated with the simulation bias and the dangerously singleminded diversion or diminution of effort associated with a disposition to
confirm what already is thought to be true. Some common scenarios-those
focused on suspects with prior records, for example-also trigger the
representativeness bias. By inflating the numerator, the simulation,
confirmation, and representativeness biases in turn ignite the uniqueness
fallacy as to the suspect and irrelevance fallacy as to non-exclusionary nonmatches, and the latter "weak" evidence further reinforces the uniqueness
fallacy. What then does the law do to extend the period during which
evidence is collected, deter scenario-formation, sequester those functions so
the latter doesn't taint the former, and propagate competing scenarios?
The answer is not much. At the investigation stage, police and
prosecutors are largely immune from outside supervision and scrutiny. Their
key decisions-whether, when, and how to investigate a crime, confiscate
and document potentially evidential traces, interview potential witnesses,
develop one or more scenarios and investigate one or more suspects,
conduct forensic analyses, inform forensic technicians of or insulate them
from police theories about who is to blame, and bring the case to the district
attorney to prosecute-are either entirely within the discretion of law
enforcement37 6 or are subject only to a weak requirement of probable
cause.377 Few of the city and county departments that make these decisions
have guidelines on these matters, and the guidance that does exist is rarely
public or enforceable. State courts and attorneys general typically honor
376. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) ("[S]o long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense . . . , the
decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury,
generally rests entirely in his discretion." (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364
(1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 172 ( 5 th Cir.
1965) (similar).
377. See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171 (2008) ("[Wlhen an officer has
probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his presence, the
balancing of private and public interests is not in doubt. The arrest is constitutionally
reasonable.").
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local discretion and forbear systematic data-collection or monitoring.
Prosecutors have absolute immunity from damages for decisions to
8
prosecute, including decisions based on faulty police investigations.7
In short, criminal defendants "do not enjoy a general constitutional
right to a proper or thorough investigation of the offense with which they
are charged."379 Except for "chain of custody" rules, which apply only when
the state confiscates and introduces evidence at trial, 8o no affirmative duties
or systematic practices assure the reliable collection of evidence,
interviewing of witnesses, scenario-development, or suspect identification.
Under the Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, officers'
negligent or reckless failure to collect or accidental destruction of evidence
does not violate due process or oblige jurors to draw adverse inferences
against the state.38, By withholding redress absent outright bad faith,
Youngblood "imposes an almost insurmountable burden upon [an] accused"
harmed by law enforcement misfeasance382 and allowed justice to miscarry in
Youngblood's own case. After serving a lengthy prison term and facing
prosecution for failing to register as a sex offender, Youngblood, through
counsel, found a semen swab from the victim that could be tested using
modern DNA analysis. It excluded Youngblood as the perpetrator.383 Federal
8
and most state courts continue to apply Youngblood.3S
4 Even the handful of
378. See, e.g.,
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1355-56, 1366 (2o1 1) (granting a
prosecutor immunity from damages after the prosecutor failed to inform a falsely convicted
defendant of a pretrial forensic test showing that the killer's blood type excluded the defendant
who had spent years on death row); Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 858-59, 863-64
(2009) (granting absolute immunity to a district attorney responsible for breakdowns in
supervision, training, and information management that led to a failure to disclose exculpatory
information against a plaintiff who spent twenty-four years in prison for a murder he did not
commit); Joseph v. Yocum, 53 F. App'x 1, 3 (ioth Cir. 2002) ("[Prosecutors] are absolutely
immune from liability ...for the decision to prosecute, even based on an allegedly inadequate
police investigation, and the decision whether and when to dismiss the charges against
plaintiff."); Schrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 1411 (3 d Cir. 1991) ("A prosecutor's alleged
failure to properly investigate before initiating a prosecution is ...within the scope of absolute
immunity.").
379. Murphy v. Quarterman, Nos. 3 -o8-CV-o826-K, 3 :08-CV-107 3 -K, 2oo8 WL 4899229, at
*2 n.3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 11, 2008) (quoting Riley v. Quarterman, No. H-0 7-2o87, 2oo8 WL
4425366, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2oo8)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38o. See LEMPERT ET AL., supra note 99, at 1216-21 (discussing chain of custody).
381. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (holding that state destruction of
evidence potentially favorable to the defense did not violate due process in the absence of bad
faith). Other cases extend Youngblood to bar relief for law enforcement's failure to collect
evidence. See, e.g., State v. Krosch, 642 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn. 2oo2); State v. Ware, 881 P.2d
679, 683-84 (N.M. 1994).
382. Norman C. Bay, Old Blood, Bad Blood, and Youngblood: Due Process, Lost Evidence, and
the Limits of BadFaith,86 WASH. U.L. REV. 241, 247 (2oo8).
383. See id. at 243-44; Peter Neufeld, Legal and Ethical Implications of Post-Conviction DNA
Exonerations, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 639, 646 (200 ).
384. See, e.g., Cost v. State, so A.3 d 184, 193 (Md. 2oo) (citing cases); People v. al-Azawi,
No. 292425, 2010 WL 4026107, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2010) (per curiam) ("A
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states that have modified it only give judges discretion to instruct jurors that
they may draw adverse inferences against the state if officials destroyed or
failed to secure important forensic evidence for no good reason and if the
state's case is otherwise weak.385

Neither the accused nor jurors even have a right to know about defects
in the state's investigation. Courts rarely find Brady or other discovery
violations when police or prosecutors fail to reveal defects,386 and absent bad
faith, they do not treat a failure to discover or collect evidence as a Brady
violation in its own right.387 In lieu of enforcing affirmative duties to collect
and test evidence or inform jurors of what was missed, American courts limit
criminal defendants to cross-examining police witnesses on what they did
and to introducing evidence the defense has found that the state could have,
88
but did not, obtain.3s
If the defense manages to expose weaknesses in the
defendant is entitled to an adverse inference instruction regarding the loss of potentially
exculpatory evidence only upon a showing of bad faith."); Bay, supra note 382, at 247 n.17, 287
n.364 (citing cases).
385. See, e.g., Cost, so A. 3 d at 188 n.3, 192-93, 196-97 (citing cases and adopting a rule
allowing the jury to draw adverse inferences if the state "destroyed highly relevant evidence in
its custody that it normally would have retained and submitted to forensic examination");
Commonwealth v. Kee, 870 N.E.2d 57, 65 (Mass. 2007) ("[Wlhere evidence has been lost or
destroyed, it may be appropriate to instruct the jury that they may, but need not, draw an
inference against the Commonwealth."); Bay, supra note 382, at 287-89 & nn.364-75 (citing
cases from states allowing adverse-inference instructions). Several states have also recently
adopted laws requiring preservation of DNA evidence. See id. at 246 & nn.15-16, 284-85 &
nn.351-58.
386. See, e.g., Woodruff v. State, 6o8 N.W.2d 881, 888 (Minn. 2000) (finding no Brady
violation despite the state's failure to disclose evidence supporting the defendant's inadequateinvestigation claim, including officers' threats to witnesses and failure to secure the scene,
collect evidence, check alibis of other suspects, or turn over key reports to the prosecutor);
Guerrier v. State, No. 54016, 2010 WL 3463355, at *2 (Nev. May 7, 2010) (holding that the
failure to disclose a police report did not violate Brady, though it may have supported the
defendant's inadequate-investigation claims). But see Workman v. Commonwealth, 636 S.E.2d
368, 376-78 (Va. 2oo6) (finding that the failure to disclose evidence supporting an
inadequate-investigation claim violated Brady).
387. See, e.g., State v. Ware, 881 P.2d 679, 684-85 (N.M. 1994) (surveying cases and
holding that only evidence missed in bad faith can violate the Brady rule).
388. See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 782 (2oi 1) (noting that the defense at
trial "stressed deficiencies in the [police and forensic] investigation"); Crawford v. Head, 311
F.3 d 1288, 1302-05 (sith Cir. 2002) (noting inadequate-investigation claims); Moreno v.
State, No. A-1oo41, 201o WL 5021778, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 8, 201o) (finding that the
defense had a fair opportunity to criticize the police investigation); State v. Martinez, No. 2 CACR 2007-0355, 2010 WL 3928631, at *8 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010) (noting inadequateinvestigation claims); People v. Corbett, Nos. Ho328 4 8, H03522 4 , 2011 WL 18733, at *13-14
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 201 1) (same); State v.Jamison, 742 A.2d 1272, 1274 (Conn. App. Ct.
1999) (same); State v. Cosey, 1997-2020, p. 13 (La. 11/28/oo); 779 So. 2d 675, 684 (same);
Fullbright v. State, 895 A.2d io88, o95-9-6 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (same); People v. Hill,
No. 287226, 2oo WL 539841, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2oo) (per curiam) (same); King
v. State, 2oo8-KA-o1 5 o0-SCT ( 16-17, 20) (Miss. 2010); 47 So. 3 d 658, 665 (same); State v.
Campobasso, No. 503042-I, 2004 WL 2284208, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2004) (same);
cf. Blankenship v. Hall, 542 F. 3 d 1253, 1270-74, 1281 (ilth Cir. 2008) (rejecting an
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state's investigation, it may use them only to attack the reliability of evidence
the state did present and argue that the state's evidence leaves a reasonable
doubt as to guilt.389 With the sole exception of Massachusetts,390 no
jurisdiction recognizes an inadequate-investigation defense or requires
judges to instruct jurors that they may treat inadequacies in the state's
investigation as sufficient in themselves to establish reasonable doubt.
Even in Massachusetts, officers have no duty to gather exculpatory
evidence.39' Trial judges are simply allowed, but not required,39 to invite
jurors to consider whether omissions in the state's investigation "tend to
affect the quality, reliability or credibility of the [state's] evidence."393 Even
that limited invitation applies only if the jury finds that the omitted tests or
actions (i) were standard procedure; (2) "could reasonably have been
expected to lead to significant evidence of the defendant's guilt or
innocence"; and (3) were omitted unreasonably.94
Except perhaps in Massachusetts, therefore, applicable legal rules do
little to assure the competence and thoroughness of crime scene and witness
investigations, particularly in exposing non-exclusionary non-matches, and
do nothing to dampen premature scenario development or selective
evidence-gathering designed to confirm scenarios. In many cases, the
defense will not even know about problems plaguing police investigations,
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on the failure to present a convincing insufficientinvestigation defense), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1041 (2011); State v. Herring, 762 N.E.2d 940,
957-58 (Ohio 2002) (similar).
389. See, e.g., Morris v. State, 2ooo-CT-o822-SCT ( 13) (Miss. 2oo6); 927 So. 2d 744, 748
("[T]he sufficiency or insufficiency of a police investigation simply goes to the weight of the
evidence, and it is for a jury to decide what to believe."); Lane v. State, Nos. 14-o7-oo871-CR,
14 -07-oo872-CR, 2009 WL 36502, at *5 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 8, 2009) ("The lack of physical
or forensic evidence is merely a factor for the jury to consider in weighing the evidence,").
390. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bowden, 399 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Mass. 198o) (recognizing a
defense based on the "fact that certain tests were not conducted or certain police procedures
not followed [that] could raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt in the minds of
the jurors"). For Massachusetts cases applying the Bowden defense, see, for example,
Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 9o6 N.E.2d 299, 315 (Mass. 2009) ("[I]nformation regarding
a third-party culprit, whose existence was known to the police but whose potential involvement
was never investigated, may be admissible under a Bowden defense . . . ."); Commonwealth v.
Tolan, 904 N.E.2d 397, 412-13 (Mass. 2009) ("The Bowden instruction permits jurors to
consider evidence (actually presented) of police failure to take certain investigatory steps...
and. . . such failures alone may be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt of the defendant's
guilt."); cf Massachusetts Criminal Model Jury Instructions No. 3.740 (2009), available at
http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/districtcourt/ury-instructions/criminal/
pdf/37 4 o-evidence-omissions-in-police-investigations.pdf.
391.
See Commonwealth v. Martinez, 769 N.E.2d 273, 281 (Mass. 2002) ("[T]he obligation
of the authorities to investigate a crime does not translate into a jury instruction that the
authorities have a duty to gather exculpatory evidence.").
392.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 790 N.E.2d 662, 670 (Mass. 2003);
Commonwealth v. Lapage, 759 N.E.2d 300, 307 (Mass. 2001).
393. Massachusetts Criminal Model Jury Instructions, supra note 39 o , No. 3.740.
394- Id.

2013]

THE EVIDENCE OF THINGS NOT SEEN

and only rarely will it know about non-exclusionary non-matches the police
missed. The best the defense can hope to do is use cross-examination to
expose documentable reasons to fear that non-matches were missed and
hope the jury-unaided by instructions-will dial down its heuristically
inflated confidence in the certainty of the state's seemingly unique evidence
of identity and overcome its heuristically induced blindness to individually
"small," though conjointly powerful, bases for reasonable doubt.
3.

Rules Regulating Discovery

Even when the state obtains evidence of non-exclusionary non-matches,
discovery rules invite the state to withhold the information from the defense
on the ground that non-matches are individually irrelevant. This is
particularly true after officials have committed themselves to an inculpatory
scenario built around "big" evidence. In essence, the Brady rule defining the
constitutional duty to disclose builds the representativeness, simulation, and
confirmation biases into its own operation.395
The Brady rule comes into play at two points in the criminal process:
before trial when officials decide whether to disclose information to the
defense, and on appeal when a reviewing court decides whether the Due
Process Clause requires it to overturn a conviction obtained after officials
opted to withhold information. Because the Court had the latter situation in
mind when it developed the standard governing both situations, the rule's
application at both stages is fraught with heuristic peril, triggering the gross
undervaluation and underuse of non-exclusionary non-matches.
In Brady v. Maryland, the Court rejected the view that prosecutions are a
poker game in which holding one's losing cards close is an acceptable
strategy for success.39 6 The Court recognized a justice interest in state
disclosure397 of evidence that is both "exculpatory" because it makes it more
likely than without the evidence that the defendant is innocent, and
8
"material" in that nondisclosure had some effect on the outcome.s9
The
395.

See Brady v.Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("IThe suppression by the prosecution

of evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment . . . ."). In United States v. Bagley, the Court held that
undisclosed evidence is material "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed . . . the result of the proceeding would have been different." United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
396. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 86-88; see also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970) ("The
adversary system of trial . . . is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right
always to conceal their cards until played."); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution:
SportingEvent or Questfor Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 292.
397. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995) ("[Tlhe individual prosecutor has a
duty to learn of [and disclose] any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the
government's behalf in the case, including the police.").
398. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88 ("Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but
when criminal trials are fair ....
A prosecution that withholds evidence . . . which, if made
available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears
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Court ruled that the evidence withheld from Brady-his co-defendant's
confession discussing their relative responsibility for the killing-could not
have affected the guilt determination, which it upheld, but might have
affected the death sentence, which it reversed.99 Since then, the Court has
refined the "materiality" standard to allow reversal of a verdict only if the
reviewing court finds that there is a "reasonable probability" that but for the
nondisclosure the jury would have reached a verdict more favorable to the
defendant.4o
A problem with the Brady rule is that it does not tell prosecutors what
they are expected to disclose before trial It includes no requirement that
prosecutors "turn over all evidence favorable to the defense, so defense
counsel and the jury can decide what is valuable," or "show all exculpatory
evidence to the judge who will decide what the defense and jury should see,"
or even "disclose all 'material' evidence, that a reasonable trier of fact would
consider important." Rather, the rule tells officials only to keep in mind
what will happen on appeal if a court finds a reasonable probability that
something they did not turn over would have changed the outcome of the
trial to come. As Professor Alafair Burke notes, Brady tells the "virtuous
prosecutor" trying to decide whether to reveal potential loser cards to "do
whatever you want as long as you don't get reversed."41
Bizarrely, Brady requires the conscientious prosecutor to decide
whether to withhold exculpatory evidence by predicting the future
determination an appellate court might make about whether the past course
of history would likely have changed if the prosecutor had made a different
prediction about the court's future ruling.4o2 Worse yet, by far the most likely
outcome is that the appellate court will make no ruling, in which case the
prosecutor has nothing to worry about because her only worry is reversal. A
"no decision" is as good as an affirmance, and one of those outcomes will
almost certainly occur unless all five of the following conditions are met:
(i) the defendant is not offered or declines a plea bargain, which usually
forestalls an appeal; (2) the trial defendant is convicted; (3) the defendant
learns that the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence; (4)the defendant

heavily on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding
that does not comport with ... justice ... .
399. See id. at 84-85, 91.
400.
Bagley,473 U.S. at 682.
401.
See Alafair Burke, Commentary, Brady's Brainteaser: The Accidental Prosecutor and
Cognitive Bias, 57 CASEW. RES. L. REV. 575, 576 (2007).
o
See, e.g., Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making, supra note 23 ,at 161o-12
402.
(criticizing Brady because "applying the standard prior to trial requires that prosecutors engage
in a bizarre kind of anticipatory hindsight review," inviting confirmation bias at multiple
points); Bennett L. Gershman, LitigatingBrady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 531, 558-59 (2007) (criticizing the post-hoc evaluation that the Brady rule
requires).
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appeals on that ground; and (5) the reviewing court finds that the withheld
evidence was "material."
Condition (1) is rare, to begin with, because over go% of prosecutions
end in plea bargains.4o3 Indeed, the prosecutor at least marginally increases
the chances of a guilty plea by withholding exculpatory evidence that might
embolden the defendant to go to trial. Condition (3) is also rare because
the prosecution controls the evidence it withheld, making it hard for
defendants to discover. Finally, reversals of criminal verdicts on any grounds,
much less on Brady grounds-condition (5)--occur in only a small
percentage of the miniscule subset of cases meeting the other conditions.4o4
Any appellate determination, especially a reversal, is unlikely, which makes it
sensible for conscientious prosecutors to err on the side of withholding
evidence. As Justice Marshall noted, the "materiality" standard gives
prosecutors the
impossible task of deciding whether a certain piece of information
will have a significant impact on the trial, bearing in mind that a
defendant will later shoulder the heavy burden of proving how it
would have affected the outcome. At best, this standard places on
the prosecutor a responsibility to speculate, at times without
foundation, since the prosecutor will not normally know what
strategy the defense will pursue or what evidence the defense will
find useful. At worst, the standard invites a prosecutor, whose
interests are conflicting, to gamble, to play the odds, and to take a
chance that evidence will later turn out not to have been
potentially dispositive.405
Still worse, when prosecutors predict, speculate, and play the odds,
heuristic biases assure that they will identify few pieces of exculpatory
evidence-particularly non-exclusionary non-matches-that have to be
disclosed.4o 6 Before requiring disclosure, Brady obliges the prosecutor to
imagine her way through several future events: she goes to trial and presents
the inculpatory scenario she and police officers have developed, a scenario
often based in part on the defendant's prior criminal record. She lays out

See RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE i 161 (2d ed.
("Of felony convictions nationwide, 94 percent are obtained by guilty plea.").
404. See, e.g., NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRsT
CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 197 n.45 (2011) ("[R]eversal
rates in federal habeas, except in capital cases, probably never reached double digits, even
during the heyday of the Warren Court."); Richard Faust et al., The Great Writ in Action: Empirical
Light on the FederalHabeas Corpus Debate, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 637, 677-81 (19901991) (finding 3% reversal rate in 1970s federal habeas corpus cases in the Southern District of
New York).
405.
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 701 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
4o6. See Burke, supra note 401, at 576-77 (arguing that cognitive biases triggered by Brady
403.

2005)

"invite [I prosecutors to systematically undervalue the materiality of evidence").
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the scenario, say, through eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant or
through the defendant's own admissions. The jury finds the state's theory is
true beyond a reasonable doubt and convicts. The appellate court considers
whether the withheld evidence would have made a difference after drawing
the strongest inferences in favor of the state that its trial evidence allows.407
These mental steps all but assure that prosecutors will succumb to
excessive confidence spurred by:
" The simulation bias thrice over. In bringing charges, the prosecutor
adopted the scenario police offered as the basis for prosecution.
Brady then requires her to imagine that she successfully presented
the scenario to the jury. Then, she must imagine an appellate court
reviewing the scenario and indulging every presumption in its
8
favor.4
" The representativeness bias. The defendant's prior record and the
scenario itself cast the defendant as someone who resembles a
40 9
criminal, obscuring the base rate of other possible suspects.
" The confirmation bias. In imagining an appellate decision as to
whether the withheld evidence would have changed the outcome,
she will bring to mind the strong parts of her case and the
40
weaknesses in the evidence under consideration. '
* An outcome bias twice over.4 Both the decision to prosecute and
the imagined guilty verdict will lend a false validity to the scenario
that triggered the outcome.
" The uniqueness and irrelevancefallacies. By leading decision makers to
assign a high numerator value to inculpatory implications of the
state's evidence and to assume innocent explanations for nonexclusionary non-matches, the above biases will create a false

407. The Brady rule requires reviewing courts to make an "independent examination of the
record," Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679 n.8 (Blackmun, J., joined by O'Connor, J.), and forbear
reversing unless withheld evidence is strong enough to alter the jury's "beyond a reasonable
doubt" confidence in the evidence it heard, see Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469-70 (2009);
Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 870 (2oo6).
4o8. See supra Part V.A. 3 .a.
409. See supra Part V.A.2.
410.
See Burke, supra note 401, at 578-8o (noting that, via the confirmation bias, imagining
the trial absent the evidence in question will lead the prosecutor "to recall facts that support"
and ignore "facts that might undermine her existing belief in the defendant's guilt" and to
"scrutinize the potentially exculpatory evidence for flaws"); supraPart V.A.3.b.
411.
Outcome bias leads decision makers to treat the very fact of an outcome as
retroactively validating poor decisions producing the outcome. See, e.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note
207, at 203-O4; Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54 J
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569, 570 (1988) (describing studies indicating that "people take
outcomes into account in a way that is irrelevant to the true quality of the decision").
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certainty in the uniqueness of the former and irrelevance of the
latter.4,2
Finally, if the prosecutor is thinking clearly, she will realize that the
appellate court itself will be prey to these biases, particularly the outcome
bias based on the jury verdict, further diminishing the already microscopic
probability of reversal.
Of course, if the exculpatory evidence the prosecutor possesses is
"big"-a credible confession by someone besides the defendant or nonmatching DNA on a rape victim's vaginal swab-we expect materiality to be
obvious and the prosecutor to disclose, heuristic biases notwithstanding. If,
however, the exculpatory evidence is "small"-a non-matching stray button
or a detail in an eyewitness's initial description to police-the biases the
Brady rule invites will create a myriad of reasons why the prosecutor will rate
the after-the-fact effect of each non-match by itself, and the aggregate effect
of them all, as low or nil.
4.

Rules Limiting Evidence of a Third Party's Guilt

As we note above, the drama that plays out in adversarial trials is not a
"Whodunit?," but a "Did Smith Do It?," triggering representativeness,
simulation, and confirmation bias from the moment the case is styled
"People v. Smith."41s If Smith could present evidence establishing a counter-

scenario, with a different suspect in the role of villain, heuristic problems
could be allayed.4'4 But the realities of our criminal justice system and the
rules limiting evidence of a third party's guilt make it difficult to mount an
effective "I didn't do it, but I'll tell you who did" defense.
In reality, few defendants have meaningful access to evidence
implicating third-party suspects, especially innocent defendants who are
disconnected from the events charged. Separating defendants from
evidence of other suspects are law enforcement's monopoly over the crime
scene and associated witnesses as well as grand jury proceedings,415 the
absence of a duty to conduct police investigations competently or face
consequences,4, 6 heuristic and legal limits on officials' obligation to turn
over leads that do not support the state's case,4,7 chronic underfunding of
indigent criminal-defense investigations,4'8 defense counsel's disposition to

412.

See supra Part V.A. 4 - 5 .

413.

See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text; text accompanying notes 361-62.

414.

See Heller, supra note 36, at 29o-98

(showing that "priming" with alternative,

exculpatory scenarios can overcome unfair heuristic advantages accompanying the state's
"direct" evidence).
415.

See supranotes 328-61.

416.

See supra Part V.C.2.

417.

See supra Part V.C. 3 .

418.
See, e.g., STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N,
GIDEO'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 10-11, 38
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give priority in deploying limited resources to poking holes in the state's
case and not to constructing her own, and the disposition of most criminal
cases by plea bargains aimed at minimizing the cost of investigations.4,9
Further decreasing incentives to look for evidence of a third-party's
guilt are the mystifying legal doctrines limiting the admissibility of such
evidence at trial. The usual rule, of course, is that the prosecution bears the
burden of proving identity, so once the defendant presents any evidence
suggesting that someone else committed the crime-an alibi, for examplethe state must dispel the implication of that evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt.42o Typically, the defendant can trigger this process with any evidence
that is relevant and not substantially more prejudicial than probative.4I
Because an edifice of guilt or innocence may be built "brick by brick,"
triggering evidence need only minutely change the probabilities of guilt or
innocence and need not meet a burden of proof by itself.42 The defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to present defensive evidence undergirds these
principles.423
But this is not how the law works when it comes to the defense that it
was Jones, not the defendant Smith, who committed the crime. As the
Supreme Court noted in Holmes v. South Carolina,most jurisdictions strictly
limit the admissibility of concededly relevant evidence that implicates or
orients non-exclusionary non-matches towards a specified alternative
suspect.42 4 In these jurisdictions, such evidence is inadmissible unless it
(2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal-aid_

indigent -defendants/Is sclaid def-bp-right.to-counsel in criminal-proceedings.authcheckd
am.pdf.
419. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 403, at 1186-87 (noting that resource constraints lead
defense lawyers to use plea bargaining to "triage" among cases based on predictions about the
relative value of additional investment of attorney time).
420. See, e.g.,
MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.12(1)-(2)(a), 1.13(9)(c) (1985) (providing that
once evidence negating an element of the offense is offered, the state must disprove that
defense beyond a reasonable doubt).
421.
See, e.g.,
FED. R. EViD. 401-403.
422. See id. 401 advisory committee's note ("The standard of probability under the rule is
,more... probable than it would be without the evidence.' Any more stringent requirement is
unworkable and unrealistic. As McCormick § 152, p. 317, says, 'A brick is not a wall' .... );
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 179-8o (1987) ("[Ilndividual pieces of evidence,
insufficient in themselves to prove a point, may in cumulation prove it.").
423. See, e.g., Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 69o-91 (1986); Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 294-97 (1 9 7 3 );John H. Blume et al., Every Juror Wants a Story: NarrativeRelevance,
Third Party Guilt and the Right To Present a Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1o69, 1103 (2007)
("When there is credible evidence of a third party's potential guilt, then strict restrictions on
admissibility of such evidence unreasonably infringe upon a criminal defendant's right to
present a complete defense .... .").
424. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 327 & n.* (2oo6) (citing cases adopting
"rules regulating the admission of evidence proffered by criminal defendants to show that
someone else committed the crime"); see also Cleveland v. State, 91 P. 3 d 965, 972 (Alaska Ct.
App. 2004) ("[V]irtually every state . . . require[s] some kind of preliminary evidentiary
showing before allowing introduction of alternative-perpetrator evidence." (quoting Smithart v.
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(1) establishes a "clear link" or "direct connection" between the alternate
suspect and the crime (the majority rule);425 (2) satisfies the defense's
effective standard of proof by singlehandedly establishing a reasonable
doubt;426 or (3) is more probative than prejudicial, reversing the usual
presumption in favor of admissibility.427 Applying these doctrines, courts
have excluded evidence that police initially arrested another man for the
crime;428 that the father of a child whom the defendant was accused of
sexually abusing had himself been convicted of sexual abuse some time
thereafter;429 that a man, whom the trial court forbade the defendant to call
at trial, was identified by two paramedics as resembling a male they saw at
the crime scene acting suspiciously and then fleeing;43o that police obtained

statements from a man with a motive to commit the crime who revealed an
unexplained familiarity with the details of the crime;43, and that a man with
no connection to the defendant had been found in possession of a
distinctive box resembling one taken from the victim around the time of the
crime.432 Only when evidence implicating a third-party suspect verges on
State, 988 P.2d 583, 586-87 (Alaska 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); David
McCord, "But Perry Mason Made It Look So Easy!": The Admissibility of Evidence Offered by a Criminal
Defendant To Suggest that Someone Else Is Guilty, 63 TENN. L. REv. 917, 936-38 (1996) (criticizing
majority rule placing a "direct connection" limitation on evidence of a third party's guilt; also
criticizing alternative rules that (i) impose a "capable-of-raising-a-reasonable-doubt" standard,
which is stricter than the usual balance of probative weight and prejudice; or (2)apply the
usual "probative weight versus prejudice" balance in an unusually strict manner when
evaluating evidence of a third party's guilt).
425. See, e.g., McCord, supra note 424, at 936-38 & n.99 (citing cases).
426. See, e.g., 41 C.J.S. Homicide § 318 (2012) ("Evidence tending to show the commission
by another person of the crime charged may be introduced by accused [only] when it is
inconsistent with, and raises a reasonable doubt of, his own guilt .
); McCord, supra note
424, at 936-38 & n.soo (citing cases).
427. See McCord, supra note 424, at 936-38 & n.soi (citing cases).
428.
State v. Oliver, 821 P.2d 250, 251-52 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting alternativesuspect evidence absent an "inherent tendency to connect the other person with the actual
commission of the crime"); People v. Owens, 97 P-3 d 227, 235 (Colo. App. 2004) (requiring a
"direct connection" between an alternative perpetrator and the crime).
429. People v. Sparman, 6o8 N.Y.S.2d 672, 673-74 (App. Div. 1994) (excluding evidence
implicating an alternate suspect with greater access to the sexual-abuse victim because "such
evidence must do more than raise a mere suspicion that another person committed the crime;
there must be a clear link between the third party and the crime" (quoting People v. Brown,
590 N.Y.S.2d 896, 898 (App. Div. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted), granting habeas
sub nom. Sparman v. Edwards, 26 F. Supp. 2d 450 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 154 F. 3 d 51 (2d Cir.
1998)).
430. State v. Woodfield, 659 P.2d ioo6, ioo8 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
431. State v. Gilman, 6o8 A.2d 66o, 663 (Vt. 1992) (barring alternative-suspect evidence
unless "motive and opportunity have been shown" and it incriminates the third party "directly"
(quoting State v. Denny, 357 N.W.2d 12, 17 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984))).
432.
State v. McNeill, 392 S.E.2d 78, 83-84 (N.C. 199o) (barring alternate-suspect
evidence that does not "point directly to the guilt of some specific person" and is "not
inconsistent with the defendant's own guilt"). For a discussion of other courts' treatment of
alternate-suspect evidence, see McCord, supra note 424, at 950-51 & n.167.
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"big" evidence43-DNA that excludes the defendant and is consistent with
the alternate suspect or an eyewitness identification of that suspect-is the
court likely to let the defendant introduce the evidence.434
Recently, the Supreme Court overturned a South Carolina rule
providing that regardless of the strength of the evidence linking an
alternative suspect to the crime, "'where there is strong evidence of [the
defendant's] guilt, especially... strong forensic evidence, the proffered
evidence about a third party's alleged guilt' may (or perhaps must) be
excluded."4s5 Despite this ruling, the Court seemed to approve the rule that
most other states apply: "[E]vidence offered by accused as to the
commission of the crime by another person must be limited to such facts as
are inconsistent with his own guilt, and.. . raise a reasonable inference or
presumption as to his own innocence ... "436 By emphasizing the "big"
character of the third-party evidence before it-the alternative suspect was
near the rape-murder victim's home at the time of the crime and told four
witnesses that he had committed the crime or that Holmes was innocentthe Court gave no solace to defendants relying on even a constellation of
"small" non-exclusionary non-matches that match an alternative suspect.437

Rather, Holmes seems to recognize a right only to fight fire with fire-to
oppose the state's "big" evidence implicating the defendant with "big"
evidence implicating a third party-while allowing states to forbid
defendants to fight fire with even a torrent of "small" non-matches. Thus,
while modestly mitigating the uniqueness fallacy, Holmes bolsters the
irrelevance fallacy.
5. Rules Limiting Statistical Evidence

In Collins, the California Supreme Court overturned a conviction based
on a fumbling, possibly invidious effort by a mathematics instructor to show
how improbable it was that there were two interracial couples in Los Angeles
433. See, e.g., McNeill, 392 S.E.2d at 83 ("[E]vidence must (i) point directly to the guilt of
some specific person, and (2) be inconsistent with the defendant's guilt.").
434. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 953 ( 9 th Cir. i98o) (finding that
the trial court improperly excluded the defendant's evidence that an alternate suspect had bait
money from the robbery with which the defendant was charged); United States v. Robinson,
544 F.2d 1 10, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1976) (reversing a conviction because the trial court excluded
evidence that a correctional officer identified someone other than the defendant as a bank
robber in a surveillance videotape recording); Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 389-90 (Ind.
1997) (affirming the admission of mitochondrial DNA evidence of a hair found on the victim
that excluded the defendant and likely matched the alternate suspect); McCord, supra note
424, at 951 & n. 168 (citing similar cases).
435. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 329 (2oo6) (alteration in original)
(emphasis added) (quoting State v. Holmes, 6o 5 S.E.2d 19, 24 (S.C. 2004)).
436. Id. at 328 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Gregory, 16 S.E.2d 532, 534 (S.C.
1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
437. Id. at 329 (rejecting the South Carolina rule because it "does not focus on the
probative value" of the defendant's "evidence of third-party guilt").
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who, like the defendant couple, matched the perpetrators' description.438 As
we note above, however, rather than limit its reversal to the expert's
manifold technical mistakes,439 the court suggested that even properly applied
statistical techniques have no place in adjudicating identity. The court
supposed that when " [c]onfronted with an equation which purports to yield
a numerical index of probable guilt, few juries could resist the temptation to
accord disproportionate weight to that index."44o It further assumed that "no
mathematical equation can prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the
guilty couple in fact possessed the characteristics described by the People's
witnesses, or even (2) that only one couple possessing those distinctive
characteristics could be found in the entire Los Angeles area."44' What we
now know about heuristic bias-particularly the certainty effectundermines both assumptions. Contrary to the first assumption, human
decision makers' quest for certainty leads them systematically to undervalue
explicit probabilities, not to overvalue them.44z Worse, the claim that the
aggregate of lesser probabilities can never be high enough to prove guilt (or
even, it seems, reasonable doubt) simply codifies the certainty fallacy as the
law of the land. In an understandable effort to head off a single miscarriage
of justice, the decision increased the risk of many more. It unnecessarily
barred a valuable method of deterring decision makers from overvaluing
"big" evidence of guilt that dangerously masquerades as "unique"
identifiers-for example, the eyewitness identification of Carlos DeLuna,
and the fingerprint "match" of Brandon Mayfield-and from undervaluing
non-exclusionary non-matches (including in those cases) that the certainty
bias and the court's ruling render invisible and effectively irrelevant.443
Despite these flaws, many courts have relied on Collins's reasoning as
elucidated by Professor Tribe as a basis for barring aggregative statistical
analysis.444 Citing Collins, the Minnesota Supreme Court has gone so far as to
438.
439.
440.
441.

People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 36-42 (Cal. 1968).
See id. at 39; supra notes 79-8o and accompanying text.
Collins, 438 P.2d at 40.

Id.

See supra Part V.A.3.c.
443. See supra notes 17-44 & Figure 2, 314-20, 329-57 and accompanying text.
444. See, e.g., United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1383 (9 th Cir. 1986) (citing Collins
as the standard for admitting probabilistic evidence); United States ex rel. DiGiacomo v.
Franzen, 68o F.2d 515, 518 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing Collins to support the view that probabilities
confuse jurors); United States v.Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 211 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (citing Collins in
support of the view that probabilistic testimony is often ruled inadmissible), affd sub nom.
United States v. Bonds, 12 F. 3 d 540 (6th Cir. 1993); Hart v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 6o Fed. Cl. 598, 6o6 (2004) (citing Collins in invalidating a special master's
reliance on probabilistic analysis to rule out a vaccine as the cause of an infant's death); People
v. Cella, 188 Cal. Rptr. 675, 684 (Ct. App. 1983) (allowing "mathematical probabilities" only if
"all crucial variables [are] quantified exactly"); Davis v. State, 476 N.E.2d 127, 134-35 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1985) (citing Collins in barring probabilistic evidence absent "empirical scientific data");
Wilson v. State, 803 A.2d 1034, 1044-46 (Md. 2002) (barring use of the multiplication rule in
442.
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impose a blanket ban on even admittedly sound probabilistic estimates of
the frequency of identifying traits in the population that are offered as an
aid in adjudicating identity in criminal cases445 Even when the court created
an exception for DNA evidence,446 acknowledging that this most "unique"seeming of evidence in fact derives its strength from the use of the
multiplication rule to aggregate multiple individually unimpressive
probabilities, it still declined to relax its general ban on statistical
quantification and aggregation.447 Although most courts have not gone as
far as the Minnesota Supreme Court, nearly all of them continue to resist
the three steps needed to implement a Bayesian solution in criminal cases in
which identity is in doubt: letting the parties (1) offer evidence regarding
the number of possible suspects (relevant to calculating the prior odds of
guilt); (2) establish the frequency of certain traits in the population for use
in estimating the numerator and denominator; and (3) present expert
testimony or secure instructions to guide jurors in proper statistical analysis.

assessing the likelihood of two infants in the same family dying of sudden infant death
syndrome (SIDS)); Commonwealth v. Drayton, 434 N.E.2d 997, 1005 (Mass. 1982)
(disallowing a fingerprint expert's estimate of "the statistical probability that prints with twelve
points of similarity could be made by two different people"); Buchanan v. State, 69 P.3d 694,
709 (Nev. 2003) (Rose, J., concurring) (citing the "landmark" Collins decision in invalidating
statistics as a deficient basis for concluding that intentional asphyxiation, not SIDS, caused a
child's death); Pearson v. State, 81 1 P.2d 704, 707-08 (Wyo. 1991) (citing Collins in excluding
probabilistic evidence); Adams I, [1996] 2 Crim. App. 467 at 482 (Eng.) ("To introduce Bayes
Theorem, or any similar method, into a criminal trial plunges the jury into inappropriate and
unnecessary realms of theory and complexity deflecting them from their proper task.")
(discussed supra Part IIB); Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of
MathematicalModels of Evidence, 36J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 136 n.38 (2007) (arguing that Bayesian
analysis is of little value in reaching reliable trial outcomes); Richard Lempert, The New Evidence
Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof 66 B.U. L. REV. 439, 442 (1986) ("Among legal
academics it is generally agreed that Tribe won this particular debate."). For more sympathetic
views of the value of using Bayesian and other types of statistical analysis in resolving factual
disputes in court, see, for example, Lempert, supra at 442; Nance, supra note 124, at 1595-616;
Posner, supra note 46, at 15o8.
445. See State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 547-48 (Minn. 1987) (excluding expert
testimony that semen found in the victim's body and on a bed was consistent with Kim's blood
type and that 96.4% of males in the Twin Cities could be excluded as possible sources of the
semen); State v. Boyd, 331 N.W.2d 48o, 481-83 (Minn. 1983) (barring evidence of a 99.9%
probability of paternity based on blood tests); State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170, 176 (Minn.
1978) (concluding that although probabilities offered by a hair expert were methodologically
sound, the predicted psychological effect on the jury was too great to allow their admission:
"Testimony expressing opinions or conclusions in terms of statistical probabilities can make the
uncertain seem all but proven, and suggest, by quantification, satisfaction of the requirement
that guilt be established 'beyond a reasonable doubt.'").
446. See, e.g., State v. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159, 167 (Minn. 1994) ("[A] DNA exception to
the rule against admission of quantitative, statistical probability evidence in criminal
prosecutions to prove identity is justified.").
447. See State v. Hannon, 703 N.W.2d 498, 5o8 (Minn. 2005) (extending the DNA
exception to multiple-source DNA samples, but reaffirming a "general prohibition against
admission of statistical probability evidence in criminal prosecutions").
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To be sure, gaps have appeared in the Collins consensus. Most courts
now allow evidence of the frequency of DNA and other "forensic" traits in
the population and, thus, of the probability of a random match between
forensic evidence and a suspect (step 2).448 Nearly all courts allow testimony
relying on the multiplication rule in inculpatory DNA cases (step 3). In
criminal and civil paternity cases, some courts have gone further, letting
experts use DNA tests to estimate the Bayesian likelihood-ratio numerator
and denominator associated with genetic matches between a child and a
putative parent (step 2), experimenting with ways to help jurors estimate the
prior odds of paternity based on non-scientific evidence (step i), and
inviting jurors to decide based on the Bayesian formula and charts with
Bayesian outcomes for different estimates of prior odds, numerator, and
denominator (step 3) .449 With limited exceptions, however, courts continue
to resist evidence regarding the frequency of non-forensic traces (step 2)
unless the reference class used to determine the frequency exactly matches
the facts of the case at hand. This presents a barrier "so extreme that [it]
would eliminate the use of statistical evidence" even for DNA and other
forensic evidence.45o Likewise, uses of the multiplication rule (step 2) and
Bayesian analysis (steps 1-3) are uncommon outside DNA cases,451 and we
know of no instances in which these techniques have been used to
systematically aggregate the force of multiple non-exclusionary non-matches
in order to establish a reasonable doubt. To this extent, Collins remains the
norm, barring the most direct method of dispelling the uniqueness and
irrelevance fallacies.
VI. SENSIBLE REGULATION OF NON-EXCLUSIONARY NON-MATCHES AS
EVIDENCE OF IDENTITY

The forces described here are hardwired into our minds, our court
system, and our law. Is it realistic to think they can be changed sufficiently to
make a difference? In this Part, we describe two new sets of tools for
addressing the problem. The first illustrates a point made earlier: adversarial
pressures can trigger innovative solutions to problems that arise in
translating probabilistic into trial proofs. The second set of tools is a
regulatory mechanism through which iterative procedural and legal
448. See, e.g.,
People v. Mountain, 486 N.E.2d 802, 804-06 (N.Y. 1985) (reversing prior
precedent and allowing evidence of blood-type matches and associated frequencies); sources
cited supra note 124.
449. See, e.g.,
T.A.T. v. R.E.B. (In re Paternity of MJ.B.), 425 N.W.2d 404, 408-09 (Wis.
1988) (describing different statistical techniques); see also supra notes 122-23, 179 and
accompanying text.
45 o . Koehler, supra note 124, at 392. For a general discussion of this barrier and why it
exists, see id. at 380-93.
451. See Nance, supra note 124, at 1612 ("Neither the likelihood ratio format nor the chart
format is commonly employed at this time in criminal cases in the United States although they
do appear in civil paternity cases .. ").
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innovation can occur in advance of certainty about the best or full range of
available solutions.
A.

NEW TOOLS To IMPROVE LAYDECISION MAKERS'APPRECIATION OF
AGGREGATVE ANALYSIS

There is a growing body of literature and practice on how to organize
human behavior to circumvent heuristic biases.45 Part of the literature,
emanating from computer scientists and other experts predominantly from
the United Kingdom, focuses on ways to help jurors and other criminalprocess actors make effective use of Bayesian analysis,453 including in
assessing the conjoint effect of non-exclusionary non-matches.454 Two of
these experts, Norman Fenton and Martin Neil, take as their starting point
that "for many people-and this includes.., highly intelligent barristers,
judges and surgeons-any attempt to use Bayes Theorem ...is completely
hopeless."455 Judges and lawyers "cannot be expected to follow even the
simplest instance of Bayes Theorem in its formulaic representation" and
"simply switch-off at the sight of a formula."456 As Felton and Neil's
452.

See sources cited supra notes 321-24.

453.

See, e.g., Colin Aitken et al., A GraphicalModel for the Evaluation of Cross-TransferEvidence

in DNA Profiles, 63 THEORETICAL POPULATION BIOLOGY 179 (2003); A. Biedermann & F. Taroni,

Bayesian Networks and ProbabilisticReasoning About Scientific Evidence When There Is a Lack of Data,
157 FORENSIC SC. INT'L 163 (2oo6); Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Are Humans Good Intuitive
Statisticians After All? Rethinking Some Conclusionsfrom the Literature on Judgment Under Uncertainty,
58 COGNITION 1 (1996); A.P. Dawid, Bayes's Theorem and Weighing Evidence by Juries, in BAYES'S
THEOREM 71 (Richard Swinburne ed., 2002); A. Philip Dawid & Ian W. Evett, Using a Graphical
Method To Assist the Evaluation of Complicated Patternsof Evidence, 42 J. FORENSIC SC. 226 (1997);
Donnelly, supra note 63; Fenton & Neil, supra note 133, at 1 4; Norman Fenton & Martin Neil,
The "Jury Observation Fallacy" and the Use of Bayesian Networks To Present Probabilistic Legal
Arguments, 36 MATHEMATICS TODAY s8o (2000) (revised July 31, 2007) [hereinafter Fenton &
Neil, "Juy Observation Fallacy"], available at http://www.dcs.qmul.ac.uk/researchgp/spotlight/uryfallacy.pdf, at 2-1o; Luke M. Froeb & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Naive, Biased, Yet Bayesian: Can Juries
Interpret Selectively Produced Evidence, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 257 (1996); Amanda B. Hepler et al.,
Object-Oriented GraphicalRepresentations of Complex Patternsof Evidence, 6 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK
275, 281 (2007) ("[Bayesian analysis] can be useful for the purely qualitative analysis of masses
of evidence ....");Christian Jowett, Sittin'in the Dock with the Bayes, 151 NEW L.J. 201 (2001);
Nance & Morris, supra note 179, at 429-33 (reporting study findings that although subjects
typically undervalue forensic match evidence, the use of a "chart format" showing the effect of
different prior odds on the likelihood ratio associated with DNA evidence can substantially
reduce error); Nance, supra note 124, at 1614-16; Bernard Robertson & Tony Vignaux,
ExplainingEvidence Logically, 148 NEW L.J. 159 (1998).
454. See Donnelly, supra note 63, at 16 (describing a questionnaire prepared by experts for
both sides to help jurors with Bayesian analysis in Adams/ , 2 Crim. App. 467 (Eng.)); Fenton &
Neil, supranote 133, at 128 (discussing jurors' use of Bayes' Theorem "when there are multiple
pieces of possibly contradictory evidence and interdependencies between them").
455. Fenton & Neil, supra note 133, at 128 (emphasis omitted); see also Allen & Leiter, supra
note 88, at 1545 (observing that "lay people make a mess" of probabilistic evidence); Tribe,
supra note 85, at 13 68 (arguing that Bayes' Theorem is "completely opaque to all but the
trained mathematician"); sources cited supra note 2 16.
456.
Fenton & Neil, supra note 133, at 117, 128.
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experimental studies have shown, however, "it is the use of abstract
probabilities and formulas, rather than the underlying concept, that acts as a
barrier to understanding."457 "When a very simple Bayesian argument is
presented visually ... using [graphic representations of] concrete
frequencies people not only generally understand it well, but they can
construct their own correct simple calculations."458
Consider also a well-known study revealing how susceptible expertsHarvard Medical School faculty and students-are to making the same
mistakes lay people do in ignoring base-rate information. The experts were
asked to gauge the chance that a person with a positive result on a test for a
disease with a prevalence of i in iooo and a false positive rate of 5%
"actually has the disease."459 Only 18% of the experts gave the correct answer
of less than 2% (/999 x .957.05 = .95/49.95 " z.87%); 45% ignored the
base rate entirely and answered 95%.460 When Leda Cosmides and John
Tooby replicated the study with Stanford undergraduates, their subjects
performed even worse: 12% got the right answer, and 56% ignored the base
rate.46, By taking a few simple steps, however, the researchers made most of
the error go away. They asked the same question of a new set of
undergraduates but (1) expressed the proportions by inviting subjects to
imagine large groups of people with the relevant traits and frequencies and
(2) asked subjects to give an answer not as a probability that a single person
with a positive result would have the disease but as the expected proportion
of many people with positive results who actually had the disease.462 This
reversed the results: 56% got the right answer and only 4% ignored the base
rate.46 3 By asking a series of "probe questions"-akin to special verdicts-that

modeled key steps in correct Bayesian analysis, they increased the number of
subjects who got the right answer to 76%, with none entirely ignoring the
base rate.46 4 Even without probe questions, 76% of subjects answered

correctly when references to percentages were omitted and frequencies were
stated as "how many of iooo people" fell into particular categories.465
Finally, when the researchers created a pictorial schema of a grid of tiny
boxes representing the "l ooo Americans" and asked subjects to answer the

122.

457

Id. at

458.

Id. at 132 (footnote omitted).

459. Casscells et al., supra note 2 1 1, at 999 (emphasis added).
46o. Id. at 999-1oo1.
461.
Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 453, at 25.
462. Subjects were told that "1 out of every 1ooo Americans has disease X" and "out of
every 1ooo people who are perfectly healthy, 50 of them test positive for the disease (i.e., the
'false positive' rate is 5%)" and asked, "on average ...[h]ow many people who test positive for
the disease will actually have the disease? __ out of __."
Id. at 24-25.
463. Id. at 26-27.
464. Id. at 26-28.
465. Id. at 31-33.
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probe questions by coloring in the boxes representing the relevant number
of individuals, correct answers rose to 92%.466
Cosmides and Tooby's results led them to question Kahneman's famous
dictum that "[i]n his evaluation of evidence, man is apparently not a
conservative Bayesian: he is not Bayesian at all."4 67 The authors concluded
that as long as their Bayesian instincts are triggered by the expression of
probabilities across many tries rather than as a "single-event probability,"
humans may be "good intuitive statisticians after all."46s Among subjects with
"a concrete visual representation of a population that depicts the relevant
frequencies, bayesian performance is... enhanced to near perfect levels."4 69
Recognizing that legal verdicts must be expressed as "the probability of
a single event," Fenton and Neil have developed tools and visual
representations to help lawyers and jurors understand the relevant concepts
in terms of frequencies, while translating results into accurate single-event
conclusions. They report that in the course of serving as expert consultants,
they have explained the same Bayesian concepts to lawyers, judges, and
juries using standard mathematical equations of the sort used in this
Article47o and "visual explanations" like those Cosmides and Tooby used in
their experiments.47' "Whereas [trial participants] find it hard both to
'believe' and reconstruct the formulaic explanation, they ...understand the
visual explanation. "472
Fenton and Neil next consider why courts perceive a difference
between letting jurors use a pocket calculator to compute damages
generated by the parties' competing theories while forbidding them to use
Bayesian algorithms to assess the parties' competing theories about what the
466. Id. at 34-37; see also id. at 37 ("[P]resent[ing] the problem information as percents
and ask[ing] for the answer as a single-event probability, elicited bayesian performance from
only 12% of subjects. But by simply translating this problem into frequentist terms we were able
to elicit correct bayesian reasoning from 76% of our subjects. By requiring them to create a
concrete, visual frequentist representation.... we were able to push their performance to 92%
correct.").
467. Kahneman & Tversky, Subjective Probability,supra note 2o8, at 450.
468. Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 453, at 62, 69. For other studies supporting the
conclusion that lay decision makers, including jurors, are better able to make sense of statistical
information presented as natural frequencies rather than single-event probabilities, see Gerd
Gigerenzer et al., "A30% Chance of Rain Tomorrow": How Does the Public Understand Probabilistic
Weather Forecasts?, 25 RISK ANALYSIS 623, 625-29 (2005);JonathanJ. Koehler, On Conveying the
Probative Value of DNA Evidence: Frequencies, Likelihood Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REv.
859, 88o-83 (s 996); Jonathan J. Koehler & Laura Macchi, Thinking About Low-ProbabilityEvents:
An Exemplar-Cuing Theory, 15 PSYCHOL. SC. 540 (2004); Koehler, supra note 284, at 498-5o8;
Samuel Lindsey et al., Communicating Statistical DNA Evidence, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 147, 154-62
(2003).

469. Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 453, at 59.
470. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
471. See Fenton & Neil, supra note 133, at 117-18, 129-35; Fenton & Neil, "Jury Observation
Fallacy,"supra note 453, at 4,7- 1 i.
472.
SeeFenton & Neil, supra note 133, at 132.
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evidence proves. The algorithms in both tools are accepted by scientists, yet
in the former case, courts do not even require expert testimony to explain
the algorithms (even though they sometimes generate slightly different
outcomes given different rounding strategies), while in the latter case,
courts forbid jurors to use the tool even after such testimony is offered. The
authors conclude that the feature present in the calculator instance and
missing in the case of Bayesian analysis is the willingness of lawyers and
jurors to accept the relevant type of calculation because they themselves can
perform it.47a To replicate that feature, Fenton and Neil developed visual
tools to enable trial participants to understand and generate simple
outcomes with the Bayesian algorithm. One tool is an animated version of a
decision tree used in medical decision making. Fenton and Neil used this
tool to display a simple Bayesian example in which there are 100,000
suspects and a forensic match of a rare blood type present in a only onetenth of i% of the population. In formulaic terms, the Bayesian equation is
1/99,999 x g/.oox = 1/99.99 -) i%. In lieu of a Bayesian formula, Fenton
and Neil used an animated version of the decision tree in Figure 3 below to
show that, as rare as the blood type is, the odds that the defendant is the
culprit are still very low (1 to 99).474
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Building on the "chart" strategy from the paternity cases, which gives
jurors a list of the Bayesian outcomes impelled by any prior odds of paternity
from 1 to 1o%,475 Fenton and Neil give jurors an electronic Bayesian

473. Id. at 131- 3 4 .
474. Id. at 133. The authors round the odds to avoid requiring jurors to imagine fractions
of people. Id.
475. See supra notes 179, 449 and accompanying text.

IOWA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 98:577

calculator and let them use it to see the effect of different assumptions.476
For example, jurors might decide there are more suspects (decreasing the
prior odds) or that there is a chance the defendant's blood got onto the
victim by accident (increasing the denominator). The researchers then
propose expert testimony or instructions telling jurors that "[a]lthough we
were able to explain this to you from scratch, there is a standard calculation
engine (accepted and validated by the mathematical and statistical
community) which will do this calculation ...instantly for us... much like

relying on a calculator to do long division."477 The jury can assume the
calculator's accuracy and focus on making good assumptions about the
ingredient probabilities.478
Fenton and Neil imagine the application of these tools in the Adams
case discussed above470 to help a jury aggregate probabilities associated with

the three items of evidence in the case: a "big" evidence match between
Adams and DNA in semen on the rape victim, as to which the two sides
offered conflicting expert testimony on the proper random-match
frequency,48o and two non-exclusionary non-matches-Adams's alibi and the
rape victim's description of the assailant as fifteen years younger than Adams
whom she could not identify in a lineup.48 , Using a suspect pool of 200,000,
based on evidence in the case, the example demonstrates the effect of the
"big" evidence by itself (a 9 1 % probability of guilt using the random-match
frequency offered by the defense; a 99.9995% probability of guilt using the
frequency the prosecution expert offered) and the effect of that evidence
together with conservative estimates of the effect of the non-matches (the
probability of guilt drops from 91% to 36% if the jury accepts the defense
random-match frequency for the DNA, but only from 99-9995% to 98.2%
using the prosecution's frequency).482 The jury then decides "if the
assumptions in the model are reasonable" and if "the resulting probability of
guilt leaves room for [reasonable] doubt."483

476. SeeFenton & Neil, "Jury Observation Fallacy,"supra note 453, at 12 ("[Bly using Bayesian
nets and a tool such as Hugin [a commercially available Bayesian calculator], it is possible to
show all of the implications and results of a complex Bayesian argument without requiring any
understanding of the underlying... mathematics."); HUGIN EXPERT, http://www.hugin.com/
(last visited Oct. 18, 2012) (calling itself" [t]
he leading decision support tool").
477. Fenton & Neil, supra note 133, at 139.
478. Id.
479. See supra Part II.B.
48o. The defense and prosecution proposed random-match frequencies of, respectively, i
to 2 million and i to 200 million. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
481. Fenton & Neil, supra note 133, at 138.
482. Id. at 140, 142-43.
483. Id. at 142; see also id. at 123-24, 133 (applying tools to a criminal case involving a
blurry photo showing some but not all of the numbers on a car's license plate and to a medical
malpractice case).
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Fenton and Neil suggest limiting these tools initially to cases involving
at least one item of evidence for which the random-match frequency is
known or can be mined from large databases of reasonably similar reference
samples. Even then, of course, a given lawyer's use of the tools may be
erroneous or exaggerated, failing, for example, to acknowledge that a
witness could be lying or that a defendant may have been framed. But
lawyers entice jurors into similar mistakes all the time, and we have no
trouble relying on objections, cross-examination, counter-experts, closing
argument, and other adversarial antidotes to remedy the problem, just as
the same devices quickly curbed parallel problems with early uses of the
multiplication rule in connection with inculpatory DNA.48 4 Accordingly,

when evidence with ascertainable random-match frequencies is availablewhich increasingly will be true as the legal market for data-mined
frequencies expands41--it is no longer fanciful to imagine effective use of

Bayesian analysis in court. That analysis could then be used to reveal the
aggregate value of non-exclusionary non-matches via tools no more
controversial than calculators. As the next Subpart develops, moreover,
Bayesian analysis in court need play only a supporting role in effective
regulatory solutions to the undervaluation of "small" non-matches.
B.

MANAGEMENT-BASED REGULATION OFNON-EXCLUSIONARY NON-MATCHES AS

EVIDENCE OFIDENTITY

Using the adversarial system to accommodate aggregative analysis of
non-exclusionary non-match evidence to the decision-making needs of trial
actors and proceedings is only a start. More systematic change is needed to
mitigate structural obstacles and legal resistance to "small" evidence of
innocence and extend reforms to the crucial stages before the process
becomes adversarial. Here, too, new tools are available: regulatory methods
that work well when what is possible and tailored strategies for getting there
are not yet fully understood.
1. Management-Based Regulation
Professors Cary Coglianese and David Lazer distinguish three types of
regulation.486 "Technology-based" regulation requires regulated entities to
adopt a specified solution to a given problem,487 such as catalytic converters
for all cars or child-guards for apartment windows above a certain floor.
One-size-fits-all solutions work well under relatively uniform and stable
conditions but are over- and under-inclusive when conditions vary and can

484. See supra notes 138-66 and accompanying text.
485. See supra Part IV.C.
486. Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private
Management To Achieve PublicGoals, 37 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 691, 694 (2003).
487. Id.
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discourage innovation by tying actors to outdated technologies.488
Alternatively, "performance-based" regulation imposes floors or ceilings on
regulated outputs.4 89 Limits on the amount of pollution factories may emit
and average test scores schools' students must attain are examples.
Performance-based regulation allows actors to adopt technologies suited to
varying conditions. If the desired end state or effective ways to measure it are
unknown, however, such regulation falters and may continue to treat
regulated entities as similar when they face disparate challenges, as when
schools are held to the same average proficiency levels, though their
students come to school on the first day with vastly different preparation
levels.49o
By contrast, "management-based" regulation induces regulated entities
to develop their own strategies, which can be precisely customized to local
conditions and can expose previously unknown end-state possibilities, ways
to get there, and measures of success.49 Regulators, for example, may
require regulated entities to generate plans to avoid harmful results,
monitor implementation and outcomes, and impose consequences to
motivate actors to adjust plans in light of evidence of success or failure.49
Planning also can be induced by publicizing undesirable outcomes, such as
toxic releases,493 publicly comparing results attained by similarly situated
entities to expose less and more effective operations,494 and using penalty
defaults to threaten entities with severe or unpredictable consequences if
they do not reach agreement on solutions with other stakeholders.495
Management-based strategies work best when the desired outcomes and
possible solutions are uncertain or when the conditions faced are highly
variable.9 6 Both of these prerequisites characterize the criminal justice

488.

Id. at 701.

489.

Id.

490.

See id.

491.

See id. at 702-03.

492. See id. at 694, 713-14 (comparing planning requirements that give regulated entities
flexibility in identifying harms to others specifying stages of the regulated activity the plan must
address); id. at 7o6-11 (advocating choices among different types of planning and
implementation mandates, depending on different incentives regulated entities have or can be
given to plan and implement).
493.
See, e.g., Charles Sabel et al., Beyond Backyard Environmentalism: How Communities Are
Quietly Refashioning Environmental Regulation, Bos. REV., Oct./Nov. 1999, available at http://

bostonreview.net/BR24.5/issue.pdf

(discussing

federal

Toxics

Release

Inventory

and

Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act).
494.
See, e.g., James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The FederalNo Child Left Behind Act and
the Post-DesegregationCivil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1703, 17o8-20 (2003).
495.

See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen,

Information-Forcing Regulation and Environmental

Governance, in LAW AND NEw GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 293, 301-05 (Grainne de

Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2007); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights:
How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV.

496.

o15, 1o67 (2004).

See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 486, at 704-o6.
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practices that invite heuristic biases and discourage use of non-exclusionary
non-matches.
First, with the recent exception of DNA and a few other categories of
forensic evidence,497 the idea of systematically regulating the collection,
documentation, analysis, data-mining for random-match frequencies, and
presentation of clues to criminal identity is new. There is no inventory of
preferred strategies or consensus on how to measure success.49s For
example, criminal investigators know they can increase the chance of
uncovering potentially identifying traces by superimposing a fine-mesh grid
on relevant surfaces and minutely examining and photographing each cell,
but standards for when to use the technique and how well it was deployed
are not widely used.499 Additionally, given the speed with which adversarial
imperatives have spurred the creation and improvement of technologies for
forensically analyzing DNA and other traces, mining burgeoning data
repositories for random-match frequencies, and using "frequentist" and
graphical representations and calculation tools to demystify Bayesian
analysis,5oo it is too soon to mandate particular technologies or performance
levels. Instead, state and local customization of solutions to distinct
conditions provides a more promising invitation for innovation.
2.

Regulation of "Big" Evidence of Identity

As Michael Dorf and Katherine Kruse have separately shown,
management-based regulation of criminal justice activities traces back to two
famed mid-196os Supreme Court decisions regulating the most common
and dangerously over-valued types of "big" evidence: custodial confessions
and eyewitness identifications.501 Although Miranda v. Arizona and United
States v. Wade are best remembered for procedures that go by their namesMiranda warnings about a suspect's right to counsel and to remain silent
during interrogation,5o2 and Wade hearings enforcing a right to counsel and
497. See, e.g., Rhonda M. Wheate & Allan Jamieson, A Tale of Two Approaches-The NAS
Report and the Law Commission Consultation Paper on Forensic Science, 7 INT'L COMMENT. ON
EVIDENCE, Art. 3 (2009) (comparing the United Kingdom's THE FORENSIC SCIENCE
REGULATOR, REVIEW OF THE OPTIONS FOR THE ACCREDITATION OF FORENSIC PRACTITIONERS

with NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 96); sources cited supra note 133.
498. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 96, at 14-i9 (proposing that an
independent federal entity be established to promote the development of forensic sciences);
Mnookin et al., supra note 96, 27-32; cf Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken System: The Persistent
Patternsof Reversals of Death Sentences in the United States, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209 (2004)
(using judicial reversal rates to estimate the accuracy of capital verdicts).
499. See Daniel 0. Larson et al., Advanced Scientific Methods and Procedures in the Forensic
Investigation of Clandestine Graves, 27 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 149, 173-75 (2011) (describing
grid and excavation methods forensics teams can use to avoid compromising crime scenes).
(2009),

See supra Parts IV.B-C, VI.A.
Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT.
REV. 61, 81-82; Kruse, supra note 36, at 648 & na 1, 670-73.
502.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
5oo.
501.
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protection against suggestive lineups5o---neither case actually mandated that
procedure.5o4 Rather, the Court tried to use a threat to overturn convictions
if the procedure was not implemented as a "penalty default" to induce
jurisdictions to adopt alternative solutions that were equally or more
protective and better suited to local conditions. Jurisdictions that adopted
alternative measures could avoid the constitutional default rule.505 As Kruse

shows, the Court issued these invitations as much out of a desire for stronger
protections than were possible on a one-size-fits-all basis as out of a hope of
easing burdens on law enforcement and courts.506
The problem with the Mirandaand Wade default rules is that they were
neither onerous enough to encourage local officials to "bargain around"
them by adopting more tailored and efficient rules nor protective enough to
impose much of a constraint on unreliably coercive interrogations and
suggestive eyewitness identifications.5o7 Indeed, when conservative advocates
made an all-out assault on Miranda in Dickerson v. United States, lawenforcement amici curiae were its staunchest defenders, helping convince
the Court to leave Miranda's default requirement in force.5oS Recently,
however, DNA exonerations of defendants convicted based on false
confessions and inaccurate eyewitness identifications have prompted a

number of states to begin regulating interrogations and lineups. Much of
the regulation has been technology-based, requiring videotaped confessions
and sequential double-blind lineups,5o9 but Wisconsin and Texas have
adopted more comprehensive and flexible management-based solutions.5' °

503. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-38 (1967).
504. Kruse, supra note 36, at 670-73.
505. Wade, 388 U.S. at 239 (inviting "[liegislative or other regulations, such as those of
local police departments, which eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional suggestion at
lineup proceedings," which, if adopted, would "remove the basis for regarding the stage as
'critical,'" obviating the requirement of counsel); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490 ("Congress and the
States are free to develop their own safeguards for the privilege [against self-incrimination and
apply them in lieu of the procedure the court imposed], so long as they are fully as effective as
those described above ....
").
506. Kruse, supra note 36, at 671 (arguing that Mirandaand Wade encouraged "legislatures
and law enforcement agencies to take their own steps to improve police investigatory practices"
because the Justices knew the prophylactic measures they proposed were "a pale substitute for
improving the police procedures themselves"). The Miranda Court explained that it was
"impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the privilege which might
be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of their creative rule-making capacities." Id.
at 672 (quoting Miranda,384 U.S. at 467) (internal quotation marks omitted).
507. See, e.g.,
Paul G. Cassell, Miranda s Social Costs: An EmpiricalReassessment, 90 Nw. U. L.
REV. 387, 477-78, 486-97 (1996); Kruse, supra note 36, at 666-72 (discussing other case law).
5o8. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438, 444 (2000).
509. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 29 3 3 .83 (B)(1) (West Supp. 2012) (requiring most
live and photo lineups to be conducted by officials unaware of which participants are suspects).
For a survey of the law regarding electronic recording of custodial interrogations, see generally
Gershel, supra note 41. See also Gudjonsson, supra note io6, at 707 (discussing advantages to
recording police interrogations); Robert J. Norris et al., "Than That One Innocent Suffer":
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court's 2005 decision in State v. Dubose
triggered that state's new approach by interpreting the state constitution to
impose stricter admissibility standards for eyewitness identifications than the
federal constitutional rule.5,, Under the federal rule, identifications based
on suggestive procedures are admissible if there are other indicia of
"reliability," such as a witness's certainty at the time of the lineup-a factor,
ironically, that studies actually correlate with identification error.5,1 Under
the Wisconsin rule, all identifications produced by "unnecessarily suggestive"
procedures are inadmissible.5's
To help local law enforcement agencies cope with Dubose's narrow and
unpredictable admissibility standard, the Wisconsin Legislature passed a
statute requiring each agency to devise a written policy "to reduce the
potential for erroneous identifications."5,4 The statute instructs law
enforcement agencies (i) to base their initial plans on "model policies" and
effective strategies from "other jurisdictions"; (2) to consider including
practices shown by research to enhance "objectivity and reliability"; and
(3) to revise their plans every two years based on evolving local and statewide
experience.515 For guidance, the Wisconsin Department of Justice has
promulgated and periodically updates a Model Policy and Procedure for
Eyewitness Identification, citing studies supporting each component.5, 6 As
EvaluatingState Safeguards Against Wrongful Convictions, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1301, 13o4 (2010-20 11)

(claiming that more than 6oo local and county jurisdictions record police interrogations but
only ig states require recording); Andrew D. Rikard, Comment, Why and How New York Should
Enact Mandatory Statewide Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1525, 1533-43
(201 1) (proposing reforms to New York's eyewitness-identification procedures); Suzanne
Smalley, Police UpdateEvidence Gathering:Suspect IdentificationIs Focus of Changes, BOS. GLOBE (July
20, 2004), http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/-glwells/boston-globe-july-2004.pdf
(listing

jurisdictions requiring double-blind lineups); sources cited supra notes 39-41.
51o. H.B. 215, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess., 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 792 (signed by Gov. Rick Perry,
June 17, 2011 ) (requiring law enforcement agencies to adopt standards and procedures for live
and photographic lineups designed by the Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas or
to implement their own equally or more protective policy); see also infra notes 514-22 and
accompanying text (discussing Wisconsin statutory scheme).
511.

State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126,

39-41, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582.

512.
See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 720 (2012); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432
U.S. 98, 1o6, 114 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972). But see Kruse, supra note

36, at 669-70 (criticizing the "reliability" escape hatch for using factors that academic research
has associated with inaccuracy as a basis for admitting suggestive identifications).
513.
Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 919130-33.
514.

Wis. STAT. § 175.50(2) (West 2oo6).

Id. § 175.50(2)-(5)
sequential procedures).
515.

(inviting but not requiring agencies to adopt double-blind and

516.
See, e.g., BUREAU OF TRAINING AND STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, WIS. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, MODEL POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (2oLO), available at
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/eyewitnesspublic.pdf ("[E]yewitness evidence is much like
trace evidence left at a crime scene. . . . [lit is susceptible to contamination if not handled

properly" (citing Wells & Olson, supra note 36, at 286-89)); Kruse, supra note 36, at 648 n.o,
687-88. The Wisconsin Model Policy urges investigators to avoid "fishing expeditions" by
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Kruse points out, the Wisconsin reforms use Dubose's novel standard and
exclusionary rule as a penalty default to encourage law-enforcement
agencies to create safe harbors by adhering to locally devised plans that are
continuously benchmarked against a state model, the best available
research, and proven practices from elsewhere in the state and nation.5,7
Wisconsin took a similar path in regulating confessions. Reacting to the
disturbing tactics Milwaukee police used to induce a fourteen-year-old to
confess, the Wisconsin high court found a constitutional violation under the
federal "involuntariness" standard, then ruled that, henceforth, juvenile
confessions would be inadmissible under state law unless they were
videotaped or taping was shown to have been infeasible.5, 8 Expecting the
court to extend similarly inflexible, technology-based regulation to adult
confessions, the Wisconsin Legislature codified the rule requiring taping of
custodial confessions by juveniles and adopted a new "policy" encouraging
videotaping of adult confessions by requiring courts to instruct jurors to
"consider the absence of

.

.

. recording" when evaluating

custodial

statements.5'9 The latter procedure puts police agencies to a managementbased choice: either videotape interrogations or adopt alternative
procedures that jurors believe are equally productive of reliable confessions.
Wisconsin's legislation governing identifications and confessions aims
to motivate law-enforcement agencies to disclose information about their
practices, which the Wisconsin Department of Justice can compare and
share with other agencies statewide.520 As Kruse notes, such regimes face a
tension between goals of transparency (allowing inter-jurisdictional
comparison and sharing) and accountability (creating disincentives to
collect and publicize information that may be used against the agency in
court).52' Wisconsin's solution to this tension, which is characteristic of
management-based strategies, is a penalty default: an effective but onerous
and inflexible procedural burden that induces agencies to devise alternative
strategies and disclose their results in an effort to avoid the default rule.522
delaying lineups until alibis and competing leads are investigated and forensic testing is
complete. WIS. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra at 7.
517.

Kruse, supra note 36, at 685, 689-o.

518.

State v.Jerrell CJ. (In rejerrell CJ.),

2005

WI 1o5, 159, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d

110.

519. See WIS. STAT. § 9 3 8.31(3)(b)-(c) (codifying Jerrell rule); id. §968.073(2)
(establishing "policy" in felony cases of "audio or audio and visual recording of a custodial
interrogation"); id. § 972.1 1 5 (2)(a) (specifying jury instruction when unrecorded custodial
statements are admitted); Kruse, supra note 36, at 69o-93.
520. See Kruse, supra note 36, at 727-28 ("This new body of information provides rich
opportunities for Wisconsin to pursue ... continuous improvement, public accountability, and
cross-jurisdictional learning.").
521.
Seeid. at 728, 731.
522.
See, e.g., JOSEPH V. REES, HOSTAGES OF EACH OTHER: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
NUcLEAR SAFETY SINCE THREE MILE ISLAND 91-120 (1994) (describing the effects of disclosures

among CEOs of nuclear-power companies, even absent public disclosures); Sabel et al., supra
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3.

Regulation of "Small" Non-Matches

Analogous management-based strategies can induce criminal process
actors to use "small," non-exclusionary non-match evidence to improve the
accuracy of identity determinations, including planning mandates, statewide
benchmarks, and publication of comparative error rates at each stage of the
investigative and trial process. For example, agencies could be given the
choice of either adopting other localities' best practices or justifying their
own actions to juries. This could be accomplished by allowing the defense to
admit evidence of practices that comparable law-enforcement agencies
elsewhere in the state use to process evidence of non-exclusionary nonmatches and by instructing juries to consider an agency's failure to use
effective practices when they evaluate the strength of the evidence.523
Numerous improvements are available to motivated agencies:
" Comprehensive videotaping of crime scenes with technology for
acute magnification and other aids for after-the-fact review,
preservation of evidence, and monitoring of investigative rigor;524
" Institutional structures or procedures to isolate pretrial investigative,
forensic-analysis, and accusatory functions from each other and
temper "uniqueness," "irrelevance," and other heuristic mistakes
2
triggered by the early identification of scenarios and suspects;5 5

* Devil's-advocate mechanisms prompting police before turning cases
over to prosecutors, and prosecutors before pressing charges, to
inventory alternative scenarios about who committed the crime and
innocent explanations for evidence that does and does not match
6
suspects;52

note 493 (describing the regulatory power of public disclosure of comparative toxic-release
data).
523.
See supra notes 514-22 and accompanying text.
524 . See, e.g., EDWARD M. ROBINSON, CRIME SCENE PHOTOGRAPHY 582 (2007) (describing
the value of photography for crime-scene preservation); Dan Warnock, The Iraqi CriminalJustice
System, an Introduction, 39 DENV.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 22 (2010) (listing practices the U.S. urged
Iraqi investigators to adopt to document crime scenes with photographs, diagrams, and tape
recordings); Dick Warrington, Crime Scene Photography:Capturingthe Scene, FORENSIC MAG., Aug.-

Sept. 2oo9, at 39 (similar).
525. See, e.g., Findley & Scott, supra note 23o, at 393-94 (discussing the value of separating
investigative and charging functions to avoid heuristic bias); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 96, at 24 (recommending that crime laboratories be removed "from the administrative
control of law enforcement agencies").
526.

See, e.g., i

MOLLY TREADwAY JOHNSON

& LAURAL HOOPER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,

RESOURCE GUIDE FOR MANAGING CAPITAL CASES: FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY TRIALS so- 11 (2004)

(describing a multi-tiered process for approving federal death-penalty prosecutions); NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 321, at 84-87 (recommending similar steps to improve
intelligence analysis).
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" Training and expert assistance for police, forensic analysts,
prosecutors, and public defenders in graphics- and calculator-aided
use of Bayesian analysis of the conjoint inculpatory and exculpatory
power of evidence for which frequency information is available, and
in estimating and comparing the effect of different prior odds;57

* Training for the same actors in data-mining techniques for
generating frequency information about potentially matching and
8
non-matching clues;52
" Open-files discovery of all non-exculpatory non-matches and-9
enforcement of ABA Model Rule 3 .8 (d), which most states follow but
do not apply to prosecutors, obliging state disclosure of all
exculpatory evidence;53o
" Admissibility at trial, unless prejudice substantially outweighs
probative value, of evidence of sins of commission and omission in
the state's capture, documentation, forensic analysis, and
presentation of trace evidence and witness information that could
identify the perpetrator, and instructions allowing juries to treat
either failing by the state as sufficient to establish a reasonable doubt
as to guilt;53'
"

Admissibility, subject to the same restriction listed above, of evidence
that an alternative suspect committed the crime, including nonexclusionary non-matches as to the defendant that match the
alternative suspect, and jury instructions to consider alternative
scenarios and hypotheses that evidence suggests;532

527.
See supra Part VIA; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 321, at 84-87
(recommending similar steps to improve intelligence analysis).
528. See supra notes 198-2oo and accompanying text.
529. See, e.g.,
Avis E. Buchanan, Op-Ed., FairerTrials and BetterJustice in D.C., WASH. POST
(Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fairer-trials-and-better-justice-indc/2011/1o/2 5 /gIQATkFMQM-story.html (advocating the open-files discovery already in use
in several jurisdictions).
530. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454, at 1, 4-5
(2009) (interpreting Rule. 3 .8(d) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, requiring "timely
disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to
negate the guilt of the accused" as broader than the Brady rule because it applies irrespective of
"the anticipated impact of the evidence" on trial outcomes (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3 .8(d) (2009)); Kevin C. McMunigal, The (Lack oJ)Enforcement of Prosecutor
Disclosure Rules, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 847, 850-55, 86o-64 (2010) (discussing states' failure to
enforce ABA Opinion 09-454); see also Attorney General's Guidelines on Disclosure, CROWN

PROSECUTION

SERV.,

http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/ato-c/attorney-generals-guidelines-on_

disclosure/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2012) (noting that fairness requires disclosure of "all material
held by the prosecution that weakens its case or strengthens that of the defence").
531.

See supra Part V.C.2.

532.

See supra Part V.C. 4 .

20131

THE EVIDENCE OF THINGS NOT SEEN

* Admissibility at trial of expert testimony facilitating the
understanding and use of Bayesian analysis and recently developed
calculator tools for implementing Bayesian analysis;ss3 and
* Broad admissibility of data-mined random-match frequencies, subject
to rigorous adversarial testing.534
The goal here is not to privilege any particular step and instead to show
the wealth of planning regimes, penalty defaults, monitoring mechanisms,
enforcement techniques, and other strategies that courts, legislatures, and
agencies can adopt to improve the use of non-exclusionary non-matches and
other small evidence to boost the accuracy of criminal identity
determinations. If there is a will, there are many ways.
VII. CONCLUSION

Inattentiveness to small flecks of non-matching evidence is no less
implicated in the miscarriages of justice recent DNA exonerations have
exposed than is excessive attention to the fool's gold of suggestive eyewitness
identifications, pressured confessions, and misinterpreted forensic evidence.
Indeed, the two problems are opposite sides of the same trick coin.
Together, they dupe intuitive decision makers via "uniqueness" and
"irrelevance" manifestations of the "certainty" fallacy and other heuristic
mistakes into (1) falsely treating eyewitness identifications, confessions,
fingerprints, and other "big" evidence as matching a unique trait of the
perpetrator and the defendant; and (2) treating "small" evidence of nonmatching traces as so easily explained away that they are irrelevant. In fact,
all identity evidence-eyewitness testimony and confessions, no less than
fingerprints and DNA, and all manner of so-called "circumstantial"
minutia-acquires its strength through the aggregation of individually
unimpressive probabilities associated with matches or non-matches between
clues and suspects.
Motivating investigators, forensic analysts, prosecutors, defense lawyers,
judges, and jurors to give appropriately disciplined attention to aggregations
of the many small probabilities that should guide decisions on the way from
crime to punishment is difficult but not impossible, individually or
institutionally. What it takes is a little patience; a panoply of old-fashioned
adversarial methods of bringing to mind competing uniqueness- and
irrelevance-disproving stories; and a multitude of new-fangled methods for
mining ubiquitous data for frequency information, making Bayesian analysis
accessible to all audiences, and inducing institutions ever-more-effectively to
manage risk. Because all of these aids are now at hand, we have all the tools

533.
534.

See supra Part V.C. 5 .
See supra notes 142-66 and accompanying text.
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we need to fashion minute probabilistic flecks into treasurably reliable
criminal verdicts.

